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PREFACE
The international trend in standard setting requires consolidation of all entities 
where the 'group' controls the operating and financing decisions. The question now 
facing the business community is "how do we identify the members of the extended 
'group' for inclusion in the accounting entity". Identifying 'group' membership and the 
correct application of the three accounting treatments for investments - consolidation if 
controlled, equity method if significant influence, and lower of cost or market otherwise - 
is predicated on a clear delineation of the attributes of dominant control. Thus the 
research question for this thesis is:
What combination of attributes gives one entity "control" 
over the decision making of another entity?
Control is modelled as a continuous concept (C;) which accountants arbitrarily 
trichotomise for reporting purposes. The upper cut-off, 9C, partitions dominant control 
situations from significant and insignificant influence relationships. Practitioners must 
assess the probability that the group exercises dominant control over another entity. For 
the /th control judgement this probability is modelled as a linear function of multiple 
control attributes (ie. XjjJ = 0, 1,2, ...,«).
A review of the literature in accounting, law, finance, economic, and management 
suggests four key attributes determine the level of dominant control: (1) the total 
ownership level; (2) the level of direct versus indirect ownership; (3) the dispersion of 
non-owned equity; and (4) the level of representation on the Board of Directors.
This research employs a conjoint methodology to empirically estimate the implicit 
weights subjects, consisting of businessmen, accountants, and financial analysts, place on
v
these four control attributes. The quasi-experimental design presents subjects with pre­
planned scenarios that differ in the orthogonal combinations of ownership, directness of 
ownership, dispersion, and board membership attribute levels. Subjects judge the degree 
of control that they feel each situation depicts. Through conjoint analytic techniques 
these judgements are disaggregated to reveal the relative attribute weights for each 
individual, and for the respondent group as a whole.
The results indicate that ownership and board membership are perceived to be the 
most important attributes in dominant control relations. The implicit weights for indirect 
ownership links and dispersely held non-owned equity, suggests these attributes mitigate 
the level of dominant control achieved through ownership and board membership. The 
model is found to exhibit predictive ability within the estimation sample and for a set of 
holdout observations. The simple linear model performs at least as well as more complex 
ideal point, quadratic, and two-way interaction specifications. The estimation procedures 
are also robust to potential violations of their theoretical properties. Finally, the cross- 
cultural instability of the estimated model parameters is found to be driven by the 
clustering of opinions within the two cultures in the sample (ie. US and Australia).
The research provides a model^ based on consensus professional judgement, that 
predicts whether one entity controls another. This model can be used by auditors, 
corporate accountants and regulators to assess control relationships. Further, researchers 
can use the model to test reporting problems that relate to the level of control. Finally 
the study represents an exposition on the conjoint methodology as a research tool for 
investigating multi-attribute decision making in accounting and auditing.
vi
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CHAPTER ONE : 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. GENERAL PROBLEM
The 'firm' evolved because it is the most efficient mechanism for business 
transactions (Coase, 1937). The nature of the firm has not, however, remained 
constant. Merger activity in the US at the turn of this century lead to the development 
of groups, consisting of a holding company and its majority owned subsidiary companies 
(Baker, Lembke and King, 1989; Parker, 1977; Ma, Parker and Whittred, 1991). This 
structural complexity induced advances in the reporting technology in the form of group 
consolidated statements (Hawkins, 1968; Kitchen, 1972; Edwards and Webb, 1984).
Contemporary group structures include ownership and other inter-entity interests 
in many related entities. Such complex inter-entity structures cloud the control issue 
and allows the non-consolidation of some controlled members of the extended group 
(Walker, Wilkins and Zimmer, 1982; Ma, Parker and Whittred, 1991; Mian and Smith, 
1990a, 1990b). The question is therefore not one of "should we consolidate the 
financial statements for the group?", as the demand for these is well established (eg. 
Whittred, 1986, 1987). The question now facing the business community is "how do we 
identify the members of the extended 'group' for inclusion in the accounting entity".
1.2. SPECIFIC PROBLEM
1.2.1. Defining the Extended Entity
The traditional definition of a group reflects historical and legal biases. At the 
turn of the century, the ownership link between the parent and subsidiary formed the
1 BOND UNIVERSITY 
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2basic criterion for determining membership of the group. Focussing on ownership links 
can lead to misreporting. This is possible where there is either decision making control 
and minority ownership (ie. de facto control), or majority ownership (ie. de jure control) 
in the absence of decision making control (Shaw, 1976). De facto control exists where 
one entity has the capacity to control the operating and financial management policies of 
another entity, irrespective of whether there is a majority ownership interest. In 
contrast, de jure control is the right of one entity to participate in asset distributions of 
another through ownership, which may or may not confer decision making control.
The normative literature debates whether de jure or de facto control should be the 
criteria for defining the broader accounting entity (Lee et al, 1976; Walker, 1970, 1976, 
1978; Shaw, 1976; Leo, 1987). In practice regulatory bodies place varying degrees of 
emphasis on both the de facto and de jure control criteria to determine economic entity 
membership. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of the regulatory definitions of 
"associated" and "controlled" entities used in the US, Canada, EEC, France, Germany, 
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, and the IAS standard. It 
also summarises the "exceptions" to the various consolidation criteria.
The nations canvassed in Table 1.1 almost uniformly define "associated" entities to 
be those that another entity has "significant influence" over either, or both, the operating 
and financial policies. Those regulations prescribing this de facto test for associated 
companies presume that ownership of 20 to 50 per cent of the capital signifies a 
"significant influence" relationship. Japan is the only nation surveyed that explicitly uses 
the discrete de jure test of 20-50 per cent ownership to define "associated" companies.
In contrast to the definitions of associated entities, the jurisdictions surveyed in 
Table 1.1 apply a diverse range of criteria to define "controlled" entities. Several 
countries use one or more criteria such as majority ownership, board membership, or 
vote control, to define controlled entities. Further, the comparison in Table 1.1 
indicates little consensus on the grounds for non-consolidation of an investee.
3Table 1.1: Survey of Extended Entity Definitions
Regulatory COUNTRIES WHERE DEFINITION APPLIED
Definitions USA Can EEC Fran Germ UK Aust NZ HK S'pore Japan IAS
"Associated" Entities
Significant Influence on Decisions Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 111
Own from 20% to 50% of Shares
"Controlled" Entities
Own > 50% Shares/Stock Y Y Y Y Y Y1 Y Y Y
Majority Board Membership Y Y Y Y Y1 Y Y
Control > 50% of Votes Y Y Y Y1 Y Y Y
Joint Management Arrangement Y Y Y Y
Capacity to Dominate, Dominant
Influence Over, or Power to Govern, liiii Y Y Y2 iiii
the Operating and Financial Policies
Exceptions to Consolidation
Not Material/Expense/Delay Y Y Y Y1 Y Y
Control Temporary (eg. for resale) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dissimilar Activities Y Y Y Y Y Y1 Y
Impaired/Others Control (eg. bankrupt) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
ALL Controlled Entities Consolidated Y Y2
Requirements for majority owned subsidiaries (New Zealand Companies Act)
Requirements for "in-substance subsidiaries" which are controlled entities other than subsidiaries (see Note 1)
COUNTRY
USA
Canada
EEC
France
Germany
UK
Australia
New Zealand 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Japan
IAS
APPLICABLE STANDARDS/LAW
FASB, SFAS 94 "Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries", ARB 51 "Consolidated Financial Statements", APB 18 
"The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock".
CICA Handbook S1580 "Business Combinations, S 3050 "Long-Term Investments".
Seventh Company Law Directive
Business Code (Code de Commerce), Law (Articles L 357-1 to 357-10), Decree (Articles 248-12-11 and 248-12-12).
German Commercial Code, para 313
Companies Act 1985 (amended), ICAEW, SSAP 14 "Group Accounts" and the "Interim Statement: Consolidated Accounts", 
SSAP 1 "Accounting for Associated Companies".
Corporations Law 1991, ICA and ASCPA AASB 1024 "Consolidated Financial Accounts", AASB 1016 "Disclosure of 
Information about Investments in Associated Companies".
NZSA SSAP 8 "Accounting for Business Combinations". (Note: Y2 = regulation proposed in Companies Amendment Bill). 
Companies Ordinance, HKSA SSAP 7 "Group Accounts", SSAP 10 "Accounting for Associated Companies".
ICPAS, SAS 3 "Consolidated Financial Statements", SAS 22 "Accounting for Business Combinations".
Commercial Code (Shoho), Ministry of Finance Ordinance "Regulations Covering Consolidated Financial Statements", Business 
Accounting Deliberation Council "Financial Accounting Standards on Consolidated Financial Statements".
IAS 27 "Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries", IAS 28 "Accounting for 
Investments in Associates".
4Table 1.1 captures the expansion in the definition of control from the simple de 
jure test of majority ownership (ie. in IAS 3) to a broadly constituted extended 
economic entity (ie. in the replacement standard IAS 27).1 The EEC Seventh Directive 
and the recent regulatory changes (and pending changes) in the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand reflect this expanded definition of control (see Table 1.1 and Appendix A).2 
Terminology differences aside, the IAS, UK, EEC, New Zealand and Australian 
provisions adopt a similar broad definition of control. In each case control is presumed 
to exist where the parent owns more than 50 per cent of the voting power - the previous 
de jure test. Control can exist with less than majority ownership if the parent also has 
the "capacity to dominate" (Australia and New Zealand), "dominant influence over" 
(UK, EEC) or "power to govern" (IAS), the operating and financing policies of the 
related entity.
The problem now is how to operationalise the concepts of "capacity to dominate", 
"dominant influence", and "power to govern". The following commentary of Australia's 
standard illustrates the problem that confronts practitioners:
Whether an entity has control over another entity will always be a 
question to be decided in the light of the prevailing circumstances. The 
definition of control depends upon substance rather than form and, 
accordingly, determination of the existence of control will involve the 
preparer of the financial reports in exercising professional skill and 
judgement. [(AASB 1024, para xv)3, Emphasis added]
This commentary leaves open the question of which attributes give 'substance' to a 
control relationship. The survey in Table 1.1 indicates that majority ownership and
1 See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the cross cultural differences evident in Table 1.1.
2 Although Table 1.1 shows that most nations allow exclusions from consolidation for reasons 
such as materiality, cost, dissimilar activities, or where control is temporary or impaired. Notably 
Australia does not allow any exclusions from consolidation.
3 New Zealand's SSAP 8 (para 4.8) contains virtually identical wording to this commentary.
5board representation are important attributes of a control situation. Other attributes, not 
listed in Table 1.1, may also impact on the degree of control. The attributes determining 
control, and their relative weights, are empirical questions explored by this thesis.
1.2.2. Accounting Technology and the Concept of Control
The concept of control lies on a continuum that extends from no control to 
absolute control. Accountants, however, trichotomise this underlying continuum so as 
to employ one of three accounting technologies to account for investments in other 
entities - lower of cost and market value, equity method, or consolidation. 
Implementing these technologies necessitates a definition of the boundaries between the 
different 'levels' of control (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Trichotomous Accounting Technology 
and the Control Continuum
De Jure "Discrete " Cut-offs
(Legal ownership rights)
20% 50%
No Lower Cost \! Equity \f Consolidation Absolute
Control or Market <- -> Accounting ’-> Accounting
Control
Significant Control
Influence
De Facto "Fuzzy " Cut-offs 
(Substance over form)
Figure 1.1 depicts both the historical "discrete" percentage tests and more recent 
"fuzzy" conceptual tests. The question accounting practitioners face is how to 
operationalise these de facto "fuzzy" cut-offs. This is a particularly weighty question as 
misclassifying an investment can have significant economic consequences to financial
statement users.
6Consider the effect of incorrectly recording at cost (or market value if lower) an 
associate company investment that should be equity accounted. Income is understated 
relative to the equity accounted income (provided the associate made a profit), and asset 
values as well as debt capacity are understated (Baker et al, 1989, p. 74). Conversely, 
equity accounting an investment, more appropriately reported at the lower of cost or 
market, overstates income, asset values, and debt capacity (provided the dividend 
payout rate is less than 100 per cent). The research evidence on the 'incremental' 
information content of equity accounting disclosures over cost only information 
suggests that under (over) statement of income and assets is likely to result in lower 
(higher) equity values in the market (Barrett, 1971; Harrison, 1977; Ricks and Hughes, 
1985). Misstating income and assets will also affect the borrowing potential of firms 
due to loan officers' functional fixation on the reported numbers. Wilkins and Zimmer 
(1985) found that loan officers do not adjust for accounting method (cost or equity) and 
hence the judgements formed were different.4
These valuation and loan effects represent real economic consequences for the 
accountant's method choice. The paramount concern is to define a cost-equity cut-off 
which lowers the probability of misreporting insignificant influence investments, thereby 
avoiding such distortions in user decisions. The size of any user decision impact of 
misclassifying an investment above the cost-equity cut-off depends on the level of 
investment. As most firms (in the US at least) mechanically apply the 20 per cent 
discrete cut-off to define the lower bound for significant influence (Comiskey and 
Mulford, 1986), the valuation and loan decision effects of misclassifying at the cost- 
equity boundary are likely to be small. Especially when contrasted with the user 
decision effects of misclassifying investments at the equity-consolidation boundary.
4 Duncan and McNamara (1991) find a similar functional fixation with respect to different 
consolidation methods.
I
7The equity-consolidation boundary is arguably economically more significant than 
the cost-equity boundary due to the size of the income and asset shares. Consider the 
situation where a controlled investment is equity accounted instead of consolidated. 
The income effect is negligible because goodwill and other adjustments are on a 
proportional basis for equity accounting, with no outside equity interest recognised. 
The assets and equity are overstated, which can mislead users to overestimate the debt 
capacity of the entity (Baker et al, 1989, p. 75).5 Hence equity accounting of controlled 
entities is potentially very misleading to users. Alternatively, if an associate entity is 
consolidated as if it were controlled, then the reported incomes are similar, but the 
balance sheet will misstate the debt capacity. The exact effect on reported debt capacity 
depends on the structure of the balance sheet for the associate, as there is an averaging 
effect of adding an investment's assets and liabilities to the parent's.
There is little direct evidence as to the user decision effects of misclassifying 
investments at the equity-consolidation boundary. The research on the relative 
usefulness of different syntax (presentations), however, provides some insights as to the 
likely effects. Consolidated accounts do make a difference to users making loan 
decisions where there are cross-guarantees or the group is 'risky' (eg. Walker, Wilkins, 
and Zimmer, 1982; Wilkins, 1988). Consolidated accounts by themselves are likely to 
create an upward bias in market risk assessments (Beranek and Clayton, 1985) making 
parent company reports necessary (Pendlebury, 1980; Francis, 1986). Hence as 
consolidated information impacts on user decisions, over or under statement in the
Highly geared associate companies (ie. 99 per cent debt financed) exacerbate this 
overstatement problem. The collapse of Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and related entities 
(hereafter Adsteam) provides a case example of this problem (for an overview of the Adsteam case see 
Gottliebson (1991), and see Shvets (1990) for detailed informadon on valuation). In December 1991 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) required Adsteam to produce accounts consolidadng all the 
major associates that the ASX considered Adsteam controlled. Adsteam's June 1991 consolidated 
accounts with equity notes evidenced leverage levels that were substantially lower than the December 
1991 ex-post consolidated accounts. The latter consolidated for the first time controlled entities that 
were previously equity accounted.
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8accounts caused by misclassifying an investment will have a significant effect on decision 
making.
Not consolidating all controlled entities compounds these user decision effects. 
Managers can choose not to consolidate some entities, either by virtue of regulated 
exclusions (see Table 1.1), or through expedient interpretation of the control 
relationship. The non-consolidation option has a similar financial statement impact to 
equity accounting controlled entities. Numerous studies have shown that non­
consolidation masks the true debt levels of the group, thus lowering reported leverage, 
and increasing return on assets and interest coverage ratios (eg. Francis, 1986; Livnat 
and Sondhi, 1986; Copeland and McKinnon, 1987; Mohr, 1988; Heian and Thies, 
1989).6
It is not clear, however, that non-consolidation distorts risk assessments by users 
interested in equity investment and credit granting decisions. Evidence suggests the 
market performs a pro-forma consolidation of non-consolidated majority owned finance 
subsidiaries (Comiskey, McEwen and Mulford, 1987) and lenders contract to reflect the 
substance of the entity (Rosman, 1992). It is not costless to adjust for non­
consolidation and in any event a non-zero level of distortion is likely to remain 
(Comiskey, McEwen and Mulford, 1987; Rosman, 1992).7
1.2.3. Research Problem
In summary, not only is the equity-consolidation boundary in Figure 1.1 far from 
uniform (see Table 1.1), misclassifying investments at this boundary has a significant 
economic impact on user decisions. Despite this economic significance, the boundary
6 Nevertheless, non-consolidation of finance subsidiaries is not associated with the use of other 
forms of off-balance sheet financing (ie. operating leases and unfunded pension benefits) which also 
distort the financial statements (Mian and Smith, 1990a).
7 Further the Adsteam case suggests that the market does not always see through the reported 
numbers and adjust the consolidated accounts to reflect the true control position.
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9between equity accounting and consolidation in Figure 1.1 (ie. the concept of control) 
remains ill defined. Thus it is this second boundary that is the focus of this thesis and 
not the less controversial, and economically less significant, cost-equity boundary. The 
specific research question this thesis investigates is:
What combination of attributes gives one entity "control" 
over the decision making of another entity?
1.3. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
The Australian, New Zealand, UK, and IAS accounting standards outline the 
attributes that may indicate a broadly defined control relationship. The standards do 
not, however, indicate the relative importance of the control attributes, nor do they 
indicate how the attributes might combine to constitute a control relationship. Whether 
one entity has the capacity to control another for accounting purposes requires an 
evaluation of the level and trade-off between the attributes that may lead to control. 
Such an assessment is clearly a matter of professional judgement. Consequently, 
deriving and testing a theoretical model of the attributes that give the capacity to control 
involves an analysis of professional judgements. The judgements of user "experts" will 
indicate the weighting of different control attributes and the trade-offs users make 
between the attributes that affect control relationships.
This research employs a quasi-experimental design that presents subjects with 
scenarios that differ in the level of different attributes that may affect control. For 
example, different levels of ownership and board membership are presented in pre­
planned combinations in an experiment instrument. The subjects judge the degree of 
control that they feel each situation depicts. Using conjoint analysis, these opinions are
I
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disaggregated to reveal the relative weights for each attribute at the individual and 
aggregate levels.
There is no theoretical reason to expect the attributes that determine a control 
relationship to differ internationally, other than to reflect historical regulatory biases. 
Major international differences would prove problematic to the efforts to harmonise 
accounting standards by the member countries of the International Accounting 
Committee. The stability of the concept of control across users, and nations, are 
empirical issues on which this research sheds some light by comparing the opinions of 
professional judges in the US and Australia.
The output of the analysis is a model based on consensus professional judgement 
that predicts whether one entity controls another. This model can be used by directors, 
auditors, corporate accountants and regulators to assess control relationships. Further, 
researchers will be able to use the theory and empirical model to test reporting problems 
that relate to the level of control.
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION
The major objective of this research is to develop and empirically test a predictive 
model of the inter-entity attributes which combine to determine the degree of control 
between entities. In doing so, the research will contribute in the four areas of 
accounting practice, regulation, teaching, and research.
First, accounting and auditing practitioners, who have to apply the concept of 
"control", will benefit from a formal model of control relationships. The model will 
assist accountants and auditors to assess the extent of control in inter-entity 
relationships and to choose consolidation when the consensus is that it is appropriate. 
The results from the model could form the base for the practitioners' internal operating
M
1manuals and check lists for use with their clients. It may also be of use in convincing 
accounting and audit service clients to change their reporting practices.
A number of other professional applications of the model are possible. In the 
extreme, the research might be of use in supporting arguments in audit negligence and 
other litigation contexts. Although determining control is a matter of professional 
judgement, a predictive model provides compelling evidence that professional judgement 
might be in error. The attributes identified in the model could also form the basis of 
client advice on ways to achieve control without the costs of majority equity investment. 
Attributes of control, other than ownership, may produce much more cost effective 
devices for establishing and maintaining control of another entity. The model will help 
identify possible trade-offs in structuring inter-entity links. Conversely the model could 
be useful in identifying takeover defence strategies. Finally, the accounting firms' in- 
house education and training programs will also benefit from simplifying the control 
concept. The control model could serve as an analytical tool as well as a pedagogic 
device for auditors and accountants.
Second, this research evidence could benefit the regulation of corporate 
accounting which is in a state of flux internationally (Table 1.1 highlights the diversity of 
consolidation practice). Any moves to harmonise consolidation accounting around the 
globe will require evidence that a broadly defined concept of control can be 
operationalised and has a common international understanding. This research will shed 
light on both these issues. Regulators in individual countries will also find the research 
valuable in weighting the important control dimensions. New regulations, revisions to 
existing standards, and/or explanatory discussion notes can be based on research 
evidence rather than politically motivated debate.8
11
8 Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979, 1986, 1990) and Solomons (1978) highlight that 
accounting standard setting is a political process. Standard setting bodies, such as the Accounting 
Standards Research Board (ASRB) in Australia, can even get 'hijacked' by special interest groups (see 
Walker, 1987), or have their voting patterns altered through different rules (see discussion of the FASB 
in Shenoy, Shriver, and Smith, 1989). Watts and Zimmerman (1979) would even argue that the
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Australia is well on the way to revising its corporate reporting standards and 
regulations. Countries such as the US have other priorities at present and are yet to 
fully address their corporate accounting regulations. They will benefit from the lead 
taken in other countries as well as the research findings of this thesis. Besides the 
regulation of accounting, the model will assist regulatory bodies, such as stock 
exchanges and government securities commissions, with the monitoring of reporting 
practice and compliance with broadly defined consolidation standards.
Third, those teaching corporate accounting will have a clear delineation of the 
attributes that give rise to a control situation and a measure of the interaction and 
relative weight placed by users on those attributes. This will assist classroom discussion 
of the concept of control. For instance, educators could use the actual scenarios from 
the experiment's "control" instrument as a pedagogic device, with little or no adaptation. 
The scenarios would help focus students on the attributes they have to assess to 
determine whether or not a relationship constitutes a control situation. The "control" 
instrument could also be used as part of an undergraduate or post-graduate case study 
or empirical research project. Students could learn about the importance of 
consolidating all controlled entities by applying the control model to well-documented 
cases such as Adsteam.9
Finally, the project provides an example of the conjoint research techniques that 
could be applied to other issues of interest to accounting researchers. Conjoint type 
methods have seen very little use in accounting and auditing research10, and limited use
current research evidence in opportunistically motivated. The motivation for the production and use of 
this research evidence notwithstanding, the findings offer a contribution to the regulation of accounting.
9 See footnote 5 for discussion and reference for this case.
10 Krogstad, Ettenson and Shanteau, (1984) use conjoint type methodology (although they do not 
refer to it as such) to assess the effect of experience (3 levels) and auditing cues (8 levels of financial 
and non-financial information) on auditor materiality judgement. Analysis is by ANOVA and no 
'predictive' function is estimated. In this regard the study differs from contemporary conjoint 
applications.
in economics and finance (eg. Teas and Dellva, 1985; Zinkhan, 1990). Conjoint analysis 
developed in the fields of mathematical psychology and psychometrics from the 
pioneering work of Debreu (1960) and Luce and Tukey (1964). Conjoint analysis has 
been refined as a research technique in marketing to evaluate the relative importance to 
consumers (ie. consumer preference) of different products and product attributes (Green 
and Wind, 1973). In marketing the focal stimuli are the attributes of a product and how 
those attributes are valued by potential customers as having the right combination of 
attributes in the final product is crucial to getting customers to purchase the product (ie. 
Fire Red vs Racing Green on sports cars).11
Similarly in accounting and auditing we are concerned with relative importance of 
different attributes that an information set might contain. Our questions usually relate to 
whether one package of information (ie. a particular product) has more decision value to 
users than competing packages of information. This thesis will demonstrate how the 
conjoint analysis technique could be of use to other accounting and auditing researchers 
interested in assessing the relative value users or preparers place on the attributes of a 
particular accounting information set.
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1.5. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The organisation of the remaining chapters of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 
reviews the relevant literatures on the concept of control. The chapter canvasses both 
the professional and academic literatures in the fields of accounting, law, finance, 
economics, and management. There is a sparseness of academic literature on control as 
it relates to accounting entities. Nevertheless, the chapter distils from this literature 
review a theoretical model of the attributes that give one entity control over another
11 See for example, Green and Wind (1975), Green, Krieger and Carroll (1987), and Kohli 
(1988).
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entity. Research propositions are presented and the final section elucidates the 
limitations of the model.
Chapter 3 discusses the experimental design used to empirically estimate the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2. The discussion of the research design 
includes a consideration of issues relating to the design and pre-testing of the conjoint 
instrument on control. Integral to this discussion is a description of the conjoint analysis 
technique and a justification for its use in the current study. The theoretical propositions 
lead to a series of testable hypotheses. The testing of these hypotheses will provide 
some answers to the research question.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the data and presents tests for non-response 
bias and reliability. Individual and aggregate level conjoint models are estimated and 
evaluated vis-a-vis the hypothesized structure of the control model. Tests of predictive 
ability conclude the chapter.
Chapter 5 explores the sensitivity of the estimated empirical models to 
assumptions underlying the statistical methods and the assumed linear additive structure. 
Stability analysis concludes the chapter and explores the homogeneity of the model 
across subjects and cross-culturally.
Finally, Chapter 6 draws a series of conclusions and notes the limitations 
associated with the experimental results. The section explores the implications of the 
research findings for accounting theory, regulation of financial reporting, and the 
practice of accounting.
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CHAPTER TWO : 
ATTRIBUTES OF CONTROL
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter extends Chapter Ts discussion of the continuous concept of control 
(see Figure 1.1), by drawing on the accounting, legal, finance, economic and 
organisation literatures to develop a model of control relationships. Although the 
accounting literature has no theory to guide practitioners or researchers concerned with 
corporate control relationships, Table 1.1 suggests certain key attributes, including 
ownership and board membership. Other business disciplines provide insights as to the 
nature of corporate control. The finance and economics literatures focus on the role of 
stock ownership, the directness of that ownership, and ownership dispersion, in the 
operation of the markets for corporate control (eg. Copeland and Weston, 1988; Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1963, 1970, 
1983). The organisation literature finds ownership and management structures between 
organisations, such as inter-locking board membership, are crucial to one entity's control 
of another entity (eg. Pfeffer, 1972; Dooley, 1969; Burt, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Stearns 
and Mizruchi, 1986;Zajac, 1988).
The chapter proceeds by proposing a general multi-attribute model of dominant 
control. The model identifies ownership level, level of direct versus indirect ownership, 
the dispersion of non-owned equity, and common board membership, as four key 
attributes. The chapter concludes with a summary of the control model for empirical 
estimation, including a discussion of its limitations and an exposition of the propositions 
implicit in the model.
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2.2. THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
Figure 2.1 depicts control as a continuous concept anchored at the points of no 
control and absolute control. At one extreme absolute control represents the 
unbounded ability to make decisions. This means that no other party (singularly or 
combined) can determine the business decisions of the controlled entity. Absolute 
control implies an extremely high level of involvement in the entity, with the upper 
bound being total control (through ownership or other arrangements) of all decision 
making within the entity. This level of control is not, however, the norm. Other parties, 
such as government, will always have a non-zero influence on the decisions of any 
business.
Figure 2.1: Categories on the Control Continuum 
Cut-off Boundaries
Significant Control
Influence
No
j Control
Insignificant
6s
Significant 6c Dominant AbsoluteControlInfluence Influence Control
At the other end of the continuum in Figure 2.1 is the point of no control. This is 
where the level of involvement by the investor company is such that it has no influence 
over the business decisions of the investee. Between the points of no control and 
absolute control are three broad categories of partial or shared control: insignificant 
influence, significant influence, and dominant control. The boundaries between these 
categories represent the reportine decision points faced by directors, accountants, and 
auditors. Figure 2.1 shows these decision points as 6S and 9C.
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The boundary between the first two categories of control, 9S, is the point where 
the investor's degree of influence moves from insignificant to significant influence over 
either, or both, the operating and financing policies of the investee. As noted in Chapter 
1, significant influence is often presumed to exist where 20 per cent or more of the 
voting stock is owned, but may exist with less that 20 per cent ownership. Other 
attributes of inter-entity relationships may allow one entity to substantially affect the 
decision making of another entity in which it has a small (ie. less than 20 per cent) 
ownership interest.
The boundary between the second and third categories of control, 0C, is the point 
where the investor moves from significant influence to dominant control over the 
investee. Dominant control is the ability to make decisions within the constraints 
imposed by the attributes of the relationship between the parties. This implies a level of 
interest (equity and/or decision making representation) that would, as a minimum, allow 
control of decisions and operations under 'normal' circumstances (Lee et al, 1976; Leo, 
1987). For example, holding more than 50 per cent of the voting power of a company 
would afford an entity de jure control over the passage of ordinary resolutions in a 
general meeting. Corporate legislation in most jurisdictions requires a higher majority 
for special motions, namely 75 per cent, but this does not necessarily represent absolute 
control. As long as an entity controls less than 100 per cent of the voting rights it will 
have to contend with the interests of minority holders. Corporate law affords special 
protection to minority interests and regulatory bodies have shown a willingness to 
ensure adequate protection for those interests.12 As a result the ability to achieve 
absolute control is limited.
12 In a recent Australian case, Adsteam forced its rights as the minority shareholder (19.9 per
cent holding and no Board members) to be recognised in the structure of the Board by the majority 
shareholders (Bond Corporation Ltd with 56 per cent holding and eight of eight Board members) in 
Bell Resources Ltd. The parties agreed to equal representation with an independent chairman (Frith, 
1989). Complaints by a group representing the remaining minority holders prompted the corporate 
watchdog body, the National Companies and Securities Commission, to question this arrangement 
(Winn, 1989; Frith, 1989). The resultant court ratified agreement provided for two Board
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The boundary between dominant control and significant influence, 0C, is ill defined 
and more controversial than the insignificant-significant influence boundary, 9S. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, misclassifying investments around the significant influence- 
dominant control boundary (ie. misjudging 9C) has a greater economic impact on users 
than misjudging the insignificant-significant influence boundary, 6S. Therefore the next 
section develops a general model of control and then concentrates on the specific 
attributes that characterise the boundary, 0C, for dominant de facto control.
2.3. A GENERAL MODEL OF CONTROL
This section initially models the general attribute structure of de facto control 
relationships. From this general framework situation specific attributes are explored to 
flesh out the model. The discussion culminates in the following four attribute linear 
additive model of dominant control:
Where:
Q
*,-o
*/i
*/2
*/3
U:
(2.1)
Degree of control over related entity /;
Unit vector to capture fixed effect over all / entity relationships; 
Total level of ownership in entity;;
Direct versus indirect ownership in entity /;
Dispersion of ownership of other stock in entity /'; 
Representation on entity i's Board of Directors; and 
Non-systematic attributes of relationship
representatives each for Adsteam and Bond, two independent members, and an independent chairman. 
This case demonstrates that the party with dominant but not absolute control has a legal obligation to 
deal fairly with the minority interest (with whom they must share control) or risk the minority holders 
taking action either through regulatory bodies or directly in the courts.
OMiSSL/
fU
ksiV* ll!
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The development of the model is based on the assumption that the concept of 
control lies on a continuum as depicted in Figure 2.1. Multiple attributes are assumed to 
manifest in each control situation. Different combinations and levels of these attributes 
represent different points along the control continuum. This multi-attribute control 
continuum is represented as follows:
Cj - f(XiO > 1», Xji ,...Xin) + Ui
(2.2)
Cj is a continuous variable, bounded by the points of no and absolute control, and 
represents the degree of control an entity has over its /th related entity. The model 
depicts the degree of control for the /th entity relationship as a function of n+\ 
attributes {Xij,j = 0,1,2,3 ... ,n\ where A'q = unit vector for common fixed effects), with 
Uj added to capture non-systematic attributes that distinguish control relationship / from 
the relationship k (/ ^k).
To operationalise the model, it is assumed that control is a linear additive function 
that maps a multi-dimensional attribute set to a uni-dimensional overall control vector. 
This assumption seems reasonable given the vast body of research in psychology that 
has found simple linear models more closely approximate human judgements than 
complex lexicographic, satisficing or multiplicative choice models (see for example 
Goldberg, 1968; Hoffman, Slovic and Rorer, 1969; Dawes, 1971; Dawes and Corrigan, 
1974; Bed, Lewis and Morrison, 1976, and Barron, 1977). To maintain generality the 
mapping function depicted in equation 2.3 is constrained to be linear in the parameters, 
but not the attributes:
/(*,>=
(2.3)
Where is the weight for they'th control attribute. The function g(.) permits the 
attributes (Xjj) to enter the general model in linear, logistic, exponential or multiplicative
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states. For tractability the theory is discussed in terms of a simple linear additive 
model.13
Equation 2.2 allows C, to take on any real number value to reflect the strength of 
the control relation implied by the underlying attributes, at least some of which will also 
be real numbers (eg. percentage ownership is non-negative real number variable). 
However the concept of control applied in accounting is trichotomous, not 
continuous.14
An entity either has dominant control, significant influence, or insignificant 
influence over related entity i for reporting purposes. This implies that there are values 
6S and Gc for C, that respectively define the boundaries between situations where there 
is insignificant or significant influence, and where one entity does or does not have 
dominant control over another. The model captures the trichotomous nature of the 
control concept in any practical setting as follows:
c*= i if c. >ec- 
c* = 0 if 0C > C. > es -, 
c* = -i ifc. <es.I l 3
In theory, 0S and 9C are constants, albeit unknown at this stage. Empirically, 
however, these cut-off points may vary between either the control situations (ie. the z's), 
individual decision makers, or the cultural environment for the evaluation. Nevertheless 
it is possible to standardise and scale C;- by some transformation function k(.) to
13 Chapter 5 empirically considers non-linear combinations of attributes (ie. different functional 
forms g(.)).
14 Figure 1.1 highlighted that accountants deem consolidation appropriate where the parent has 
dominant control of the investment and entities not controlled, but over which there is significant 
influence, are equity accounted. Where there is little influence the accountant reports the relationship 
at the lower of cost or market value.
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transform the cut-offs to known constants. For instance, defining C, = k(C;) one could 
create new boundaries such that 0C' is equal to one, and 9S' is equal to zero. That is,
0C =<0C)
= 1
and
6S = k(6s)
= 0
The problem that accounting practitioners and researchers face is to assess the 
probability that the relationship between an entity and its /th related entity falls into one 
or other of the three control categories.15 That is, do the attributes of the relationship 
indicate an insignificant influence, significant influence or a dominant control situation? 
Assessing this question requires the professional to estimate the probability that
•je $ j|c
C. = 1, or C. = 0, orC. =-l. Any estimation of these probabilities using the
model must be relative to the cut-off points, 6S and 6C, and the probability function 
generating the observed values of Cj.
The following equations formally express the probability of an inter-entity 
relationship being located in each accounting category.
Dominant Control
prob(C* - 1) = prob(Ct >6C\9C =1)
= prob(ui >9C-PjgiXij))
(2.4)
15 The model depicts that accountants, auditors and managers behave as if they assign 
probabilities to whether one entity controls another. It is debatable, however, whether accountants, 
auditors and managers can articulate their probability assessment or even explicitly assign probabilities. 
This is an empirical issue that is addressed in the research design in Chapter 3.
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Significant Influence
P'ohi c; • 0) - pmhiff > c: > (9 J = I, ft =0)
=proKA-Z^P,g(x,y>
~m-ZU pmw-w.-'ZI PA*,))
(2.5)
Insignificant Influence
prob{C* = -1) = /?roZ)(C,. < 6s \ 6s =0)
= prob^ < ^ -^"o PjgiXij))
=m-zUPMxf»
(2.6)
F(.) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for w(. Equations 2.4, 2.5 and 
2.6 are solved by evaluating^.), the probability density function (PDF) for uh over the 
relevant range for the probability being evaluated.
For the probability that the relationship is one of dominant control, the PDF is 
evaluated from the cut-off 6C through to plus infinity, the maximum for C;. That is:
prob(C* = 1) = j /(«,)
J Vc
(2.7)
For the probability that the relationship is one of significant influence, the PDF is 
evaluated from the cut-off 6S up to the boundary 0C for Q . That is:
prob{C* = 0) = /(m, ) dut
(2.8)
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To assess the probability of a relationship where there is insignificant influence, 
the PDF is evaluated from minus infinity up to the cut-oflf ds for C, . That is:
prob(C; = -\)=\6' fixi^du,
J -CO
(2.9)
The assumptions about the generating process for w, will influence the choice of 
statistical methods to employ in estimating the model (see Maddala, 1983; Hensher and 
Johnson, 1981).16 Chapters 3 and 5 provide a more in-depth consideration of these and 
other issues that relate to the empirical estimation of the model.
This thesis henceforth focuses exclusively on modelling dominant control and the 
boundary 0C, which has proved economically significant and internationally 
controversial. Nevertheless the general model developed in this section captures all the 
levels of control. Additional theoretical and empirical research is required on the nature 
of 9S , but this is not the focus of the current research. With the general model in place, 
the next section explores the nature of the attributes (the Xjj) that give rise to control 
situations. In particular, the model captures the attributes that characterise de facto 
dominant control situations, rather than purely de jure control.
2.4. FOUR ATTRIBUTES OF DOMINANT CONTROL
Applying the general model requires a knowledge of the attributes affecting 
dominant control. This section reviews the accounting, legal, finance, economic and 
organisational literatures which suggest four key attributes that may affect whether a
16 For example, a logistic error distribution would require a logit estimation procedure, and 
normal errors might give a probit (normit) or linear probability model (regression with dichotomous 
dependent variable). Ordered versions of these statistical procedures are more appropriate for 
estimating the general model outlined above, which defines C( as representing a set of ordered 
categories.
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particular entity has dominant control over entity /. These attributes, discussed in detail 
below, are:
(a) Xu = Total level of ownership;
(b) Xj2 = Level of direct vs indirect ownership;
(c) Xj2 = Dispersion of ownership of other stock; and
(d) Xj4 = Representation on Board of Directors.
2.4.1. Total Level of Ownership
Majority ownership may not be necessary or in fact sufficient for de facto 
dominant control. De facto control is determined by the facts of the situation that may 
or may not equate with the attributes that lead to de jure control. The level of beneficial 
interest, through both direct and indirect ownership, is but one attribute that can 
influence the degree of de facto and de jure control. The following examples and case 
evidence demonstrate the inadequacies of using ownership as the sole control measure.
Consider three entities, A, B and C, that each own 33 per cent of D Ltd. If the 
majority of the board of D Ltd are representatives of C Ltd (either through support or 
connivance with A and B), then C controls D Ltd. Control is therefore effected with 
less than majority ownership (Shaw, 1976, p. 72). Further, empirical evidence discussed 
by Leo (1987, p. 13) indicates some US companies control the destiny of other 
companies with as little as 15 per cent of the issued capital. Shaw (1976) describes the 
UK case of Price and Pierce Ltd that consolidated a fellow subsidiary (Price and Pierce 
International Inc.), which was a foreign subsidiary of the group, yet not majority owned. 
The accounts in this case were qualified because the UK Companies Act at that time 
required majority ownership irrespective of the de facto control relationship. In another 
UK case, the consolidation of Argyll Foods Ltd and Morgan Edwards Ltd was set aside 
by the court as the accounts did not meet the "legal form" of a group, the de jure test of
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majority ownership. This decision ignored that the directors operated the companies as 
a single unit, and the auditor's opinion that consolidation was in the interests of true and 
fair reporting (Markovic, 1992; Ashton, 1986). The de facto control test embodied in 
the current UK legislation (see Table 1.1) would now support the consolidation of these 
entities.
These examples show that majority ownership may not be necessary for dominant 
control. Majority ownership may not even be sufficient for control, although it is the 
presumption of recent legislation and professional standards (ie. Australia - 
Corporations Law 1989, AASB 1024; New Zealand - Companies Amendment Bill, 
SSAP 8; UK - Companies Act 1989, SSAP 14; Internationally - IAS 27). The following 
example, discussed by Blue (1990), illustrates this point. A building firm enters a joint 
development arrangement with its financier, in the form of either a company or a trust. 
The financier insists on a separate entity to distance the joint operation from the 
developer's activities. The agreement splits any profits or losses 60/40 in the developer's 
favour. However the financial institution has majority control of the board (in the case 
of a company) or is the sole trustee (in the case of a trust). Thus despite having majority 
ownership the developer does not have dominant control over decision making in the 
business.17
These examples demonstrate that majority ownership is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for control. However, the finance and economic literatures on the 
markets for corporate control suggest that majority ownership is a sufficient criterion in 
the context of a takeover for one entity to control another (Copeland and Weston,
17 The case of Adelaide Steamship Ltd vs Bell Resources, discussed in footnote 12, provides 
another example where majority ownership did not translate to dominant control. Under a court 
approved agreement the board for Bell Resources was structured with equal representation for Adsteam 
and Bond Corporation, with an independent Chairperson. Bond agreed not to vote its 56 per cent 
holding for a period of 6 months. Thus Bond Corporation, while the majority shareholder, did not have 
dominant control. Further, the arrangement was successfully challenged by the then National 
Companies and Securities Commission on the grounds that Adsteam controlled Bell Resources Ltd. 
without lodging a formal takeover offer in contravention of the Takeovers Code.
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1988). Anti-takeover counter measures adopted by the management of target firms 
evidences further the import of stock ownership. Greenmail (share buybacks), 
supermajority and standstill clauses, as well as anticipatory changes to the ownership 
structure all represent takeover defences that focus on the percentage owned (DeAngelo 
and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983; Dann and DeAngelo, 1985).
In summary, controlled companies are consolidated, and the total percentage of 
shares owned is an important attribute in determining if a parent company does or does 
not control related entity However, 50 per cent ownership is not a necessary 
condition for dominant control as other attributes may contribute to the strength of the 
control relationship. If the total percentage ownership, Xj, , j = 1, is a significant 
attribute in the control model then:
Proposition One
There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of ownership 
and the degree of control over related entity /.
2.4.2. Level of Direct vs Indirect Ownership
Associated with majority ownership is the issue of complexity of that ownership 
holding. The composition of the ownership link is recognised in legislation and 
professional standards as a key attribute in assessing the degree of control. Such 
corporate regulations use the term beneficial interest to mean all interests, direct or 
indirect, from which one entity can obtain benefit (for example the Australian 
Corporations Act 1989; UK Companies Act 1989, New Zealand Companies Act 1981). 
IAS 27, SSAP 8 (NZ), SSAP 14 (UK), and AASB 1024 (Australia) all define an 
'ownership interest' to be capital held either directly, or indirectly through another entity. 
The significance of direct and indirect links stems from the degree of control the link 
implies. Problems arise for assessing control when multiple indirect links are created.
27
Consider the following example based on the structure of ownership links in the 
Adsteam group. IEL Ltd was a wholly owned subsidiary of Dextran Pty Ltd, a private 
company. Dextran Pty Ltd was in turn owned one third each by public listed companies 
A, D and T. A owned 49 per cent of D and D owned 43 per cent of A, all held directly. 
Through another entity, A also indirectly owned 18 per cent of D Ltd. A had an 18 per 
cent direct interest, and a 27 per cent indirect interest, in T. T's investments included 3 
per cent of D directly, and 18 per cent indirectly. D owned 27 per cent of T indirectly 
through another entity, and had a direct holding of 44 per cent.18
Directors, accountants, and auditors must resolve the following questions based 
on the case information above: What is the indirect link between A and EEL Ltd and 
does A have the capacity, based on ownership, to control IEL Ltd? To determine this 
they must evaluate whether the numerous indirect links weaken or strengthen the 
relationship between A and EEL Ltd. As ability to control EEL Ltd partly hinges on 
whether it has significant influence or dominant control over either, or both, related 
entities D and T. If A controls D and T, then it also has the capacity to control the 
decision making of Dextran and hence EEL Ltd.
In summary, the case example demonstrates that control assessments are more 
problematic where ownership is indirect through intervening structures. Directors, 
accountants, and auditors must consider whether the complexity of the indirect links 
lessens the capacity to control. If the directness of the inter-entity ownership, XljJ = 2, 
is a significant attribute in the control model then:
Proposition Two
There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of direct 
versus indirect ownership and the degree of control over related entity /.
18 This example highlights only the major links between A (Adsteam), D (David Jones), T 
(Tooths) and their investment in Dextran/IEL. See also Appendix B for a diagrammatic representation 
of the Adsteam group that incorporates the relationships discussed and other less significant inter-entity 
links.
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2.4.3. Dispersion of Ownership of Other Stock
Williamson (1963) identifies dispersion of ownership as a key determinant of 
managements' ability to make discretionary decisions in an agency environment. His 
agency model considers the issue of control within a single company, however the role 
of dispersion of ownership extends to between entity control relationships in general. 
Dispersion refers to the level of concentration in ownership held by parties other than by 
the potentially dominant entity. In a de facto control framework a broad view of 
dispersion would define entity /' as widely held if there is a low probability that other
f
stockholders will act in concert against the dominant entity. This includes actions at 
annual general meetings, directors' meetings, or in the courts. Alternatively, entity i is 
closely held where a third party holds a significant block of /'s stock, thus making it 
more likely that the dominant entity has to consider the wishes of the third party.
Case evidence illustrates that one entity may control another entity with a minority 
stock holding if the remaining stock in the second entity is widely held.19 For the years 
1983 to 1987, 51 per cent of Petersville Sleigh Ltd's equity was held by investors other 
than members of the Adsteam group. From 1988 to 1990 this percentage was about 40 
per cent. During this entire period, however, the Adsteam group holding20 represented 
over 70 per cent of the capital held by the 20 largest shareholders. In addition, the 
largest single non-Adsteam group holding during this period ranged between 1.75 and 
4.8 per cent. The dispersion of the equity not held by the Adsteam group allowed the 
group to control Petersville Sleigh Ltd.21 Between 1983 and 1987 this control was
19 This case discussion again draws on the Adsteam group structure depicted in Figure B.l, 
Appendix B.
20 That is, held by Adsteam directly, or held indirectly through David Jones, Tooths, National 
Consolidated or an associate of these four companies. In fact Adsteam only established a direct holding 
in Petersville Sleigh (of 19.8 per cent) from 1990 onwards.
21 This is the opinion of respected market commentators such as Alan Kohlor (Columnist, 
Financial Review), Sir Ron Brierley (Chairman, Brierley Investments) and Victor Shvets (Investment 
Analyst, Baring Securities).
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achieved with a minority holding, and with a majority, albeit indirect holding, between 
1988 and 1990.
Evidence from the UK supports this case and suggests that disperse ownership 
ensures that only in extreme situations does the control of large public companies come 
under pressure from interest groups (Tricker, 1984, p. 75). There are, however, large 
block shareholders in many organisations that can restrict the largest shareholder's ability 
to dominate management. For example, a third party who holds a large equity block 
may disrupt the power of a dominant entity through proxy contests and court action. 
Proxy contests and stockholder suits, however, are not common events and empirical 
evidence suggests that block holders do not always initiate or lead proxy contests (Dodd 
and Warner, 1983). Although these suits are usually over breaches of fiduciary duty 
(Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986; Jones, 1986; Kesner and Johnson, 1990), they 
essentially serve to define the boundary between dominant control and absolute control.
The economics and finance literatures suggest that dispersion plays a major role 
in the operation and regulation of equity markets. Dispersion impacts on the market for 
takeovers, especially where holdings of significant fractions of equity are evident or 
there is competition for 'large blocks' of shares (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 
1983; Dann and DeAngelo, 1983). What constitutes a 'significant fraction' or a 'large 
block' will depend on the facts of the case. Insider trading legislation, takeover 
regulations, and evidence from capital market research, suggests a holding of 5-10 per 
cent is sufficiently large to constitute a 'significant fraction' or a 'large block'.22 
Alternatively, a significantly large holding relative to the size of the dominant entity's 
holding (say about half the size) would prima facie give another party a significant voice 
in any court or general meeting challenge.
22 For example the Australian Corporations Law defines a substantial shareholder to be one who 
holds 5 per cent or more of one class of voting shares (S 708). See also Duncan and Etebari (1990).
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In summary, the evidence from cases, on proxy contests, and on the role of 
dispersion in equity markets suggests ownership dispersion is an important attribute in 
assessing control relationships. It indicates the possibility of other interests competing 
for control, which at the extreme could make dominant control impossible. If dispersion 
of ownership of other stock, ,7=3, is a significant attribute in the control model then:
Proposition Three
There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of dispersion 
of ownership of other stock and the degree of control over related entity
2.4.4. Representation on Board of Directors
The percentage of board members is a key determinant of whether one company 
can achieve dominant control over another company as the decision making power in 
the modem corporation lies with the Board of Directors (Tricker, 1984). The 
organisational literature defines the degree to which there is common control of two 
corporate boards to be proportional to the sum of the directorship overlaps or interlocks 
between the corporations (Mariolis and Jones, 1982).23 The creation of common or 
interlocking board representation may, however, be to achieve a range of organisational 
goals. These include co-opting resources as a means of establishing dominant control.
The organisational literature suggests director interlocks can be a device to co-opt 
resources, information flows, or to coordinate activities, where legal, financial or other 
constraints make control through outright acquisition impossible (Pfeffer, 1972; Dooley,
23 The economic and organisational literatures draw a distinction between managerial and owner 
controlled firms in terms of the proportion of inside (executive) directors to outside (non-executive) 
directors (Williamson, 1963, 1970, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Weisbach, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972; Tricker, 1984; Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Kesner and Johnson, 1990). 
This distinction is not relevant to the dominant control model of this study as it is the commonality of 
Board membership between the dominant entity and dominated entity that is important, not the 
composition of the Board per se (Tricker, 1984). Board members, executive and non-executive, that are 
common between two related entities are prima facie non-independent and evidence the level of 
dominance one entity has over another.
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1969; Burt, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Stearns and Mizruchi, 1986; Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988). The use of common or interlocking directorships, in conjunction with other 
boundary spanning devices, such as ownership, allow an entity to achieve dominant 
control over the operating and financing policies of other entities (Palmer, 1983; Zajac, 
1988).
Empirical research on interlocking board membership has not controlled for the 
confounding effects of ownership level and therefore can not distinguish between co­
operation and dominant control motivations for the link. The evidence does suggest 
reconstitution of a broken interlocking directorship is more likely if there are multiple 
ties, where the receiving24 firm is profitable, or when the sending firm has borrower- 
lender financial 'power' over the receiving firm (eg. Palmer, 1983; Stearns and Mizruchi, 
1986; Richardson, 1987).25
Burt (1980) provides more definitive evidence as he considers a broader spectrum 
of inter-entity ties, including the level of ownership. He finds that ownership and 
common board membership (direct and indirect) are complementary control relations. 
Adsteam's interlocking directorship structure provides case evidence on the 
complementary roles of ownership and board membership in achieving dominant 
control. Table C.l in Appendix C shows the split between common (ie. non- 
independent) directors and independent directors in the main Adsteam group companies. 
The majority of the directors were under common influence and therefore were not 
independent. This table shows that board control dominated other forms of control as 
direct ownership links, although non-zero, were for the most part significantly less than 
50 per cent (see Figure B. 1, Appendix B).
The strength of any inter-corporate relationship, such as control associated with 
majority ownership, is diluted if not associated with representation on the Board of
24 'Sending' and 'receiving' means the directional flow in the appointment of the director.
25 Contrary to expectation, however, the direction of the director interlock is not necessarily 
maintained (Palmer, 1983).
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Directors. Conversely, for board membership to confer capacity to control generally 
requires some non-zero ownership interest as well. Dominant control is likely to rest 
with the party that has the majority board representation and sufficient ownership 
interest to establish and maintain that majority position. The profession in the UK 
(ICAEW, 1989b) presumes that a 20 per cent interest is a sufficient 'participating 
interest' to establish dominant control through non-ownership links such as control of 
board membership.26
In summary, a 'controlled' Board of Directors is one where a significant or 
majority percentage of the board are not independent or are under the influence of 
another entity. A person on /'s Board of Directors is a representative of another entity, 
firstly if that entity has the power to appoint or remove the member from /'s board. 
Secondly, if it is reasonable to assume that a board member's voting pattern is under the 
influence of another entity, or an associate of another entity, then that director is a 
representative of that other entity. All other directors are considered independent of the 
controlling entity. If the level of board membership, Xy , y = 4, is a significant attribute 
in the control model then:
Proposition Four
There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of common 
board membership and the degree of control over related entity i.
2.5. MODEL OF DOMINANT CONTROL
A general multi-attribute model of dominant control was developed in section 2.3. 
Control was modelled as a continuous multi-attribute concept for which there exists a 
unique boundary, 6C, between the regions of dominant control and significant influence.
26 However, a non-zero ownership interest is not necessary in all jurisdiction. For instance 
German law allows board control, through common directorships, to be vested in one company under a 
management agreement absent any cross-ownership.
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A review of the relevant literatures identified the level of ownership, level of direct 
versus indirect ownership, dispersion of non-owned equity, and common board 
membership, as the four key attributes of dominant control.
Exactly which of these attributes, if any, is significant in the model, and the 
question as to relative importance of each attribute, are both empirical issues for 
investigation in the subsequent chapters. Further empirical issues include the degree to 
which the attributes are complementary or substitutes and the validity of the assumed 
linear additive structure.
2.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
As with the development of any model, the process of abstracting from reality 
introduces a number of limitations into the model. The significant limitations of the 
model depicted in equation 2.1 include its linear form, omitted variables, the role of 
institutional investors, issues of power relations within the board, and characterisation of 
the dependent variable as continuous.
The model as specified in equation 2.1 is linear additive. This may be an over 
simplification of the real effect of the four attributes in the model. At the very least 
interaction effects may require consideration. It could also be the case that the 
attributes enter the model in some other non-linear multiplicative or exponential form. 
These are essentially empirical issues to be addressed in Chapter 5.
The form of the attributes is less significant than their completeness. If omitted 
variables correlate with any of the attributes in the model then the parameter estimates 
for those variables will be biased. This seems unlikely as case evidence and the review 
of the literatures on corporate governance suggest that the four attribute model captures 
the major attributes that lead to dominant control. Any other attributes that give rise to 
an inter-entity relationship should strengthen the control implicit in the attributes
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included in the model. Further the effects of these other attributes are likely to be non- 
pervasive and are captured by iij, the non-systematic element in the model.
The behaviour of the dispersion attribute in the model is determined in part by the 
operational policies of institutional investors. This has not been explicitly considered in 
the model. Institutions form a large fraction of modern equity markets. Evidence 
suggests institutional ownership during the 1980's in the UK (Tricker, 1984, p. 111), the 
US (Teweles and Bradley, 1987), and Australia (Lewis and Wallace, 1985, p. 284) was 
over 60 per cent. Despite this economically significant holding, institutional investors 
typically do not intervene in the management of investee companies. Except in rare 
cases institutions "vote with their feet" when perturbed by the actions of corporate 
management. McDaniel and Wyatt (1988) suggest, however, that US institutions are 
becoming more active and vocal about management decisions such as management's 
decision to employ anti-takeover devices. In Australia, institutional investors have 
recently played major roles in determining the management of several large banks (eg. 
Westpac and ANZ). This action followed market concern over the performance of the 
banks. Any such change in behaviour by institutions will cloud the role of dispersion in 
control evaluations.27
Power relations within the board represents an important non-systematic attribute 
that mitigates the effectiveness of board representation (A^) as a control mechanism. 
Anecdotal evidence, in particular, suggests that the personalities on the board can over­
ride the weight of numbers. An aggressive Chairperson or CEO/Managing Director can 
sway the votes of their fellow directors to achieve their own agenda. In a dominated 
board context, the weight of numbers should lie with the dominant entity. If these 
numbers include an aggressive personality then this would lessen the proportion of 
directors needed to dominate the board. If however the aggressive personality is not
27 McDaniel and Wyatt (1988) note, however, that conflict in fiduciary duty, insider trading 
prohibitions, and antitrust provisions, all serve as barriers to active involvement by institutional 
investors in the control of corporations.
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part of the controlled subset of directors then this may mitigate the effectiveness of the 
controlled subset. In this second case the model will over-estimate the extent of control 
implied by attribute four.
Finally, the characterisation of the dependent variable as a continuous theoretical 
concept belies the fact that practitioners assess control in terms of three discrete 
categories. Modelling control as a series of categories, that is as a step function rather 
than a plane in multi-dimensional space, would be more representative of decision 
making by practitioners. However, discrete classifications are particularly hard to make 
when dealing with borderline cases. A continuous control measure overcomes this 
problem by allowing practitioners and researchers to represent different 'shades of grey' 
as such and not force these cases into distinct groups. The appropriate accounting 
technology is determined from the model after the inter-entity relationship of interest has 
been located on the control continuum. The transformation k(.) and the pre-determined 
cut-off value 0C' are employed in this stage to make the determination.
2.7. PROPOSITIONS
A number of theoretical propositions emerge from the discussion of the model. 
The first four propositions, stated in section 2.4, relate to the attributes that determine 
the degree of dominant control in inter-entity relationship z. These four propositions are 
summarised as:
Propositions One to Four
There is a direct proportional relationship between each of the four 
attributes - total percentage ownership, level of direct versus indirect ownership, 
level of dispersion, the level of board membership - and the degree of control 
over related entity
i
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The discussion of the model thus far has not considered the relative importance of 
the attributes in determining the degree of control. It may be that the attributes will 
have differing importance to the strength of the control relation. A neutral expectation 
would be that the attributes attract equal weighting in the model.
Proposition Five
The four attributes have equal influence on the degree of control over 
related entity
The aim of this research is to produce a predictive model of the attributes that 
determine the degree of dominant control. This suggests that the model should evidence 
predictive ability both within and out of sample.
Proposition Six
The four attribute control model has predictive ability.
Two further propositions concern the nature of the relationship between the 
attributes in the model. The assumption underlying the development of the model is that 
the attributes are linear additive, rather than some alternative state such as exponential 
or multiplicative.
Proposition Seven
The control model is linear additive.
This also implies that the model will be main effects only and that there will be no 
significant interactions between the attributes.
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Proposition Eight
There are no interactions between the attributes in the control model.
One final issue is the structure of the model over differing groups of business 
executives and international jurisdictions. The ex ante expectation is that the structure 
of the model will be cross-sectionally stable over different decision making executives 
and countries.
Proposition Nine
The structure of the control model is stable across different decision 
making executives and countries.
2.8. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
This chapter identified that control is a continuous concept ranging from no 
control to absolute control. It is the dominant control region on this continuum that is 
of theoretical and practical interest. Directors, accountants, and auditors must assess 
the probability that any particular inter-entity relation constitutes a dominant control 
relation. This is captured in the model by representing control as a continuous variable 
for which there is a discrete cut-off, 0C'. This cut-off demarks the boundary between the 
significant influence and dominant control regions on the continuum, and is modelled as 
a linear function of four attributes: ownership, direct versus indirect ownership, 
dispersion of remaining equity, and level of board representation.
The model is subject to a number of potential limitations. These include the 
model's linear form, omitted variables, the role of institutional investors, issues of power
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relations within the board, and the characterisation of the dependent variable as 
continuous. Despite these potential limitations, the model implies nine propositions that 
relate to the attributes in the model, the marginal effects of the attributes, the model's 
predictive ability, the assumed linear structure of the model, and the structural stability 
of the model.
The following chapter details of the research design and methods employed to 
empirically estimate the model. Chapter 3 also develops a series of testable hypotheses 
to explore the conceptual relationships stated in the propositions.
bond university
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CHAPTER THREE : 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapter developed a theoretical model of the attributes affecting 
corporate control. The current chapter discusses the research methods used to explore 
this theoretical model, restated in equation 3.1 as follows:
Where:
Q
*/o
*/2
^/3
W/4
ui
(3.1)
Degree of control over related entity z;
Unit vector to capture fixed effect over all i entity relationships; 
Total level of ownership in entity z;
Direct versus indirect ownership in entity z;
Dispersion of ownership of other stock in entity z; 
Representation on entity z's Board of Directors; and 
Non-systematic attributes of relationship z.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the rationale for the 
conjoint experiment. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the experiment design. 
Sections 3.4 to 3.7 describe the operational measures for the dependent and independent 
variables, development of the test instrument, selection of test subjects, and data 
collection procedures. Sections 3.8 describes the methods of analysis and the 
hypotheses to be tested. The final section summarises the chapter.
40
3.2. RATIONALE FOR CONJOINT METHOD
Conjoint analysis is a method for estimating the joint effect of two or more 
independent variables on the ranking, preference for, or ordering, of a dependent 
variable. Conjoint methods developed in mathematical psychology as a way of 
decomposing judgements of multi-attribute alternatives to reveal the implicit 
(unmeasurable) importance attached to the underlying dimensions (Debreu, 1960, Luce 
and Tukey, 1964; Krantz, 1964; Krantz and Tversky, 1971; Srinivasan and Shocker, 
1973; Green and Rao, 1971; Green, 1974). The emergence of conjoint analysis 
parallelled the development of multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) techniques (eg. 
Coombs, 1964). Both are designed to analyse ordered judgements.
Conjoint methods are more powerful techniques than MDS for analysing 
judgements of multi-attribute alternatives as they allow the researcher to decompose 
total-object evaluations to reveal the decision importance of the underlying attributes. 
The philosophy implicit in conjoint's decomposition approach is that humans form 
judgements in a holistic fashion. Decision makers do not necessarily assign explicit 
weights to every, or even any, of the underlying attributes (Shepard, 1964). More 
importantly, there is no adequate independent measure for the weights decision makers 
assign to the underlying dimensions (Luce and Tukey, 1964; Krantz and Tversky, 1971). 
The research on subjective measures in psychology even suggests subjects are inaccurate 
in the explicit importance ratings they attach to the components of their own decisions.28
Conjoint analysis overcomes these measurement problems by measuring the 
decision (ie. D) the subject makes relative to the researcher manipulated stimuli set i. 
The stimuli are constructed so that the patterns in the subject's decisions reveals the 
weight they subjectively place on the pre-determined levels of attribute j, presented in 
stimulus set z (ie. the Ay). The hypothesis is that:
Di cc FiXij)
28 For a discussion of this research see Shepard (1964).
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Statistical analysis of the subject's decisions, Z),-, provides an estimated vector of 
weights for the Xy. That is, the subject's decision model is inferred from their decisions. 
The model's normal form is:
Z> = Y/ /?,X +m,
Where (3j is the subject's revealed weight for attribute j, and «, is a non-systematic 
residual term. This conjoint model differs from standard applications of linear 
regression in that the researcher controlled independent variables are an integral part of 
the data collection process for the dependent variable. In the context of the current 
study, the subject's evaluation (ie. C, = controlled or not controlled) of the multi­
attribute experimental stimuli is decomposed by conjoint techniques to reveal the 
subject's weights (ie. the Pj) for the underlying attributes (ie. Xjj, j = 0,1,2,3,4), as per 
equation 3.1. Companies, through their directors, accountants and auditors, evaluate 
inter-company relationships and decide whether or not one company controls another. 
Based on the multi-attribute relationship involved they make a dichotomous judgement, 
C, > 0C (ie. controlled) or Q < 6C (ie. not controlled). There is no explicit weight for 
each attribute in arriving at an overall control 'score' for comparison with a known cut­
off, 9C. A decomposition technique, such as conjoint analysis, is necessary to 'discover' 
the implicit weights for the attributes from the subject's total-object evaluation (ie. 
control-not control decision).
There have been few applications of conjoint analysis in either the accounting and 
auditing research (see Krogstad, Ettenson and Shanteau, 1984), or the research in 
economics and finance (eg. Slovic, Fleissner, and Bauman, 1972; Teas and Dellva, 1985; 
Zinkhan, 1990).29 Conjoint analysis, however, features widely in the marketing
29 Conjoint has some parallels with hedonic regression in economics. The latter involves 
regressing a price index on factors which may represent time or quality dimensions to discover the 
implicit price for the time or quality factors. The main difference between conjoint analysis and 
hedonic regression is that the dependent variable in conjoint analysis is a choice or a judgement not a 
market observation, such as price (see Bemdt, 1991).
42
literature, which has refined the conjoint methods as a research tool. Marketing 
researchers use it to measure consumer preferences for the attributes of products (Green 
and Wind, 1973, Cattin and Wittink, 1982, 1989; Hair et al, 1987). The focus is on 
how the product attributes, such as the desirability of red versus green sports cars, are 
valued by potential customers.30 Similarly this study's concern is with the relative 
importance (ie. decision impact) of different attributes of the control multi-attribute 
information sets. Conjoint analysis is the appropriate method for addressing the issues 
of this study. It also represents a potentially valuable research tool to accounting and 
auditing researchers.31
3.3. OVERVIEW OF THE CONJOINT EXPERIMENT
The marketing literature offers some design lessons on the application of conjoint 
analysis. These lessons serve as a guide to other business researchers, in particular 
accounting and auditing researchers. The literature identifies seven major design issues 
to resolve in the construction of a conjoint study (Green, 1974, 1984; Wilkie and 
Pessemier, 1973; Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Louviere, 1988; Wittink and Cattin, 
1989). The seven design issues are summarised in the first column of Table 3.1.
Column two of Table 3.1 lists the options available to the researcher for each 
design issue. The nature of the theoretical model being investigated effectively limits the 
choices applicable in the design of any particular study. Also, some of the design 
options dominate others in contemporary conjoint applications (eg. full profile over 
trade-off analysis or paired comparisons). Appendix D provides a detailed discussion of 
the options in the design of conjoint experiments.
30 For example Urban and Hauser (1980), Green, Krieger and Carroll (1987), and Kohli (1988).
31 For example, conjoint techniques could be used to assess auditor evaluations of audit situations 
with differing levels of evidence quality for account risk, or user evaluations of financial statements 
with different amortization periods for goodwill, depreciation, or other accounting choices.
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The design features selected for the current conjoint experiment are listed in the 
third column of Table 3.1. First a linear or vector model is assumed for the subject's 
judgement model in the current study. Sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5 explores the 
validity of this assumption and estimates an ideal point and quadratic model as a 
comparison. Second, the data is collected using a full profile evaluation method, which 
is consistent with the trend in the marketing literature. This method presents subjects 
with a complete case description and requires a decision based on that description. Self- 
explicated importance ratings are also collected for each attribute to facilitate analysis of 
face validity. Third, the measurement scale for the dependent variable is a mixture of 
two methods. Subjects initially assign the stimuli sets to a category (ie. either controlled 
or not controlled). The subjects then rate their confidence in their decision on a 5-point 
scale. Fourth, the attribute set is limited to the four attributes in the theoretical model. 
The levels for the attributes are approximately equally spaced, although some are 
unequally spaced. All attributes span their real range with the number of levels ranging 
between 4 and 6. Section 3.4 discusses the measures for the degree of control and the 
choice of attribute levels, level spacing, and level range.
Fifth, the study employs a highly fractional factorial design (an orthogonal array) 
to identify 32 treatment cases. A further 6 holdout stimuli sets are added for predictive 
ability analysis giving a total of 38 cases. No learning stimulus sets are included in the 
instrument. The sixth design issue is the data collection procedure. Verbal descriptions 
of the attributes for each stimuli set were presented to subjects on cards in the study's 
mailed instrument. Finally, OLS is used as the main estimation technique in the current 
study. Other estimation techniques are considered in Chapter 4.
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Table 3.1: Conjoint Experiment Design Issues, Design Options, 
and Choices for this Study
Design Issue Design Options Choices for this Study
(1) Selection of Judgement 
Model
Vector (linear) model
Ideal point
Part-worth
Mixed model
Vector (linear) model
Ideal point (and a quadratic 
variation) also explored
(2) Data Collection Method Two factor trade-off analysis
Full profile evaluation
Paired comparisons 
Self-explicated rating
Hybrid of any of these
Full profile evaluations 
Self-explicated rating (for 
analysis of face validity)
(3) Measurement Scale for 
the Dependent Variable
Paired choice
Rank order
Rating scales
Constant sum scales
Category assignment
Mixture
Mixture
- Category assignment for 
control decision
- Rating scale for decision 
confidence
(4) Independent Variable 
Attributes
Number of attributes
Number of attribute levels
Spacing of attribute levels
Range for attribute levels
Four attributes
Between 4 and 6 levels each 
Approximately equal spacing 
Levels span real range
(5) Stimuli Set Construction Fractional factorial design 
Random sampling
Repeated measurement
Learning stimuli
Holdout stimuli
Fractional factorial design 
(orthogonal array) to identify 32 
treatment stimuli
No learning stimulus sets
6 Holdout stimulus sets
(6) Stimulus Presentation 
Procedures
Verbal description cards 
Paragraph description
Pictorial representation
Computer cue presentation 
Mixture
Verbal description cards
(7) Model Estimation 
Technique
OLS regression
Logit or probit
Ordered logit and probit 
MONANOVA
MDS - LINMAP, PREFMAP
OLS regression
Compared to logit, probit and 
ordered probit estimation.
In summary, a conjoint experiment was constructed according to the design 
parameters selected in Table 3.1. The experiment was designed to collect data to 
estimate the four-attribute model of dominant control in equation 3.1. Subjects 
evaluated sets of stimuli presented as pre-planned cases (or profiles) containing different
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levels of the four control attributes. There were 38 attribute sets: 32 for model 
estimation and 6 holdout cases for prediction analysis. Each subject made 38 
dichotomous 'control' evaluations and 38 confidence ratings. The following sections 
detail the empirical measures used and the development of the conjoint instrument.
3.4. EMPIRICAL MEASURES
Empirical measures for the variables in the model (equation 3.1) draw on the
i
theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, and case evidence on the nature of the variables. 
The measure for the dependent variable, degree of control, is discussed first followed by 
the levels used to represent the independent variables, the four attributes of control.
3.4.1. Dependent Variable - Degree of Control
The dependent variable cannot be defined as the actual control decisions of 
companies as in practice this measure is confounded by the reporting objectives of 
management. To overcome this problem the subjective evaluations of subjects are 
captured in the context of an experiment where other motivating factors can be held 
constant. The conjoint experiment achieves this objective by presenting different 
combinations of the control variables with all other extraneous variables held constant. 
A mixture of measures, similar to Rosenberg's (1956) category assignment and rating 
task, is used to capture the decisions of the subjects. First, the practitioner subjects 
make a dichotomous controlled-not controlled decision. High task familiarity, 
associated with the correspondence between the experimental task and the parameters 
for the subject's real word decisions, is likely to result in more reliable control decisions.
A second measure of the dependent variable requires the subjects to rate the 
degree of confidence they have in their decisions. Decision confidence is measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale with anchor points at "Not Too Confident" and "Extremely
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Confident". This measure allows subjects to indicate the control decisions that they feel 
represent 'grey' or uncertain cases. An 'index' of possible states of dominant control is 
then formulated by taking the product of the control evaluations (ie. controlled-not 
controlled) and the confidence rating on a 5-point scale. This multinomial control 'index' 
simultaneously reflects the practitioner's dichotomous operationalisation of the concept, 
and approximates the continuous control concept depicted in Figure 2.1.
3.4.2. Independent Variables - Levels of Control Attributes
The independent variables in equation 3.1 were manipulated through a series of 
cases. Each case contained varying levels of the independent variables identified in 
Chapter 2. Table 3.2 below summarises the levels for each of the attributes.
Table 3.2: Independent Variables - Levels for Control Attributes
Independent Variable Levels for Control Attribute
Total Percentage Ownership (Xn) 15%, 30%, 45%, 49%, 51%, and 65%
Fraction of Ownership Direct (Xi2) 0%, 40%, 60%, and 100% a
Dispersion of Other Ownership (Xj3) "Widely Held", 10%, 20%, and 30%
Level of Membership on 10 Member Board (X]A) 2, 4, 6, and 8 members
a The % Indirect = 100% - % Direct
The choice of levels for each attribute was influenced by:
1. the legislation and standards regulating reporting practices;32
2. case evidence of the attributes influencing control;33
3. research evidence on the number and spacing of attribute levels;34 and
4. practical issues of subject fatigue and interest in the case.
32
33
34
See Chapter 1 and Appendix A for a discussion of the legal and regulatory framework.
See Appendix B and C for details of the Adsteam case material.
See Appendix D for a discussion of design issues in conjoint research.
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The levels for the percentage ownership attribute are 15, 30, 45, 49, 51 and 65 per 
cent of the shares. The six levels represent points surrounding the conventional equity 
accounting and consolidation cut-offs (ie. 20 and 50 per cent) and therefore capture 
perceptions at the margins of these traditional measures. Four of the levels are 
concentrated in the 30-51 per cent band, as the focus of the study is the cut-off for 
dominant control and therefore consolidation (not the lower bound for equity 
accounting). The 15 per cent level represents an arbitrary lower end ownership level at 
which control might be possible, and 65 per cent represents an arbitrary maximum 
ownership level associated with no control. This gives a total of six levels for the 
instrument. Prior research suggests that additional levels increase subject's evaluation 
load, with limited or no gain for the results (see discussion in Appendix D).
The total ownership attribute is presented in four combinations of direct and 
indirect ownership. Direct ownership is set to be either zero, 40, 60, or 100 per cent of 
the total ownership (which respectively corresponds with 100, 60, 40 and zero per cent 
indirect ownership). The 100 per cent direct ownership level reflects cases where the 
dominant entity holds only a simple direct holding in another firm. Conversely the 
holding by the dominant entity may be 100 per cent indirect. The two intermediate 
combinations reflect holdings which are either majority direct (ie. 60/40 per cent 
direct/indirect) or majority indirect (ie. 60/40 per cent indirect/direct). Again additional 
intermediate attribute levels would significantly increase the evaluation task for subjects.
Dispersion of ownership is represented by four levels. At one extreme all shares 
not owned by the dominant entity are said to be "widely held". This represents 
situations where less than 10 percent of the remaining equity in the investee is held by a 
single entity. The other three levels of dispersion, 10, 20 and 30 per cent, represent the 
percentage of other shares closely held in a cohesive block. These levels recognise that 
the probability of action by block holders increases as the size of the block increases. A 
10 per cent block is the minimum sized block that prima facie indicates a closely held
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firm (see Chapter 2). The total ownership level of 65 per cent places an upper bound on 
the percentage that can logically be closely held. The maximum percentage representing 
closely held was therefore set marginally below this upper bound at 30 per cent. The 
final level, 20 per cent, is the mid point between the 10 and 30 per cent levels.
The four levels of non-independent board membership are 2, 4, 6, and 8 directors 
on an average sized ten-member Board of Directors. The two points either side of the 
'majority' cut-off, 4 and 6 directors out of ten, respectively reflect situations where the 
dominant entity either has significant influence or control of the board's decisions. An 
absolute dominant position of 8 members on the board was also set. The two majority 
positions of 6 and 8 common board members are drawn directly from the Adsteam case. 
Finally a minority position of 2 non-independent board members was selected to 
complete the range for the board membership levels.
3.5. CONJOINT INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT
A conjoint test instrument was developed that presented subjects with set 
combinations of the discrete attribute levels. Subjects judged each case as controlled or 
not controlled. Subjects also rated their confidence in their judgements on a Likert-type 
scale. The instrument development proceeds by: (1) identifying an orthogonal array as 
the factorial design for the study; (2) developing the initial set of stimuli case cards; (3) 
evaluating and adapting the initial cases; and (4) pre-testing the stimuli and instructions.
3.5.1. Factorial Design - Orthogonal Array
The composition of the stimuli cases in a conjoint experiment is determined by the 
factorial design employed. A full factorial design allows the researcher to measure the 
effect of each level of each variable on control evaluations, while holding all other 
variables constant. There are, however, two problems with using a full deign. First, the
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test instnament for the full factorial model is very demanding as it requires subjects to 
evaluate a total of 6x4x4x4=384 stimuli combinations (ie. six levels for attribute X^, and 
four levels for each of Xjj and X^). Fatigue and other non-experimental effects 
may confound any results if subjects are required to assess this many cases. Second, the 
full design creates a multicolinear independent variable set that leads to inflated standard 
errors when estimating the regression parameters.
Fractional factorial designs deal with these two problems by trading off measuring 
some or all interaction effects to obtain a smaller number of treatment stimuli (Cochran 
and Cox, 1950; Winer, 1973). An orthogonal array, a type of highly fractional factorial 
design, provides researchers with the most parsimonious set of possible designs. It 
requires that each level of a variable occurs with each level of the other variable with 
proportional frequencies, rather than equal frequencies (Addelman, 1962; Bose and 
Bush, 1952; Raghavarao, 1971; Dey, 198 5).35 Depending on the number of variables 
and levels, an orthogonal array design usually requires 30 or fewer stimuli cases. The 
trade-off is that the design is optimised to measure main effects (Green, 1974). An 
orthogonal array design is appropriate for the current study given: (1) the theory in 
Chapter 2 envisages main effects only;36 and (2) the task size constraint.
3.5.2. Stimuli Set Development
An orthogonal array was randomly selected from one of many possible balanced 
designs using the SPSS-PC: Conjoint Module. That is, one that gives mathematically 
valid (ie. uncorrelated) estimated attribute parameters (Green, 1974). This array 
provided the factorial design for the 32 treatment cases. A further 6 holdout cases were 
added to the initial set of 32, giving a total of 38 treatment cases altogether. The
35
36
In contrast a full factorial design requires equal frequencies necessitating many more cases.
The issue of whether subjects implicitly assess interactions is considered in Chapter 5.
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holdout cases provide a small data set against which to evaluate the within subject 
predictive ability of the model estimated using the base 32 treatment cases.
Table 3.3: Matrix of Attribute Levels and Orthogonal Array 
of 38 Treatment Cases for Control Instrument
Ownership: Total, Board Mem bership Board Membership Board Membership Board Membership
Direct, and Indirect % 2 of 10 4 of 10 6 of 10 8 of 10
Total Direct Indirect Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion
% % % Wide 10% 20% 30% Wide 10% 20% 30% Wide 10% 20% 30% Wide 10% 20% 30%
15%
6%
9%
15%
9%
6%
15%
32
23
10
7
17
25
27
19
30%
12%
18%
30%
18%
12%
30%
29
24
35
21
4
26
11
15
5
45%
18%
27%
45%
27%
18%
45%
3 34
8
20
22
13
37
49%
20%
29%
49%
29%
20%
49%
14
31
12
36
18
51%
20%
31%
51%
31%
20%
-
51%
2
28
9
38
65%
26%
39%
65%
39%
26%
65% 6
33 1
30
16
Table 3.3 presents the matrix of attribute level combinations that potentially could 
be used in the conjoint instrument. The twenty four rows in the table represent the six 
levels of total ownership each subdivided by the four levels of direct and indirect 
ownership. The sixteen columns comprise the four levels of board representation, 
further subdivided by the four levels of dispersion. Thus each cell represents one of the 
384 treatments possible in a full factorial design. The cell labels "1" to "38" correspond 
to the 38 attribute combinations in the 38 cases (ie. 32 estimation cases and 6 holdout 
cases) in the treatment instrument (see Appendix E for the actual case cards).
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3.5.3. Evaluation of the Cases
The researcher and two colleagues reviewed the initial orthogonal array of cases 
to assess each combination for intuitive reasonableness and representativeness of real 
stimuli. They felt there was a high number of cases with total ownership at the upper 
limit of 65 per cent, and a relatively low frequency of cases at the 45 per cent ownership 
level. A disproportionate number of the cases at the upper end of the ’control' 
continuum would add little to the model's discriminatory power and could appear 
irrelevant to subjects. A simple ad hoc adjustment was employed to adjust the array of 
cases as the Steckel, DeSarbo and Mahajan (1991) methodology37 was felt to be 
unjustified given that none of the cases per se were unreasonable. The orthogonal array 
was adjusted by swapping the factorial distribution for the 65 per cent "total ownership" 
row with the factorial pattern for the 45 per cent row. The adjusted array was, 
however, orthogonal (see Appendix F for correlation matrix for the independent 
variables). Table 3.3 presents the orthogonal array of the final 38 cases used in the 
conjoint instrument.
3.5.5. Test Booklet and Pre-Testing
The test booklet presented subjects with instructions for the experiment, 
definitions of the variables, 38 four-line case descriptions, and a response sheet (see 
Appendix E). The ordering of the stimuli cases in the experiment, however, was
37 Steckel et al (1991) discuss ad hoc remedies that could be employed if the orthogonal array 
contains non-representative stimuli, including: (1) ignore the problem; (2) delete non-representative 
stimuli; (3) develop composite attribute from combinations of sub-attributes; (4) search for another 
orthogonal design; (5) change the coding of the attribute levels so the design is representative; (6) 
sample stimuli from probability distribution of attributes; and (7) modify the non-representative profile 
changing one or more attribute levels. Options (1) and (2) adversely effect the estimation of the 
conjoint model. The third option requires more cases and thus is less compact. Steckel et al (1991) 
show the remaining options (ie. 4-7) are subsumed by their model for identifying modified fractional 
factorial designs. However the designs from their methodology are only locally optimal and do not 
guarantee a globally optimal result. Thus this method may confound the factorial design.
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randomised. Implementation of this standard procedure controls for possible 
confounding effects of testing and or halo effects.
The test instrument and instructions were circulated amongst the accounting 
faculty at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and Bond University, 
Gold Coast, Australia, and the marketing faculty at Murdoch University, Perth, 
Australia. The revised version of the instrument was then pre-tested on seven subjects 
whose occupational credentials included experience as directors, financial executives, 
security analysts and accountants. The results for the pre-test, and the suggestions 
received from the subjects, resulted in only minor modifications to the test instrument.
Two further pre-tests were conducted using forty-three students majoring in 
accounting. The purpose of the first test with the students was to check for any 
remaining ambiguities in wording and instructions. It also provided an estimate of the 
total time burden and clerical effort required by the response format. The objective of 
the second pre-test was to establish the stability of the responses to the test instrument. 
The second pre-test, using the same students, was conducted ten weeks after the first. 
The estimated models for the two pre-tests were not significantly different at either the 
individual or group levels and no adjustments were deemed necessary.
3.6. SUBJECTS
A random sample of 1000 directors, financial executives, public accountants and 
credit/security analysts was selected from the US and Australian populations of potential 
subjects. Separate sampling frames were identified for the US and Australia. Two main 
sources of potential US subject were employed. The first was a database from the 
University of Southern California of over 6000 corporate executives, directors and 
public accountants located around the US. A second database was employed to identify 
credit and security analysts based in California, and is therefore not be representative of
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US credit and security analysts in general. A random sample of 500 potential subjects 
was identified from these two databases. The sample was stratified one third credit and 
security analysts, and two thirds corporate executives, directors and public accountants.
The Australian Business Who's Who was used to identify corporate executives and 
directors for the 1000 largest Australian companies. The sampling frame for public 
accountants was Bond University's School of Business executive database. An outside 
agency (which must remain confidential) provided a listing for credit and security 
analysts. Again a random sample of 500 potential subjects was identified from these 
three databases which was stratified one third credit and security analysts, and two 
thirds corporate executives, directors and public accountants.
The range of subject groups is considered representative of the major users of 
financial statements. Directors, financial executives, accountants and credit/security 
analysts have to deal with the issue of 'control' frequently and thus are considered 
appropriate judges of whether one company controls another. No specific group of 
shareholders is included, although some of the subjects may also fall into this category.
3.7. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES
The test instrument was mailed to the potential subjects with a personally 
addressed cover letter, signed by the researcher, introducing the study and inviting the 
addressee's participation in the study. The cover letter assured anonymity but at the 
same time gave the subjects the opportunity to receive a summary of the results if they 
so wished. The expected time required to complete the instrument was also made clear 
to the subjects (see Appendix E for a sample cover letter and test instrument employed).
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The test instrument defined each of the attributes in turn. It also included 
instructions for the subjects on how to evaluate the case cards and self score their 
responses. These instructions are reproduced below.
1. Detach along the perforations each of the 38 cases to form a series of "cards".
2. Sort all 38 "cards" into two piles -- one pile for those cases you consider company X 
controls company Z and one pile for those where company X does not control company Z. 
Some respondents may wish to use a third 'doubtful' pile, which is then re-evaluated and 
split as appropriate between the control and not control piles.
3. Examine the contents of your final two piles, making sure that you agree with your 
evaluation, swapping some "cards" over to the other pile if you like.
4. Taking each pile in turn, record your responses on the response form over the page. 
Make sure that you circle YES if you consider company X does control company Z and 
NO for each case you consider company X does not control company Z. Also indicate 
how confident you are about your evaluation on the 5-point scale. (See example below)
5. Complete the additional questions concerning your evaluations and background. Seal the 
response booklet in the reply-paid envelope and place in the post.
The card sort approach was chosen for three reasons. First, card sorting (also 
referred to as Q sorts) is a proven research method for capturing individual opinions, 
preferences and decisions (Stephenson, 1953; Rosenberg, 1956; Kerlinger, 1986) and is 
often used in marketing conjoint studies (Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Wittink and 
Cattin, 1989). Second, the method allows subjects to freely compare and sort the case 
cards, a freedom that conventional 'rate-the-lisf formats do not afford. This means 
subjects can separate straight forward cases from a 'doubtful' pile that can be returned to 
for more careful consideration. If the card format makes it easier for the subjects to 
assess the cases then judgement quality is likely to be higher. Third, the 'game-like' 
quality of the task generates subject interest. Such a positive disposition on the part of 
subjects may improve the probability of obtaining quality responses.
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The following example case and response form provided a guide for the subjects:
Example Case Presentation:
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Stock 
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Stock in Z 
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
All direct 
Widely Held 
8 of 10
If you judge that company X does control company Z then place this case in the control pile and 
record your evaluation by circling YES on the response form. If you feel EXTREMELY 
CONFIDENT about your classification then circle a number close to 5, as below.
Case Does Co. X Not too Extremely
No. Control Co. Z? Confident 1 2 3 4 5 Confident
Eg. (yes) no 1 2 3 4 ©
If, however, you are NOT TOO CONFIDENT about your classification of the case then circle a 
number closer to 1, as appropriate. Be sure to use the full range of the scale to indicate the degree 
of confidence you have in your evaluations and remember there are no right answers to this task. 
We are interested in YOUR PERCEPTIONS of the control relationship.
Subjects were also required to provide self-explicated ratings of the importance of 
each control attribute. The instrument concluded with questions concerning the subjects 
occupation and education (see Appendix E for the research booklet).
3.8. ANALYSIS PROCEDURES AND HYPOTHESES
The analysis of the conjoint experiment data proceeds in seven distinct steps. 
These include an overview of the responses, estimation of individual and aggregate level 
models, testing the structure of the control model(s), predictive ability analysis, 
sensitivity analysis, and exploratory stability analysis. The sections below outline each 
of these steps and the associated hypothesis to be tested.
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3.8.1. Step One: Overview of Responses
The first stage of the analysis is to code the data into the computer and check for 
input errors. Response rates and descriptive statistics are computed to profile the data. 
Non-response bias and reliability of the responses are then tested.
3.8.2. Step Two: Estimate Individual Control Models
The second step in the analysis is to estimate the following regression equation for 
each subject from their evaluations of the 32 estimation cases.
DQ,m= + A.mOwii; + y^Dir/Ind, + /?3,mDisP; + A^Boardj + ^m
(3.1)
Where:
DCt/n = subject iris (m = 1, ... M. M = 246) 'index' score for the degree of 
control for case i (i = 1, ..., T: T- 32).
Own,- = ownership level (ie. Xu) is either 15, 30, 45, 49, 51, or 65%.
Dir/Ind;= level of direct vs indirect holding (ie. Xjj) is either 100, 60, 40 or 0%.
Disp; = dispersion (ie. X^) is either 0, if "widely held", or 10, 20 or 30%.
Board; = level of board membership (ie. X^) is either 20, 40, 60 or 80%.
The dependent variable is constructed by multiplying the dummy variable for the 
control evaluation (ie. -1 if case i is evaluated as "Not Controlled", and 1 if it is 
evaluated as "Controlled"), by the subject's confidence level, measured on a 5 point 
Likert-type rating scale. This coding scheme gives the whole number range, excluding 
zero, from -5 to +5. The independent variables, the attributes, are coded as continuous 
variables reflecting the various levels discussed in section 3.4.2 and shown in Tables 3.2 
and 3.3. Descriptive statistics summarise the distribution of estimated parameters across 
subjects. F-tests indicate the significance for each of the M individual models (M=246).
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3.8.3. Step Three: Estimate Aggregate Model
An aggregate model can be constructed by either forming an average model, or 
estimating a pooled regression model. First, the average model is constructed from the 
mean beta estimate for each of the A/individual models by calculating the following:
i M
(3.2)
Where m signifies that the parameter is for the average model. The average 
model therefore represents the mean 'consensus' weighting for the attributes.
Second, a pooled model is estimated by dropping the subject subscript m in 
equation 3.1 and running a regression on the pooled cross-sectional data (Green and 
Tull, 1978; Huber and Moore, 1979; Moore 1980). This provides an estimate for the 
pooled parameter vector . It is unclear in the literature, however, whether an average
or pooled model is more appropriate. Evidence based on simulated data sets shows that 
average and pooled models give similar predictions (Huber and Moore, 1979).
The average model is assumed to be sufficient for the aggregate analysis in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 explores whether pooled estimation provides a better aggregate 
model in terms of predictive ability. Both average and pooled approaches can, however, 
lead to a 'majority fallacy' in that neither may represent the most common, or in fact any 
subject's judgement structure (Moore, 1980). For this reason the hypotheses of the 
study, stated below in generic form, are tested at the individual level in addition to the 
aggregate level whenever appropriate.
3.8.4. Step Four: Test the Structure of the Control Model(s)
Step four in the analysis is to state and test hypotheses concerning the structure of 
the control model. The first five hypotheses are tested in Chapter 4 for the M individual 
models, and the aggregate (ie. average) model.
rThe theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 requires that there should be a direct 
proportional relationship between the total level of ownership (Ar(1), the level of direct 
versus indirect ownership (Xjj), the dispersion of the other equity (Xjj), the level of 
board membership (A^), and the degree of dominant control over related entity /. When 
a subject is presented with case / containing a combination of ownership, directness of 
ownership, dispersion, and board membership levels then these attribute levels should 
have a significant linear effect on the subject's control judgement. The hypotheses for 
the parameters in equation 3.1 are that:
a
Hypothesis One
Ho: A = 0
Hj: A > 0
Hypothesis Two
H0: A = 0
H2: A > 0
Hypothesis Three
Hq: A = 0
Hj: A < 0
Hypothesis Four
H0: A = 0
H4: A > 0
Proposition five stated that dominant control is determined by an equally weighted 
combination of the four attributes. The null hypothesis is that the parameters for 
equation 3.1 are equal. The alternative hypothesis is less clear. A priori both ownership
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and board representation might be expected to have a greater impact on the capacity to 
control than either direct versus indirect holding or the dispersion of the other equity 
interests. This stems from the fact that the former two attributes can be thought of as 
establishing control and the latter two as mitigating the strength of that control. 
Directness of holding and dispersion off-set the control effect of ownership and board 
representation. Allowing for the negative scaling for dispersion, the following 
hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis Five
Hq: Pj = Pk (/' * k; for j, *=1,2, 3, 4)
Hs: At least one Pj * Pk
3.8.5. Step Five: Predictive Ability and Face Validity Analysis
In this step the predictive ability of the M individual models and the aggregate 
model are assessed. Any identified 'poor performers' - subjects exhibiting low levels of 
structure and hence low predictive ability - can be excluded from further analysis at this 
stage (Hair et al, 1987). The estimated regression model for each individual and the 
aggregate model are used to 'predict' each subject's decision for the 32 estimation cases 
and for the 6 holdout cases. Pearson correlations indicate the degree that the predicted 
and actual decisions agree for both the estimation and holdout sets of cases. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the predicted decisions and actual 
evaluations for the estimation and holdout cases:
Hypothesis Six
Hq: p=0
H6: p>0
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This hypothesis is tested using the predictions from both the individual and 
aggregate control models. The face validity of the estimated control model is assessed 
by comparing the predictive ability of the M individual models to that of three alternative 
models. These alternatives are a self-explicated model (self rated importance of the 
attributes) and two naive models (equal weight and ownership only models).
3.8.6. Step Six: Sensitivity to Assumptions
Step six explores the control model's sensitivity to a series of assumptions. By 
analysing the predictive performance of the model under different assumptions the 
sensitivity analysis provides further tests of hypothesis six. First the pooled model is 
estimated and its predictive ability compared with the aggregate (ie. average) model as 
an aggregate level summary of the control model. Second the robustness of the model 
to violations of the assumptions of the OLS estimation technique are tested. The pooled 
model is re-estimated using logit, probit, ordered probit, and linear probability 
formulations. The predictive performance of these estimation techniques is compared. 
Thirdly the validity of the assumed linear combination of the four attributes is explored 
by estimating the model with a squared transformation of the attributes (ie. g(.) = A^2). 
Both an ideal point model and a quadratic model are considered. The null hypothesis is 
that the parameters (ie. the fij) for the non-linear variables will be zero. Specifically:
Hypothesis Seven
H0: Pj = 0 (j = 1, 2, 3, 4)
H7: At least one Pj' * to
If the null is rejected then the appropriateness of the linear model depends on its 
predictive performance relative to the non-linear model. The assumed linear model also 
implies that there are no interaction effects between the variables. This is also a
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maintained hypothesis throughout the model's development and discussion. The null 
hypothesis is that all six two-way interactions (/?5 to /^q) will be zero. That is:
Hypothesis Eight
H0: Pj = 0 (, = 5,6,7,8,9,10)
H8: At least one Pj' *0
Again if the null hypothesis is rejected then the sensitivity of the results to the 
assumed linear model depends on the relative predictive performance. Hypotheses 
seven and eight are tested for the individual and aggregate models.
3.8.7. Step Seven: Stability Analysis
The last step in the analysis is to consider the stability of the model across 
individual subjects and countries sampled. Individual level model stability implies that 
the parameter values for each attribute represent drawings from a common distribution 
of values for that attribute. The stability of the model across individuals is explored by 
testing the cross-sectional structure of the estimated parameters for each attribute. The 
null hypothesis is that Pi, pi. Pi, and P^ are equal across individuals such that:
Hypothesis Nine
H0: Pj>m = Pj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4; V m e {1, 2,..., M})
H9: At least one Pj m Pj
A restricted F-test is used to test hypothesis nine. If the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted then a k-means cluster analysis is used to identify distinct groups of subjects 
identified in terms of the clustering of the estimated parameters for the model. The
i
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validity of the cluster structure is explored through an ANOVA of the relationship 
between the cluster structure and the self-explicated weights, the residual variance, and 
measures of accounting expertise.
The final analysis issue is the stability of the model across countries. The subjects 
in the US and Australia currently operate under different regulations. The US 
regulations use majority ownership as the test for control. Whereas Australia has just 
adopted (for the last reporting year) the broader concept of de facto capacity to control. 
One would expect the Australian subjects to place less weight on ownership and more 
emphasis on the other attributes. A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is 
estimated to explore the differences between a pooled cross-sectional US model and a 
pooled cross-sectional Australian model. The null hypothesis is that the parameters for 
the US and Australian subjects are equal. That is:
Hypothesis Ten
H0: Pj,US = Pj^iust (/=1>2vM)
H10: At least one Ph vs * Pj>Aust
To further explore the cross-cultural differences the individual model parameters 
for each country sub-sample are cluster analysed. The average attribute parameters for 
each culture specific cluster are used to profile that cluster. An alternative to hypothesis 
ten is that the attribute weights will be equal for similar cross-cultural groups of 
subjects. To test this SUR models are estimated for each of the corresponding cross- 
cultural clusters of subjects.
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3.9. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
A conjoint experiment was identified as the appropriate method for the study. A 
decomposition technique, such as conjoint, is required to 'discover' the implicit attribute 
weights from the multi-attribute control decisions of practitioners. Although conjoint 
methods have seer 'ittle use in accounting research, they represent a potentially valuable 
tool for accounting and auditing researchers.
Seven major design issues, identified in the marketing literature, were resolved in 
the construction of the experiment. A category assignment-confidence rating task was 
designed. A series of levels were identified for each attribute that were combined into 
treatment cases. An orthogonal array was used to limit the size of the research task and 
determine a minimum set of attribute level combinations. It also ensures the factorial 
design will yield valid estimates for the model. The development and pre-testing of the 
research instrument were discussed along with the subject identification and 
administration procedures.
The seven steps for the individual level and aggregate level data analysis were 
enumerated together with the hypotheses to be tested. The following chapter presents 
the results of the first five stages of this analysis and draws conclusions in relation to 
hypotheses one to six. Chapter 5 then presents the results for the sensitivity and stability 
analysis outlined in steps six and seven. It also tests hypotheses seven to ten.
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CHAPTER FOUR :
ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports the results for the analysis steps one to five outlined in the 
preceding chapter. Based on this analysis, hypotheses one to six are tested and a series 
of conclusions are drawn for the theoretical model. The chapter proceeds as follows. 
Section 4.2 provides an overview of the responses including the data collection and 
coding, analysis of non-response bias, descriptive statistics, and reliability tests. Section
4.3 details the estimation of both individual and aggregate level control models. This 
section also tests the hypotheses concerning the structure of the control model. Section
4.4 examines the predictive ability and face validity of the individual and aggregate 
control models. The final section summarises the findings of the chapter.
4.2. OVERVIEW OF RESPONSES
4.2.1. Data Collection and Coding
The treatment booklet was mailed to potential participants in the US and 
Australia. Completed test instruments were returned in the supplied self-addressed 
reply-paid envelope. The response statistics for the mailed survey are summarised in 
Table 4.3. A high proportion of the mailed surveys were returned marked indicating 
participation "Declined" or "Return to Sender" (ie. respondent not prepared to 
participate or undeliverable due to database decay factors such as location or personal
BOND UNfVHFSSnY
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changes). From the remaining 611 surveys mailed but not returned unopened, a total of 
246 usable responses were received (ie. 40.3 per cent of the possible responses). 
Techniques to enhance response rates, such as follow up mailing procedures, were not 
possible due to the anonymous response format and the restricted access to databases.
Table 4.1: Survey Response Statistics
Survey Item Australia USA Total
Random Sample Mailed Survey 500 500 1000
Less: Returned "Return to Sender" 161 145 306
Less: Returned "Declined" 42 41 83
Total Possible Responses 297 314 611
Completed Responses 141 117 258
Less: Unusable Responses 5 7 12
Total Usable Responses 136 110 246
% Usable vs Possible Responses 45.8% 35.1% 40.3%
The usable responses were coded into a spreadsheet by an independent coder with 
no knowledge of the hypotheses being tested. The coded data were independently 
checked against the hand-written responses. Data coding and entry errors were 
corrected prior to commencing the planned data analysis.
4.2.2. Non-Response Bias
High non-response rates can lead to biased estimates for population parameters if 
non-respondents are significantly different to respondents (Scott, 1961; Oppenheim, 
1966; Armstrong and Overton, 1977; Kalton, 1983; Courtis, 1989). A crude test for 
non-response bias is to compare the responses of early and late respondents as non­
respondents are often similar to late respondents (Oppenheim, 1966, p. 34). There is, 
however, no guide as to the size for the early and late sub-samples, thus applying 
Oppenheim's (1966) procedure is necessarily ad hoc (see Courtis, 1989).
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Table 4.2: t-test for Difference in Mean Responses of Early and Late 
Respondents Partitioned by Country Sampled
Australian Samp e US Sample
Case Number Mean
n=91
Mean
n=45
t a
Value
2-Tail 
p-Value
Mean
n=73
Mean
n=37
t a
Value
2-Tail
p-Value
1 3.55 3.18 0.87 0.389 3.86 3.76 0.27 0.784
2 2.44 1.44 1.80 0.075 3.10 2.59 1.09 0.280
3 -0.16 -0.04 -0.17 0.862 0.55 -0.35 1.25 0.213
4 -1.12 -0.49 -0.99 0.327 -0.60 -0.84 0.33 0.739
5 2.65 2.67 -0.04 0.971 1.49 2.24 -1.26 0.211
6 1.98 1.13 1.39 0.168 1.79 1.81 -0.03 0.979
7 -3.49 -3.38 -0.35 0.727 -3.55 -3.19 -0.83 0.412
8 1.24 0.89 0.57 0.573 0.93 0.70 0.33 0.739
9 4.37 4.11 0.86 0.391 4.16 4.08 0.25 0.803
10 -4.04 -4.00 -0.19 0.850 -4.32 -4.16 -0.54 0.595
11 1.32 2.18 -1.70 0.093 0.64 1.11 -0.71 0.483
12 3.18 3.11 0.18 0.859 2.33 2.62 -0.61 0.545
13 3.69 3.18 1.43 0.156 2.59 3.32 -1.53 0.129
14 1.04 0.93 0.17 0.862 0.85 0.30 0.81 0.419
15 2.87 3.11 -0.56 0.575 2.49 2.68 -0.32 0.752
16 4.98 4.98 0.01 0.994 4.89 4.97 -1.55 0.125
17 -0.59 -1.31 1.26 0.209 -1.97 -1.35 -1.05 0.296
18 3.71 3.40 0.93 0.357 2.77 3.08 -0.66 0.514
19 0.31 -1.18 2.46 0.016 -1.26 -1.27 0.02 0.987
20 0.45 -0.24 1.13 0.261 -0.67 -0.78 0.17 0.864
21 -1.79 -1.38 -0.72 0.473 -1.81 -1.35 -0.73 0.466
22 3.85 ■ 3.73 0.42 0.678 2.70 2.97 -0.55 0.584
23 -4.64 -4.58 -0.34 0.732 -4.64 -4.57 -0.69 0.493
24 -4.18 -4.09 -0.39 0.698 -4.10 -4.22 0.53 0.599
25 0.47 0.58 -0.18 0.855 -0.12 0.32 -0.68 0.496
26 0.75 0.29 0.74 0.462 -0.14 0.00 -0.20 0.840
27 1.62 0.93 1.18 0.241 0.51 0.41 0.15 0.878
28 3.64 3.29 0.84 0.403 3.92 3.86 0.19 0.850
29 -2.90 -2.31 -1.19 0.237 -2.45 -2.51 0.11 0.913
30 4.68 4.62 0.61 0.546 4.63 4.43 0.92 0.364
31 1.96 1.58 0.66 0.513 1.95 1.22 1.16 0.251
32 -3.80 -3.13 -1.53 0.132 -3.32 -3.05 -0.50 0.621
33 3.79 3.40 1.18 0.243 3.74 3.84 -0.28 0.780
34 -1.25 -0.96 -0.50 0.615 -1.00 -2.16 2.05 0.044
35 -3.47 -3.31 -0.46 0.644 -3.36 -3.65 0.83 0.411
36 3.81 3.38 1.53 0.131 2.68 3.16 -0.95 0.345
37 4.55 4.11 1.73 0.088 3.86 3.84 0.06 0.950
38 4.74 4.64 0.89 0.375 4.41 4.54 -0.51 0.608
Self Ratings
A Complexity 2.63 2.69 -0.29 0.771 2.40 2.49 -0.39 0.698
B Dispersion 4.05 3.87 1.02 0.310 4.12 3.54 2.66 0.010
C Own 4.01 4.40 -2.32 0.022 4.15 4.16 -0.06 0.953
D Control 4.45 4.27 1.22 0.225 4.22 4.43 -1.12 0.264
E Board 4.12 3.91 1.17 0.246 3.85 3.86 -0.07 0.942
a t-Value for Hq: nEariy = based on separate variance estimates (ie. not pooled).
rConsistent with other accounting research (see Wilkins, 1984) the current study 
defines the first two thirds of the responses to be early respondents, and the last one 
third of the responses to be late respondents. Table 4.2 reports the results for an item- 
by-item t-test of the difference in the mean early and late responses. For the Australian 
sub-sample, only the responses to case 19 and self rating question "C" are significantly 
different (p < 0.05, two-tailed test) between early and late respondents. For the US sub­
sample only evaluative question "A" is significantly different (p < 0.05, two-tailed test) 
between early and late respondents. This rate of significant difference is about what one 
would expect as being due purely to chance (ie. 4-5 of eighty six t-tests significant). 
Further, the F-statistics reported in Appendix G, Table G.3, suggest there is little 
evidence of any systematic difference in the variance of responses for early and late 
respondents. In total this evidence supports the conclusion that non-respondents are 
unlikely to exhibit mean judgements or judgement variance different from that of 
respondents.
4.2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Coded Responses
Descriptive statistics for the responses to the thirty eight cases and the five self- 
explicated ratings, reported in Table 4.3, profiles the range and variability of responses 
that underlie the estimation of the model. The responses to most of the thirty eight 
cases span their theoretical range of -5 to +5. The major exceptions either have a 
different lower bound (ie. -4 for cases 1, 28, 33, and 38; -2 for case 30), or a maximum 
response other than the theoretical upper bound (ie. +4 for case 10; +3 for case 35).
Case 16 exhibits the least variance in opinion with responses ranging from +3 to 
+5 (the median response is 5). This case represents a point of consensus among the 
respondents as all respondents rate it as a control situation. Table 4.3 also shows that 
for all except four cases (ie. 3, 20, 25 and 26), the mean response is significantly 
different from zero (p < 0. 01).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Responses
Case Number Minimum Median Maximum Mean t-Value a p-Valueb
1 -4 4 5 3.6 27.3 <0.001
2 -5 3 5 2.5 14.5 <0.001
3 -5 1 5 0.04 0.2 0.843
4 -5 -2 5 -0.8 -3.7 <0.001
5 -5 3 5 2.2 12.2 <0.001
6 -5 3 5 1.7 8.6 <0.001
7 -5 -4 5 -3.4 -27.6 <0.001
8 -5 3 5 1.0 4.5 <0.001
9 -5 5 5 4.2 44.7 <0.001
10 -5 -4 4 -4.1 -49.1 <0.001
11 -5 3 5 1.2 6.2 <0.001
12 -5 3 5 2.8 19.5 <0.001
13 -5 4 5 3.2 23.0 <0.001
14 -5 2 5 0.9 3.8 <0.001
15 -5 4 5 2.8 16.5 <0.001
16 3 5 5 5.0 291.3 <0.001
17 -5 -2 5 -1.2 -6.4 <0.001
18 -5 4 5 3.3 23.9 <0.001
19 -5 -2 5 -0.7 -3.2 0.004
20 -5 -2 5 -0.2 -0.9 0.376
21 -5 -3 5 -1.7 -8.5 <0.001
22 -5 4 5 3.4 24.2 <0.001
23 -5 -5 5 -4.6 -82.7 <0.001
24 -5 -4 5 -4.1 -51.9 <0.001
25 -5 2 5 0.3 1.4 0.173
26 -5 2 5 0.3 1.4 0.173
27 -5 2 5 1.0 4.8 <0.001
28 -4 4 5 3.7 30.9 <0.001
29 -5 -4 5 -2.6 -15.2 <0.001
30 -2 5 5 4.6 102.6 <0.001
31 -5 3 5 1.8 9.0 <0.001
32 -5 -4 5 -3.4 -23.4 <0.001
33 -4 4 5 3.7 30.8 <0.001
34 -5 -3 5 -1.3 -6.3 <0.001
35 -5 -4 3 -3.4 -29.8 <0.001
36 -5 4 5 3.3 24.4 <0.001
37 -5 5 5 4.2 39.8 <0.001
38 -4 5 5 4.6 70.0 <0.001
Self Ratines
A Complexity 1 2 < 2.5 NA NA
B Dispersion 1 4 0 4.0 NA NA
C Own 1 5 5 4.1 NA NA
D Control 1 5 5 4.3 NA NA
£ Board 1 4 5 4.0 NA NA
a t-Value for Hq: // = 0, for n = 246 responses. 
b Two-tailed test.
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For twelve cases (ie. cases 4, 7, 10, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 29, 32, 34, and 35) the 
mean response is significantly less than zero (medians also less than zero), indicating 
that on average the company portrayed in each of these cases is considered not 
controlled. The remaining cases (ie. cases 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11-16, 18, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 
33, 36-38) on average are judged to represent control situations as the mean response is 
significantly positive (medians are also positive). Finally, the self-explicated importance 
ratings span their theoretical range of+1 to +5. The median and mean responses are in 
the 4-5 range for all these items, except for question "A" (concerning the importance of 
complexity of the ownership structure), where the average response is 2.5 (median is 2).
4.2.4. Reliability of Responses
Reliability in conjoint studies is normally assessed by the consistency of the 
conjoint judgements using either test-retest or alternative form methods (Green and 
Srinivasan, 1978; Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Segal, 1982). The anonymous survey did 
not, however, permit a second mail out to collect test-retest or alternative form data.38 
For this reason the current study uses a modified version of Beesley and Hensher's 
(1987) paired-choice-dominance reliability measure.39
The test measures the consistency of response to cases with 'similar' attribute 
mixes. Consistency is operationalised as the cross-sectional correlation between 
responses to pairs of cases (A,B) within the same ownership row-board membership 
column in the attribute matrix, Table 3.3. A high correlation (defined as p = 0.5)
38 This test was applied to the pre-test data for the students whose responses were found to be 
test-retest reliable. Further, prior research in marketing has found conjoint measures test-retest reliable 
(Acito, 1977; McCullough and Best, 1979; Segal, 1982).
39 Beesley and Hensher's (1987) test requires the researcher to 'plant' a series of logically 
dominant choices in the set of paired comparisons. The hypothesis is that consistent respondents will 
correctly identify the dominant cases. In the current study, case 16 (see Table 3.3) represents a logically 
dominant stimulus case (ie. 65 per cent owned, all direct, remaining share widely held, and 8 of 10 
Board members). All respondents judged this case to be a control situation with a confidence rating of 
3 or greater (see Table 4.3), indicating some degree of logic in respondent judgement. The design did 
not, however, allow for further logically dominant cases.
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between the response to cases with similar ownership and board membership attributes 
implies that respondents are internally consistent in their case evaluations. Conversely 
low or negative correlations suggest respondents make inconsistent evaluations.
Table 4.4: Reliability of Input Judgements: Correlation Between Case 
Pairs (A,B) Similar in Ownership and Board Membership Attributes
Case A Case B r a
z-Value b 
Ho: /7 = 0.5
2-Tail
p-Value
23 32 0.253 -4.53 <0.001
7 10 0.522 0.46 0.646
17 25 0.641 3.28 <0.001
19 27 0.714 5.40 <0.001
24 35 0.458 -0.84 0.401
24 29 0.437 -1.26 0.208
29 35 0.680 4.35 <0.001
4 21 0.477 -0.48 0.631
11 26 0.594 2.10 0.036
5 15 0.715 5.43 <0.001
3 34 0.680 4.36 <0.001
8 20 0.636 3.16 0.002
13 37 0.598 2.19 0.028
12 36 0.785 7.94 <0.001
1 33 0.704 5.07 <0.001
a Pearson correlation coefficient for n = 246 respondents. 
b z-Value for Fisher's transformed r (Klugh, 1974, p. 237)
7' 7'^ sample “ ^ population
C7Z,
Where: Z’ = 0.5[ln(l + r)-ln(l-/-)] 
1
CTz' = “TT
Table 4.4 reports the pairwise correlations for the responses to 'similar' stimulus 
cases. The correlations in Table 4.4 are high, especially considering that the pairing 
(A,B) ignores the effect on the responses of the other two attributes, complexity of 
ownership and dispersion (see Table 3.3). The average correlation is 0.59. A Fisher z- 
test (Klugh, 1974, p. 237) for differences in correlation indicates that only one 
correlation is significantly less than the defined 'test' value (p = 0.5). The remaining
i
rcorrelations are either not significantly different from (ie. statistically the same), or 
significantly greater than, the test level of 0.5.
Additional analysis reported in Appendix H, Tables H.4 and H.5, shows that there 
is a low correlation between responses to cases that are 'dissimilar' in their attribute mix 
(ie. at the extremes of the case matrix in Table 3.3). In sum, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that respondents were consistent in their case ratings. That is, the conjoint 
instrument produced reliable data for estimation of the model.
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4.3. INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE MODEL ESTIMATION
The model (equation 3.1) was estimated separately for each respondent using the 
Conjoint Module in SPSS-PC (SPSS, 1990). This module produces OLS parameter 
estimates and predictive analysis for each of the M = 246 individual respondents. An 
aggregate (ie. average) model is calculated from the mean estimated attribute 
coefficients for the M individual models. Henceforth the average model is referred to as 
the aggregate model.
Prior to estimating the individual and aggregate models, the control judgements 
were re-scaled to enhance the validity of the parametric analysis. Interval scale data is 
insensitive to linear transformations (Torgerson, 1967, p. 19), so the judgement data 
were re-scaled to lie on the equidistant ten point scale -4.5 to +4.5 (initially the 
responses were represented by the ten integer values -5 to +5 excluding zero).40 The 
input data were also standardised so that the parameter estimates for the individual 
models could legitimately be compared across respondents and to enhance the
40 The implication of treating the coded judgements as interval scaled is explored further in 
Chapter 5. It is noteworthy that the measurement literature (Torgerson, 1967; Cliff, 1973), conjoint 
research in marketing (Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Wittink and Cattin, 1989), and research in 
psychological measurement (Anderson, 1970; Krantz and Tversky, 1971) all suggest that the analysis 
will be robust to this assumption.
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interpretation of the aggregate model coefficients.41 Table 4.5 presents a summary of 
the parameter estimates for the M individual models and the aggregate model.42
Table 4.5: Parameter Estimates for the M Individual Models 
and the Aggregate Model
Panel A: M Individual Models Panel B: Aggregate Model
Independent
Variable
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile % K
Sig. at 0.10
A u
B -rj,m
(t-Value)c
1-Tail
p-Value
A
Constant (>90) -2.671 -2.402 -2.023 100% -2.329
(-80.92)
<0.001
Own ($,) 3.039 3.850 4.577 99.2% 3.666
(50.04)
<0.001
Dir/Ind (/?2) -0.071 0.099 0.375 29.3% 0.191
(7.76)
<0.001
Disp ($3) -1.815 -0.622 0.191 43.5% -0.806
(-8.84)
<0.001
Board (£,) 1.174 1.906 2.678 89.4% 1.959
(29.13)
<0.001
A
a Mean /jf for the A/ = 246 individual models is signified by the ' subscript. 
b Aggregate model R2 = 0.5832, and Adjusted R2 = 0.5830. 
c t-test for H0: fy - = 0, df = 32-5=27.
41 Descriptive statistics indicated that respondents differed in their response mean and variance. 
Some respondents used the entire range for the confidence rating scale, while others used only a few 
points, typically at the extreme. To overcome this problem the re-scaled case evaluations (ie. the 
dependent variable) were standardised to mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. Standardising each 
individual's evaluations effectively anchors all respondents to the same scale. Those inclined to be 
more "confident" in their evaluations and those reluctant to use the "5" (very confident) score are all 
brought to the same scale and can be compared legitimately.
42 Appendix I, Table 1.6, reports the model estimates for the raw data (ie. unadjusted and 
unstandardised), and Table 1.7 reports the model for adjusted (ie. re-scaled) but unstandardised data. 
The structure of the estimated models for these two sets of data is equivalent to those reported in the 
current chapter for the adjusted and standardised data. The adjusted and standardised data model does, 
however, exhibit greater predictive ability, the key criterion for model selection (see Pedhazur, 1982, 
pp. 136-137.), than either of the alternative models. For this reason all further analysis is based on the 
adjusted and standardised data.
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The F-statistics for each of the M individual models were significant (p < 0.01) 
suggesting each model has significant in-sample explanatory power. The pooled 
residuals can also be used to test the combined explanatory power of the individual 
models, irrespective of whether there is contemporaneous correlation between the 
residuals for the individual models.43 An additional F-statistic is constructed from the 
pooled OLS residuals for the M individual equations as this is equivalent to a test of the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR, see Appendix K for discussion) estimation of the 
entire set of equations (Zellner, 1962; Dwivedi and Srivastava, 1978; Hirschey, 1981; 
Judge et al, 1985, 1988; Dielman, 1989). The F-Value for the pooled residuals is 17.39 
(df = 984, 6642, p < 0.001). This confirms the M individual F-tests and implies that the 
M individual models as a group have significant explanatory power. Finally, an Omnibus 
F-test, constructed to test the aggregate model, is significant (F = 9.39; df = 989, 6637; 
p < 0.001)44 suggesting that the aggregate model has significant explanatory power too.
4.4. TESTING THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The generic hypotheses concerning the structure of the control model (see 
Chapter 3) are tested at both the individual and aggregate levels. The individual level 
results are reported in Panel A of Table 4.5. The table reports the percentage of 
significant (p < 0.10) individual-model t-tests for each attribute. Over eighty nine per 
cent of the estimated parameters for the constant, ownership, and board membership,
43 This procedure is appropriate provided the residuals for the M=246 models do not violate the 
homogeneous variance assumption implicit in the F-test. See discussion in Appendix J.
44 The F-statistic for the aggregate model is defined in terms of the coefficient of determination 
(R2), adjusted for degrees of freedom (which allow for the Mxk individual model parameter estimates 
from which the k parameters for the aggregate model are estimated), which in turn is the square of the 
multiple correlation coefficient (R) for the aggregate model. The F-statistic based on the average 
parameters from A/individual ^-variable regressions each with T-observations is defined as:
R2/(M(k-l) + k)
(l-R2)/(M(T-k)-k)
Where: M= 246, k = 5, and 7’= 32.
A I
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are significant. Thirty per cent of the estimated parameters for directness of ownership, 
and forty four per cent of the estimated parameters for dispersion, are significant. For 
the majority of individuals this evidence rejects the null for hypotheses one and four that 
the betas for ownership and board membership (ie. ^ and ^4) are equal to zero. For 
some individuals the evidence also rejects the null for hypotheses two and three of zero 
betas for the directness of ownership and dispersion attributes (ie. Pj and /J3). Further 
analysis of the structural differences among individual models is conducted in Chapter 5.
A t-test is used to test the hypotheses at the aggregate level (based on the 
sampling distribution for the betas). This analysis tests whether the mean parameter for 
attribute j (ie. /^ -) is different from zero. The results presented in Panel B of Table 4.5 
reject the null to hypotheses one to four that the betas for the four attributes (ie. Pi, Pi, 
p$, and Pi) are equal to zero.
The average parameters for Own and Board (ie. /^and $4) have a significant 
positive (p < 0.001) bearing on the degree of control one entity has over another, thus 
supporting hypotheses one and four. The large positive coefficient for the ownership 
attribute supports the ownership definition of control, the mainstay of regulation and 
practice until recently. The significant positive weighting on board membership 
suggests, however, that regulation and practice based solely on ownership defined 
control will only partially capture the true control relationships of companies.
The ratio of direct to indirect ownership (ie. /?2) has a significant positive impact 
on control (p < 0.001), consistent with hypothesis two that control is enhanced if 
ownership is direct. The average coefficient is small indicating this attribute has a 
marginal impact on the control relationship. The individual model parameter estimates 
for Dir/Ind range from negative to positive values suggesting that not all respondents 
interpreted this variable as having a positive impact on control.
The average estimated parameter for dispersion (ie. $3) is negative and significant 
(p < 0.001), although there is a wide range of estimated values for the M individual
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models. The negative average Disp parameter (p < 0.001) is consistent with hypothesis 
three that respondents place a negative weight on the control effects of other blocks of 
equity. The more closely held the firm, the greater the level of the other attributes 
required to establish the capacity to control. Nevertheless, dispersion has a small effect 
on the degree of control relative to the ownership and board membership attributes.
The individual and aggregate level evidence on the structure of the control model 
rejects the null hypotheses and allows the acceptance of hypotheses one to four. The 
conclusion is that dispersion has a negative direct effect on the degree of control while 
ownership, directness of ownership, and board membership have a positive direct effect 
on the degree of control. The individual level evidence is, however, less conclusive for 
the dispersion and directness of ownership attributes.
Hypothesis five stated in null form that the parameters for the four attributes 
would be equal. The hypothesized equal weighting of the attributes suggests that 
equation 3.1 can be reformulated as follows:
DCi m= m + PRestricted^ (Ownt- + Dir/Ind; + Dispt- + Board,) + £ • w
(4.1)
The explanatory power of the restricted model in equation 4.1 can be compared to 
the unrestricted model at both the individual and aggregate levels. An F-test was used 
to evaluate whether the M restricted individual models had significantly better 
explanatory power than the M unrestricted individual models. The F-statistic, 
constructed from the pooled residuals for the M restricted and unrestricted individual 
models, was significant (F= 16.39, df = 738, 6642; p < 0.001).45 This evidence rejects 
the null for hypothesis five at the individual level.
45 This statistic is equivalent to a SUR estimation of the M individual models with the restriction 
that all the parameters for the mth individual are equal (ie. f}^m = PnestTicted,m J = f 2, 3, 4), although 
the estimates for Pjtestricte^m may var>' across individuals.
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At the aggregate level, an F-test, based on the coefficient of determination (R2), 
was used to compare the explanatory power of the unrestricted and restricted aggregate 
models (Gujarati, 1988, p. 231).46 The F-statistic for the unrestricted aggregate model 
{k average parameters estimated from M equations each with ^-variables and T- 
observations) and the restricted aggregate model (estimated from M equations each with 
j independent linear restrictions) is defined as follows:
() / Mip _ Unrestricted Restricted !
(\-R
Unrestricted
) M(T-k)-k
The respective coefficients of determination (R2) for the unrestricted and 
restricted models are 0.5832 and 0.2114. The F-statistic for the difference between 
these two R2 parameters was significant (F = 8.02; df = 738, 6637; p < 0.001). This 
evidence for the aggregate model rejects the null hypothesis that the parameters for the 
model are equal (ie. ^ ^ ~ h = Pa) at ^ aggre8ate level-
To test the alternative to hypothesis five, each of the M individual models were re- 
estimated with different pairs of parameters restricted to be equal to each other. Panel 
A of Table 4.6 reports the F-Values (based on the pooled disturbances for each 
restricted estimation), and the number of individual models for which this F-ratio was 
significant. The results indicate that the parameters for all four attributes are different 
for the pooled tests. Further these differences exist for eleven per cent or more of the 
individual respondents, supporting the alternative to hypothesis five.
Panel B of Table 4.6 reports corresponding aggregate level analysis. Pairwise t- 
tests were constructed based on the sampling distribution of the beta values for the base 
M individual models. The results for the aggregate level t-tests are consistent with the
46 See footnote 44 for a discussion of the relationship between the coefficient of determination
(R2) and the multiple correlation coefficient (R) for the aggregate model.
rindividual level F-tests. In sum this evidence supports the alternative to hypothesis five 
and implies that the weights for the four attributes are all significantly different.
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Table 4.6: Analysis of Equality of Model Parameters
Panel A: M Individual Models Panel B: Aggregate Model
Variables Restriction® F-Valueb p-Value % Sig® Comparisond t-Value p-Value
Own v Dir/Ind
A A
Pljn-Pijn 30.68 <0.001 85.8%
A A
A m “A m 44.94 <0.001
Own v Disp 9.19 <0.001 48.4%
A | A .
A,m A,m 1 24.46 <0.001
Own v Board
A A
12.63 <0.001 54.1%
A A
A m “A.m 17.14 <0.001
Dir/Ind v Disp 2.64 <0.001 10.9%
A 1^1
Pl,m ~ 1 P?>,m 1 -6.51 <0.001
Dir/Ind v Board
A A
15.18 <0.001 58.9%
A A
A,m _A,m -24.67 <0.001
Disp v Board 1 hjn 1 5.49 <0.001 28.9% 1 A,m ' ~A.m 10.17 <0.001
a Linear restriction placed on the M individual models. 
b F-Value (df= 246, 6642) for the pooled residuals. 
c Percentage of A/individual level F-Value significant at the 0.01 level. 
d Aggregate model parameter comparison for t-test, two-tailed p-Values.
The correlation between the parameter estimates for the M individual models was 
computed to gauge the respondents' cross-sectional trade-offs between the attributes. 
The correlations reported in Table 4.7 show that respondents who placed greater veight 
on ownership tended to also place a lower weight on the ratio of direct to indirect 
holding. Similarly there was a trade-off between the level of ownership and board 
membership. This is not surprising as these are the two main indicators of control in 
terms of the theoretical and empirical models.
Table 4.7: Pearson Correlations Between Parameter Estimates
Own ($j) Dir/Ind (//2) Disp (/?3) Board
Own (fij 1
Dir/Ind (yS2) -0.214 1
Disp (jffj) -0.164 -0.155 1
Board (fiA) -0.798 0.034 0.402 1
I
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What is surprising is the positive correlation between the parameter estimates for 
dispersion and board membership. The theory suggests that this correlation should be 
negative as dispersion reduces the control effects of ownership and board membership. 
The empirical relation implies, however, that respondents who placed more weight on 
board membership also placed less weight (allowing for the negative scale) on 
dispersion. That is, where board membership is judged important then dispersion is 
considered less important. These trade-off issues are considered further in Chapter 5.
4.5. PREDICTIVE ABILITY AND FACE VALIDITY ANALYSIS
4.5.1. Estimation Sample Predictive Ability
The internal validity of the conjoint model is determined by the correlation 
between the input values for the control evaluations (the dependent variable) and the 
estimated control values from the control model (Green and Srinivasan, 1978). This 
tests the model's goodness of fit for the estimation sample. A high correlation implies 
that the model captures most of the characteristics of the input control judgements.
The predicted values for each of the M individual models were correlated with the 
respondent judgements for the 32 estimation cases. Pearson's correlations for the M 
individual models ranged between 0.63 and 0.95. All correlations were significant at the 
0.001 level or better (see Table 4.8 for a summary frequency distribution). The M 
individual models therefore have a high level of estimation sample predictive ability.
Table 4.8 also reports the distribution of correlations between the respondents' 
control evaluations and the aggregate model's predicted level of control. The 
correlations for the aggregate model tend to be slightly lower than the correlations for 
the predictions from the M individual models.
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Table 4.8: Distribution of Correlations Between Estimation Control Evaluations 
and Control Predicted by the A/Individual Models and the Aggregate Model
Range for 
Pearson's r
Frequency of r for:®
M Individual 
Models
Aggregate
Model
<0.50 0 3
0.51-0.55 0 0
0.56-0.60 0 6
0.61-0.65 1 16
0.66-0.70 3 30
0.71-0.75 16 37
0.76-0.80 29 59
0.81-0.85 67 58
0.86-0.90 80 33
0.91-0.95 47 4
0.96-1.00 3 0
Total n - 246 246
Mean r 0.8466 0.7636
Median r 0.8560 0.7769
r for Aggregate Model b= 0.7636
II
59 = 779.99 p <0.001
a See j2 statistic for equivalence of frequencies, based on 6 collapsed categories, 
b Correlation between pooled aggregate model predictions and pooled evaluations.
The significant statistic, based on collapsed categories, rejects the null 
hypothesis that the frequency distributions are the same.47 On the whole the aggregate 
model does not perform as well as the M individual models. Nevertheless, the 
correlation between the pooled estimation sample predictions for the aggregate model 
and the pooled individual evaluations was 0.7636, and significant (p < 0.001).
47 The x2 statistic can only be calculated where no more than one expected frequency (the 
expected frequency is the distribution for the individual models) is less than five (but none less than 
one). In the current study the statistic can only be calculated by collapsing adjacent categories (at the 
upper and lower ends of the range) such that all categories for the expected distribution meet this test 
(see Siegel and Castellan, 1988). This procedure is applied for all subsequent j2 tests of equivalence of 
frequency distributions.
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4.5.2. Holdout Sample Predictive Ability
The predictive ability of the estimated models can also be tested against the 
holdout sample evaluations (Acito and Jain, 1978). Predicted values for the six holdout 
cases were computed using the estimated parameters for each M individual models. 
Pearson's correlations indicate the degree to which the predicted and actual evaluations 
co-vary. The Pearson's correlations for the M individual model predictions ranged 
between 0.07 and 0.99, with an average Pearson's correlation of 0.85 (median of 0.89). 
Ninety three percent of the AT individual model holdout correlations were significant at 
the 5 per cent level or better (ie. better than chance number significant).
Table 4.9: Distribution of Correlations Between Holdout Control Evaluations and 
Control Predicted by the M Individual Models and Aggregate Model
Range for 
Pearson's r
Frequency of r for:a
M Individual 
Models
Aggregate
Model
<0.50 4 5
0.51-0.55 0 0
0.56-0.60 3 1
0.61-0.65 3 1
0.66-0.70 5 6
0.71-0.75 7 6
0.76-0.80 23 17
0.81-0.85 34 30
0.86-0.90 53 66
0.91-0.95 79 79
0.96-1.00 35 35
Total n = 246 246
Mean r 0.8639 0.8707
Median r 0.8935 0.8969
r for Aggregate Model b = 0.8173
X2 (df = 7) = 6.47 p = 0.486
a See x1 statistic for equivalence of frequencies, based on 8 collapsed categories. 
b Correlation between pooled aggregate model predictions and pooled evaluations.
Table 4.9 reports the frequency distribution of correlations between each 
respondent's holdout control evaluations and (1) control predicted by their respective
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/nth individual model, and (2) control predicted by the aggregate model. The pooled 
cross-sectional correlation for the holdout sample predictions by the aggregate model is 
0.8173, and highly significant (p < 0.001). This evidence suggests that both the M 
individual models and the aggregate model have predictive ability in relation to the 
holdout sample.
The statistic for equivalence of frequency distribution is not significant and 
suggests that the aggregate model and M individual models predict the holdout 
evaluations equally well. The mean and median Pearson correlations support this 
conclusion. Further a comparison of the first columns in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggests 
that the prediction rates for the holdout sample are on average higher than for the 
estimation sample. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 4.1, which compares the 
estimation and holdout sample frequency distributions of Pearson correlations for the M 
individual models.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of Estimation and Holdout Sample Pearson Correlation 
Distributions for M Individual Models
The distribution for the holdout sample lies to the right of the distribution for the 
estimation sample reflecting that the holdout sample correlation was higher for sixty nine
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per cent of the respondents. This is somewhat misleading, however, as it does not 
adjust for the degrees of freedom and thus is like comparing unadjusted R2 values.
An F-statistic was constructed for each respondent to test whether their model's 
holdout prediction rate was significantly different to its estimation sample prediction 
rate.48 Under the null of no significant difference in prediction, the critical value for Fa
=0 01 df = 6 27's 3-56. Figure 4.2 depicts the expected and actual frequencies for the F- 
Values. One of the M F-Values is significantly greater than the critical value (two 
further F-Values are significant at the 0.05 level, Fa=0 05, df = 6, 27 = 2.46), indicating
that the predictive performance of the vast majority of M individual models was not 
significantly worse for the holdout responses than for the estimation sample responses.
Figure 4.2: Observed and Expected Frequency for F-Values for Change in
Explanatory Power
The observed frequency distribution of F-Values appears to lie slightly to the left 
of the expected frequency distribution which is consistent with some individual models 
having more explanatory power for the holdout responses. The kurtosis of the actual
48 The test statistic is based on the assumption that the prediction errors for each sample are 
normally distributed. Given this assumption the ratio of the two sums of squared errors, adjusted for 
the number of profiles in each set, is distributed F with (in this case) 6, 27 degrees of freedom.
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distribution of F-Values suggests that a greater then expected frequency of models 
exhibited statistically no change in explanatory power (ie. F-Value not different to one). 
A chi-squared statistic, based on 13 collapsed categories, was calculated to test the 
equality of proportions between the two frequency distributions in Figure 4.2. The 
statistic was significant = 46.73; df = 12; p < 0.001) supporting the conclusion that 
the observed frequency of F-Values is significantly different from the expected 
distribution (ie. lies to the left of, and is more kurtose). This marginal improvement in 
predictive performance (remembering most F-Value are insignificant), after adjusting for 
degrees of freedom, is not expected as the model is optimised to predict the estimation 
responses.49
The fact that most M individual models and the aggregate model evidenced 
holdout predictive ability leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis. We can accept 
hypothesis six that the holdout correlations are significantly positive, and the model has 
predictive ability. Nevertheless, the poor performance (ie. 0.00 < r < 0.50) of some 
individual models, and the aggregate model for some respondents, suggests that the 
evaluations for those respondents are less reliable than for the majority of the sample.
It is customary in applications of conjoint analysis to drop those respondents that 
exhibit low structure and predictive ability (Hair et al, 1987, p. 418). The analysis in 
Appendix L identifies seven respondents for whom either their individual conjoint 
model, or the aggregate model, exhibited low holdout predictive ability. Dropping these 
seven respondents did not, however, improve the performance of the aggregate model 
significantly (see Appendix L, Table L.8). Given the marginal improvement in 
prediction by the new model the remainder of the analysis includes all respondents. 
Chapter 5 will explore further the differences in the individual models.
49 The performance of the M individual models as a whole, based on the pooled distribution of 
residuals, was not significantly different between the holdout and estimation samples (F = 0.837, p > 
0.40). Similarly, the residuals for the aggregate model were not significandy different between the 
holdout and estimation samples (F = 0.649, p > 0.70).
A 4
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4.5.3. Face Validity
The face validity of the conjoint model is assessed by comparing it against the self- 
explicated attribute ratings and two 'naive' model specifications (Parker and Srinivasan, 
1976; Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Green, Goldberg and Montemayor, 1981; Green, 
1984). Prior research has found low but significant correlations between self-explicated 
attribute weights and conjoint estimated attribute weights (Winzar, 1991; Winzar and 
Johnson, 1993). Consistent with these findings, Table 4.10 reports that the cross- 
sectional Pearson correlations between the self-explicated attribute ratings and the 
coefficients for the individual models are low. Only the correlations for the ownership 
and board membership attributes are significant. This suggests that the conjoint 
measures and self-explicated ratings for these attributes are measuring the same 
dimension and therefore the conjoint measures have face validity.
Table 4.10: Pearson Correlations Between Self-Explicated Attribute Importance 
Ratings and Estimated Parameters for the A/Individual Models
Independent
Variable
Pearson's r t-Value 1-Tail
p-Value
Own (fix) 0.248 3.996 0.000
Dir/Ind (/72) 0.082 1.291 0.099
Disp ($3) -0.075 -1.179 0.120
Board 0.515 9.380 0.000
The majority of research comparing conjoint and self-explicated models has found 
that conjoint models have greater predictive ability than self-explicated models (Akaah 
and Korgaonkar, 1983; Green, Goldberg, and Montemayor, 1981; Green, Goldberg and 
Wiley, 1982; Cattin, Hermet and Pioche, 1982; Green, 1984; Winzar, 1991; Winzar and 
Johnson, 1993). Studies by Leigh, McKay and Summers (1984) and Akaah (1991), 
however, have found the opposite and suggest that self-explicated models perform 
better than conjoint models.
I
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To test the explanatory power of the self-explicated responses a self-explicated 
model was calculated for each respondent by multiplying their 'importance' rating for 
each attribute by the attribute level and summing across attributes for each case. The 
values for the self-explicated model were then correlated with each respondent's 
estimation sample evaluations. Table 4.11 compares the distribution of correlations for 
the self-explicated and M individual models. The average correlation for the self- 
explicated model is lower than the average correlation for the A/individual models. The 
X2 statistic for the collapsed categories indicates there are significantly more low 
correlations for the self-explicated models than for the A/individual models.
Table 4.11: Distribution of Correlations Between Estimation Control Evaluations 
and Control Predicted by the A/Individual and Self-Explicated Models
Range for Frequency of r for:a
Pearson's r M Individual 
Models
Self-Explicated
Models
<0.50 0 48
0.51-0.55 0 24
0.56-0.60 0 28
0.61-0.65 1 34
0.66-0.70 3 41
0.71-0.75 16 32
0.76-0.80 29 28
0.81-0.85 66 10
0.86-0.90 81 1
0.91-0.95 47 0
0.96-1.00 3 0
Total n = 246 246
Mean r 0.8466 0.6190
Median r 0.8564 0.6324
X2 (df = 6) = 7502.8
p < 0.000
a See x2, statistic for equivalence of frequencies, based on 7 collapsed categories.
Appendix M, Figure M.4 reports a plot of the two distributions sorted by the 
correlation for the self-explicated model. The diagram shows that in every case the 
individual model performed better than the self-explicated model. An F-test was
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constructed to test if the explanatory power of the two models was the same (ie. test 
based on difference in R2) and 70.7 per cent of these F-Values were significant (p < 
0.01). In addition, an F-ratio between the pooled residuals for the self-explicated and M 
individual models, scaled by the respective degrees of freedom, was significant (p < 
0.001) for both the estimation (F = 61.2, df = 7872, 6642) and holdout samples (F = 
79.5, df = 1476, 1476). It can be concluded that the estimated models outperform the 
self-explicated weights in predicting the estimation and holdout sample judgements.
The final test of the linear model's validity is to compare its performance against 
two 'naive' models. The first model places a 'unit weight' on all attributes and is often 
used as a naive model in research (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). The second model 
consists of a unit weight for ownership, the attribute of regulatory importance, with zero 
weights for the other attributes (Parker and Srinivasan, 1976; Green and Srinivasan, 
1978). The computed values for both the unit weight and ownership models were 
correlated with each respondent's estimation sample evaluations.
Table 4.12 reports the distribution of correlations across respondents for the two 
naive models. The average correlation for both the unit weight and ownership models 
are lower than for the average correlation for the M individual model predictions. Based 
on collapsed categories, the j2 statistic is significant for both the unit weight and 
ownership models indicating the frequency distributions for the two naive models are 
not the same as for the A/individual models.
Appendix N, Figures N.5 and N.6 respectively plot the correlations for the unit 
weight and ownership models versus the correlations for the M individual models. The 
diagrams shows that in all except two cases the m\h individual model performed better 
than the corresponding unit weight and ownership models (one correlation was less and 
one was the same).50
50 Additional F-tests indicated that the M individual models had significantly (p < 0.01) greater 
explanatory power (ie. test based on difference in R2) than 89.0 per cent of the M individual self- 
explicated models, and 64.2 per cent ownership models.
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Table 4.12: Distribution of Correlations Between Estimation Control Evaluations 
and Control Predicted by the A/Individual and Two Naive Models
Range for 
Pearson's r
Frequency of r for:a
M Individual 
Models
Unit Weight 
Models
Ownership
Models
<0.50 0 122 61
0.51-0.55 0 44 16
0.56-0.60 0 32 26
0.61-0.65 1 20 28
0.66-0.70 3 14 23
0.71-0.75 16 10 24
0.76-0.80 29 4 25
0.81-0.85 66 0 22
0.86-0.90 81 0 12
0.91-0.95 47 0 9
0.96-1.00 3 0 0
Total n = 246 246 246
Mean r 0.8466 0.5027 0.6151
Median r 0.8564 0.5023 0.6460
X1 (df = 6) 13216.8 5751.4
p <0.001 p< 0.001
See j2 statistic for equivalence of frequencies, based on 7 collapsed categories.
Finally, the F-statistic constructed from the pooled residuals indicated that the M 
individual models resulted in significantly less error (ie. sums of squares) than the unit 
weight model (F = 6.79; df = 7872, 6642; p < 0.001), and the ownership model (F = 
2.90; df =7872, 6642; p < 0.001). This evidence supports the conclusion that the M 
individual models outperform both the unit weight and ownership models in predicting 
the estimation sample responses and therefore the control model has face validity.
4.6. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
The chapter presented an overview of responses, estimated the individual and 
aggregate level control models, and tested the predictive ability of those models. There
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was no evidence of non-response bias. The responses were also found to be consistent 
and in that sense the measures provided reliable data for the model estimation.
Table 4.13 summarises the generic hypotheses and the results for the hypothesis 
testing reported in the chapter.
Table 4.13: Summary of Hypotheses and Major Results
Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis One: Ownership is positively Table 4.5
related to degree of control
H0: P\=^ H0: Rejected
ft > 0 H,: Accepted
Hypothesis Two: Directness of ownership is Table 4.5
positively related to degree of control
H0: ft = 0 H0: Rejected
H2: ft > 0 H2: Accepted
Hypothesis Three: Dispersion is negatively Table 4.5
related to degree of control
ft = 0 H0: Rejected
H3: ft<0 H3: Accepted
Hypothesis Four: Board membership is Table 4.5
positively related to degree of control
Ho: ft = 0 H0: Rejected
H4: ft > 0 H4: Accepted
Hypothesis Five: At least one attribute is Table 4.6
weighted differently in the model
H0: ft = ft (/'* *; fork = 1,2,3,4)
H5: At least one ft ^ ft
Hq: Rejected
H5: Accepted
(All sig. different)
Hypothesis Six: The predicted and actual Tables 4.8, 4.9, Figures
decisions are positively correlated 4.1, 4.2
H0: /7 = 0 Hq: Rejected
H6: p>0 H6: Accepted
The estimated aggregate model supported hypotheses one to four that all the 
attributes have a significant direct effect on degree of control. The individual level 
analysis was less conclusive and suggested that the directness of ownership and
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dispersion attributes are significant for control assessments for only some subjects. All 
four attribute coefficients were, however, found to be different to each other at both the 
individual and aggregate levels, rejecting the null for hypothesis five.
The estimated parameters for the model indicated that ownership and board 
membership are perceived to be the most important attributes in dominant control 
relations. However, the implicit weights for indirect ownership links, and low levels of 
dispersion of non-owned equity, suggests these attributes are perceived to mitigate the 
level of dominant control achieved through ownership and board membership.
The predictive ability analysis supported hypothesis six, that the model has 
predictive ability, for both the estimation and holdout samples. The aggregate model, 
however, did not perform as well as the M individual models in predicting the estimation 
sample judgements, although it did provide better predictions for the holdout sample. 
The estimated conjoint models perform better than three alternative specifications. 
Specifically, the individual models provide better predictions for the estimation sample 
than either the self-explicated model, a unit weight model, or an ownership only model 
(see Tables 4.11 and 4.12).
The conclusion from all the analysis is that the estimated conjoint models support 
the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2. The following chapter extends this 
analysis and considers the sensitivity to assumptions, and stability, of the estimated 
models.
BOND UNIVERSITY
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CHAPTER FIVE :
SENSITIVITY AND STABILITY ANALYSIS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to test both the sensitivity and stability of the 
individual and aggregate level models estimated in Chapter 4. As discussed in Chapter 
3 (see analysis step six in section 3.8.6.), testing the model's sensitivity involves analysis 
of four issues. First the pooled model is estimated and its predictive ability compared 
with the aggregate (ie. average) model. Second the robustness of the model to 
violations of the assumptions of the OLS estimation technique are tested. Third and 
fourth, the sensitivity of the control model to the assumptions that it is linear additive 
and main effects only, is tested.
Analysis of the model's stability is also discussed in Chapter 3 (see analysis step 
seven in section 3.8.7.). First the stability of the model across the individuals is tested. 
Second, the stability of the model between the two cultural groups represented in the 
sample (ie. the US and Australia) is analysed. Throughout this analysis predictive ability 
(the correlation between the control evaluations and the predictions for the different 
model specifications) is the key indicator of the model's sensitivity and stability.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 explores the sensitivity of the 
estimates to violations in the assumptions of the statistical methods and sensitivity to 
violations in the assumptions of the theoretical control model. Section 5.3 analyses the 
stability of the estimated control model across individuals and across cultural 
boundaries. Section 5.4 then considers within culture differences in the structure of the 
control model. The final section summarises the findings.
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5.2. SENSITIVITY TO ASSUMPTION VIOLATION
5.2.1. Tests of Pooled Aggregate Model
It was assumed in Chapter 3 that the average model was a better aggregate model 
than a pooled model in terms of predictive ability. Sensitivity to this assumption is 
explored by estimating and comparing the predictive performance of a pooled cross- 
sectional OLS model, a generalised least squares (GLS) model, and a Kmenta (1986) 
type model.51 The aggregate model in Table 4.5 is the comparison point in this analysis.
Table 5.1 presents the three estimated pooled models. The estimates for the 
pooled cross-sectional OLS model are inefficient as the disturbances exhibit both cross- 
sectional heterogeneity and cross-sectional contemporaneous correlation (Judge et al, 
1985, 1988; Dielman, 1989).52 Therefore conventional F and t tests of significance are 
no longer valid. The GLS model adjusts for the problem of heterogeneity in the 
disturbance covariance matrix for the OLS model (see Appendix K). The Kmenta 
(1986) pooled cross-sectional model adjusts for both heterogeneous and 
contemporaneously correlated disturbance problems (hereafter referred to as the 
'Kmenta' model).
Despite the differences in the estimation techniques, the parameter estimates for 
the three estimation techniques are virtually identical. The Kmenta model, however, 
exhibits greater estimation sample explanatory power (ie. R2) than the pooled OLS 
model, pooled GLS model, and the aggregate model (see Table 4.5 for the latter). This 
is expected as the Kmenta model incorporates more sample information and should fit
51 See Appendix K for a discussion of pooled cross-sectional regression.
52 A Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistic r) was significant (ij = 132.9, X2a=o.o\,df=\ = 6.635) 
indicating heterogeneous disturbances (White et al, 1990, p. 90.; Judge et al, 1985, pp. 446-447). 
White's test for heterogeneous disturbances (and other misspecifications) was also significant = 
51.1, df = 1, p < 0.001) confirming that the disturbance for the OLS model are heteroskedastic (White 
et al, 1990, p. 90; Judge et al, 1985, pp. 453). In addition, a Breusch-Pagan test statistic LlM was also 
significant (7-lm = 40425, df = 30135, p < 0.001) indicating that there was significant cross-sectional 
correlation in the disturbances (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 474-477).
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the estimation sample better than the other models. Table 5.1 reports the holdout 
predictive ability correlations for the pooled models and the results of Fisher r-tests for 
difference in correlation between the pooled models and the aggregate model. Despite 
the superior in-sample performance, neither the Kmenta, pooled OLS, nor the pooled 
GLS models, exhibit greater holdout sample predictive ability than the aggregate model.
Table 5.1: Parameter Estimates for OLS, GLS and Kmenta 
Pooled Cross-Sectional Models
Variable
OLS a GLS Kmenta b
Pj 1-Tail
(t-Value) p-Value
pj 1-Tail
(t-Value) p-Value
Pj 1-Tail
(t-Value) p-Value
A
Constant (fiQ) -2.329 -2.366 -2.405
(-83.4) <0.001 (-86.9) <0.001 (-90.7) <0.001
Own (y9,) 3.666 3.761 3.856
(84.5) <0.001 (88.8) <0.001 (93.6) <0.001
Dir/Ind (/J2) 0.191 0.184 0.178
(9.5) <0.001 (9.3) <0.001 (9.3) <0.001
Disp 0?3) -0.806 -0.787 -0.765
(-12.4) <0.001 (-12.4) <0.001 (-12.4) <0.001
Board 1.959 1.965 1.969
(60.2) <0.001 (61.9) <0.001 (63.7) <0.001
F-Value 2751.3 <0.001 2990.2 <0.001 3261.8 <0.001
Estimation Sample
Pearson's r 0.7636 0.7703 0.7898
z-Valuec -0.02 1.41 5.85
R2 0.5831 0.5933 0.6238d
Holdout Sample
Pearson's r 0.8173 0.8173 0.8172
z-Value 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
R2 0.6680 0.6679 0.6678
a The GLS model is an OLS estimation after weighting the M individual Yl and matrices by o; '.
b The Kmenta model is estimated as per Kmenta (1986, pp. 616-625) with p = 0 (ie. zero auto­
correlation).
c z-Value for Fisher Z-test for differences in the pooled and aggregate model correlations. 
d Buse R2 (see Judge et al, 1985, pp. 477-478).
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A more important issue is that the residuals for the GLS and Kmenta models 
exhibited significant heterogeneity and contemporaneous correlation. This raises the 
question as to the underlying cause of the observed covariance matrix. The pattern in 
the residuals could be due to different groups of individuals (ie. g cz {/w = 1, 2, 3, ..., 
M}) behaving differently. These differences would not be captured by the variables in 
the model. Section 5.3 explores this issue further. The problems with the structure of 
the covariance matrix, and the predictive ability evidence, leads to the conclusion that 
the average model is as good an aggregate model as any of the pooled models. The 
results in Chapter 4 are therefore robust to the assumed average model for aggregate 
level testing of the generic hypotheses. More importantly, the evidence provides further 
support to hypothesis six in that the aggregate (ie. average) model has superior holdout 
sample predictive ability relative to the pooled models.
5.2.2. Tests of Assumptions of OLS Estimation
The analysis in Chapter 4 assumes that OLS estimation is robust to the assumption 
that the dependent variable was interval rather than ordinal scaled. To test the 
sensitivity of the analysis to this assumption the structure and performance of the OLS 
model is compared with models estimated using techniques that assume only a limited 
(binary or ordinal) dependent variable. Appendix O, Table 0.10, discusses and presents 
the estimated parameters for pooled cross-sectional logit and probit models estimated 
from the respondents' binary control judgements for the 32 estimation cases.53 Table 
0.10 also reports the results for OLS and Kmenta linear probability models (ie. effects 
coded, -1 for not-control and 1 for control, binary regression). An ordered probit 
model, which has the advantage of capturing more information from the ten point
53 Individual level logit and probit models are not presented as the estimation algorithms failed to 
converge for a significant fraction of the sample.
unstandardized dependent variable, was also estimated.54 These models exhibited 
similar structural properties and were not too dissimlar to the aggregate model reported 
in Chapter 4. A more important issue is the relative predictive ability of the binary, 
ordinal, and interval models. Table 5.2 reports the percentage of predictions from each 
model that correctly captures the respondent judgements of'not-control' and 'control', as 
well as the total percentage correct.
Table 5.2: Comparison of Percentage Correct Predictions and Normalised Success 
Index for Different Estimation Techniques
% Predictions Correct Success
Estimation Model Not-
control
Control Total Index
Interval DV- Individual Level
OLS - M Individual Interval 78.52% 91.91% 85.26% 0.705
OLS - Aggregate Model 68.68% 86.02% 76.80% 0.534
Interval DV - Pooled Level
OLS - Interval 68.68% 86.02% 76.80% 0.534
Kmenta - Interval 65.88% 79.26% 72.65% 0,453
Binary DV - Pooled Level
OLS - Linear Prob 70.00% 77.56% 74.78% 0.457
Kmenta - Linear Prob 78.12% 80.12% 79.43% 0.544
Logit 78.12% 80.12% 79.43% 0.544
Probit 78.12% 80.12% 79.43% 0.544
Ordinal DV - Pooled Level
Ordered Probit 78.12% 80.12% 79.43% 0.544
Not surprisingly the M individual OLS models, which are optimised to the 
individual rather than group behaviour, perform the best in predicting the 'not-control' 
and 'control' evaluations of the respondent. The pooled cross-sectional OLS and
54 An ordered probit, rather than ordered logit, model was estimated because it allows the 
disturbances to be correlated (Judge et al, 1985, p. 772). In contrast, ordered logit assumes that the 
disturbances are independently and identically distributed with Weibull density functions. The 
consequence of this assumption is that the logit model has the property of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (ie. the model odds are unaffected by the presence of additional alternatives), which can be 
a significant negative feature in such models unless the alternatives are distinct (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 
770-771). This is unlikely in the current study, therefore only a ordered probit is estimated.
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Rmenta interval dependent variable models do not perform as well as the M individual 
models. However, the pooled cross-sectional OLS models performed as well as the 
pooled Kmenta linear probability, logit, probit and ordered probit models, which 
performed exactly the same. All models performed slightly better than the pooled OLS 
linear probability model.
A Hensher-Johnson normalised success index was calculated to compare the 
performance of the respective models (see White et al, 1990; Hensher and Johnson, 
1981; and Maddala, 1983). The index, reported in Table 5.2, shows that neither the 
logit nor probit (binary and ordered) pooled models were superior to the Kmenta linear 
probability pooled model in recapturing the 'not-control' and 'control' judgements of the 
respondents. More importantly, the M individual OLS models out predict all the other 
models, providing additional support for hypothesis six.
The conclusion from this analysis is that OLS regression estimation techniques are 
robust to the joint assumption that the standardised input judgements are interval scale 
and that the theoretical properties of OLS regression are not seriously violated. This is 
consistent with other researchers who have found OLS robust to conjoint ordinal 
measurement (Jain et al, 1979; Winzar, Duncan and McNamara, 1992).
5.2.3. Tests of Linearity in Variables
The control model was theorised to be linear additive in the attributes. An ideal 
point and a quadratic model are estimated as alternatives to this assumed linear model. 
The ideal point model posits that the control evaluation (DCi>m) is negatively related to 
the squared distance (<7,2) of the location (Xy) of the /th case from the /wth individual's 
ideal point (Pj m) for attribute j (Carroll, 1972; Green and Srinivasan, 1978; see the 
conjoint design discussion in Appendix D). For example, ownership above some ideal 
level (say 45 per cent) may be weighted more heavily than lower ownership levels. This 
implies an increasing curvilinear relationship between control and ownership. The
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essential nature of the ideal point model is captured in equation 5.1 by including Xjj2 in 
addition to Xjj (Carroll, 1972; Green and Srinivasan, 1978; also see Appendix D). The 
values for the ownership, directness of ownership, dispersion, and board membership 
attributes were squared (ie. giXjj) =Xi2,j = 1, 2, 3, 4) to create four new variables {X^, 
y = 1, 2, 3, 4) and the following equation estimated for each respondent (transformed 
variables and parameters for transformed variables are indicated " ' "):
DC|>= A),m + A,m0wnf + + ft^Disp; + ^^Board,
+ A,m' Own/ + p2>n; Dir/Ind/ + ^ Disp/ + pA>m' Board/ +^>’
(5.1)
The second model is a simple quadratic model. The independent variables in the 
simple quadratic model consist of the squared values of the four attributes. This model 
provides a measure of the direct effect of each quadratic variable on the individual's 
judgement process. In that sense it is a base against which to evaluate the ideal point 
model. This base is important because of the high correlation (r > 0.94) between linear 
and non-linear independent variables for the ideal model (see Appendix P, Table P.ll 
for correlation matrix).55
The results for the average estimated parameters for the ideal point and quadratic 
models are reported in Table 5.3. Appendix P, Table P.12 also reports the quartile 
distribution for the parameters for the two models. Over 99 per cent of the F-statistics 
for the M individual ideal point models, and all the F-statistics for the M individual 
quadratic models, are significant at the 0.01 level. The F-statistic for the combined 
disturbances is also significant (p < 0.001). The conclusion is that the models have 
significant explanatory power.
The high covariance and large sampling variances for the estimators means that the parameter 
estimates and t-statistics for the ideal point model are likely to be misleading (Johnston, 1984; Gujarati, 
1988; Judge et al, 1985, 1988).
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Table 5.3: Average Estimated Parameters for Ideal Point and Quadratic Models
Ideal Point Model Quadratic Model
Independent
Variable
A
Pim
(t-Value)
1-Tail
p-Value
A
Pi,m
(t-Value)
1-Tail
p-Value
A
Constant (/?0) -2.627
a(-43.92) <0.001
-1.319
(-67.96) <0.001
Own (£j) 4.761
(15.25) <0.001
-
Dir/Ind (y?2) 0.150
(3.29) 0.002
- -
Disp {p3) -0.553
(-3.21) 0.002
- -
Board 2.597
(14.65) <0.001
- -
Own2 (£,') -1.446
(-3.68) <0.001
4.604
(49.42) <0.001
Dir/Ind2 {p2') 0.041
(0.97) 0.333
0.176
(7.58) <0.001
Disp2 (£,') -0.843
(-1.62) 0.107
-2.537
(-8.84) <0.001
Board2 (^4') -0.638
(-4.38) <0.001
1.878
(29.34) <0.001
F-Valueb
% Sig. at a = 0.0lc
9.524
99.19%
<0.001 6.469
100.00%
<0.001
R2 ^
Adjusted R2
0.5852
0.4409
0.5499
0.4832
a t-test for H0: Pj — = 0. 
b F-statistic based on the pooled residuals.
c Percentage of A/ individual F-statistics significant for model comparisons. 
d R2 and adjusted R2 for the average ideal point and quadratic models.
Only the negative parameters for the non-linear values of ownership and board 
membership are significant. The negative coefficients for ownership and board 
membership imply that larger values of these two attributes are weighted less heavily 
than small values. The results for the quadratic model suggest, however, that the 
parameters for non-linear ownership, directness of ownership, and board membership, 
are significantly positive. Dispersion, due to its negative scale, is significantly negative.
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The quadratic model implies that larger values for all the attributes are weighted more 
heavily. The difference between the ideal point and quadratic models probably reflects 
the confounding effects of high multi-colinearity amongst the regressors on the 
parameter estimates for the ideal point model. Finally, the significant parameters mean 
that the null for hypothesis seven is rejected.
Table 5.4: Estimation and Holdout Sample Prediction Correlations and F-tests for 
Incremental Explanation by Ideal Point and Quadratic Models
Ideal Point Model Quadratic Model
Estimation Sample
0.7650
1.183
p <0.001
984/5658
2.85%
0.7416
1.140
p< 0.001
6642/6642
0.00%
Pearson's r
F-Valuea
Sig
dfl/df2
% Sig. at a = 0.01b
Holdout Sample
0.7880
0.923 
p > 0.50 
1476/1476 
0.00%
0.7471
1.037 
p = 0.243 
1476/1476
0.00%
Pearson's r
F-Valuec
Sig
dfl/df2
% Sig. at a = 0.0lb
a F-statistic for pooled residuals tests (1) for the ideal model Hq: the non-linear attributes do 
not have incremental explanatory power over the four linear attributes; (2) for the 
quadratic model Hq: the residuals for the quadratic model are not significantly greater than 
the residuals for the M individual linear.
b Percentage of M individual F-statistics significant.
c F-statistic for pooled residuals tests Hq! Holdout sample errors for the ideal point and 
quadratic models no greater than the holdout errors for the M individual linear models.
Prediction correlations for the estimation and holdout samples are reported in 
Table 5.4. The estimation sample correlations for the ideal and quadratic models are no 
better than those for the base aggregate model (see Table 4.5). An individual and 
pooled F-statistic was constructed to test if the addition of the four non-linear variables 
in the ideal point model had incremental explanatory power. Of the individual F- 
statistics, only 2.8 percent indicated that the ideal point model had significantly (p < 
0.01) more explanatory power, and three (ie. 1.22 per cent) individual F-statistics
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indicated that the ideal point model had significantly less explanatory power (Fa = 0 99 4 
23 = 0 .072), than the individual linear models. The F-statistic for the pooled residuals 
was significant, indicating increased explanatory power overall.
None of the individual quadratic models exhibited significantly more or less 
prediction error (ie. F-statistics all insignificant) than for the base linear model (although 
the pooled F-statistic was significant). This evidence suggests that the two non-linear 
models do not fit the estimation data any better or worse than the base linear model at 
either the individual or aggregate levels.
The holdout correlation rates, reported in Table 5.4, are significantly lower for the 
average ideal point and quadratic models than for the linear aggregate model. A Fisher 
z-test for difference in holdout prediction correlations between the aggregate model and 
both the ideal point model (z = -3.166), and the quadratic model (z = -6.991), were 
significant (p < 0.001). None of the M individual F-statistics for increase in holdout 
errors are significant, nor is the F-statistic for the pooled prediction errors (see Table 
5.4). In addition, none of the M individual F-statistics for either model indicated 
significantly less holdout sample error (Fa = o.99( 6, 6 = 0 118). This evidence leads to 
the conclusion that neither the ideal point nor the quadratic models perform significantly 
better or worse than the M individual linear models in predicting the holdout 
judgements.
The evidence for the non-linear models indicates that they are no better than the 
simple four attribute linear model in explaining the estimation sample judgements. The 
base linear model, however, does have greater predictive ability for the holdout sample 
than either of the two non-linear models. This higher out of sample prediction rate, and 
the simplicity of the base linear model, lead to the conclusion that it is the superior 
model for control evaluations.
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5.2.4. Tests of Interaction Effects
The final assumption tested is the assumption that the control model is a main 
effects only model. The null to hypothesis eight states that all two-way interaction will 
be zero (ie. fij' - 0, y = 5 to 10). The model was re-estimated for each individual with 
additional composite variables to capture the two-way interactions. The six interaction 
variables were highly correlated with each other and with the four main effects attributes 
(see Appendix Q, Table Q.13). Therefore to estimate the incremental explanatory 
power of each interaction term the model was estimated swapping in one of the six 
interaction variables (Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan, 1990). A combined interaction model 
was also estimated.
The average estimated parameters for the six two-way interaction models and the 
combined interaction model are reported in Table 5.5. The F-statistics for the pooled 
disturbances suggest that all the specifications of the M individual two-way interactions 
models have significant explanatory power. Over 97 per cent of the M individual F- 
statistics were significant (p < 0.01). The significant t-statistics for all but the dispersion 
and board membership two-way interaction means that the null to hypothesis eight is 
rejected. The estimated interaction parameters $5 to % are significantly non-zero. Only 
the interaction between dispersion and board membership is insignificant (ie. Ao - °) 
for interaction model 6 and the combined interaction model.
The rejection of the null hypothesis means that the validity of the assumed linear 
model rests on its relative predictive ability. Table 5.6 reports the estimation sample 
prediction rates for the average interaction models. The estimation sample prediction 
correlations are similar to those for the linear aggregate model (see Table 4.8).
Table 5.5: Average Parameter Estimates for the Two-Way 
Interaction Control Models
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Combined
A A A A A A A
Independent B - arj.m Pj.m P].m Pjm Pjm Pj.m
Variable (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value)
A
Constant (/?0) -2.398 -2.019 -2.981 -2.189 -2.468 -2.296 -2.287
b(-67.02) (-57.33) (-54.28) (-64.38) (-73.36) (-59.67) (-32.64)
Own {f}x) 3.836 2.718 5.454 3.646 3.690 3.682 3.479
(44.07) (29.21) (39.00) (49.66) (50.25) (49.80) (21.33)
Dir/Ind (^2) 0.318 0.176 0.227 -0.074 0.450 0.191 -0.329
(7.76) (7.09) (9.18) (-2.18) (9.53) (7.76) (-5.16)
Disp (^3) -0.797 -3.176 -1.049 -1.691 -0.806 -1.065 -4.582
(-8.76) (-17.54) (-11.03) (-11.92) (-8.84) (-4.88) (-13.82)
Board C#*) 1.968 2.066 3.300 1.959 2.218 1.881 3.561
(29.07) (30.41) (26.33) (29.13) (30.68) (22.57) (28.97)
Own*Dir/Ind (^g) -0.339 - - - - - 1.436
(-3.44) - - - - - (13.86)
Own*Disp - 6.320 - - - - 7.281
- (17.01) - - - - (18.59)
Own*Board (^7) - - -3.576 - - - -3.249
- - (-14.04) - - - (-12.53)
Dir/Ind*Disp (jffg) - - - 1.770 - - 1.766
- - - (11.40) - - (11.43)
Dir/Ind*Board (^9) . - - - -0.518 - -0.536
- - - - (-8.27) - (-8.61)
Disp*Board (y9j0) - - - - - 0.517 -0.193
- - - (1.62) (-0.58)
F-Valuec 14.02 15.21 16.35 14.43 13.94 14.46 9.81
Sig. p< 0.001 p< 0.001 p< 0.001 p <0.001 p <0.001 p <0.001 p <0.001
% Sig. at a = 0.01d 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.6%
R2 e 0.5836 0.5966 0.6002 0.5882 0.5849 0.5833 0.6192
Adjusted R2 0.5185 0.5336 0.5378 0.5239 0.5200 0.5182 0.4782
a Mean fiJ for the M individual models is signified by the ' subscript. 
b |t-values| > 3.33 are significant at p < 0.001, two-tailed test. 
c F-statistic based on the pooled residuals.
d Percentage of M individual F-statistics significant for model comparisons. 
e R2 and adjusted R2 for the average two-way interaction models.
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Individual and aggregate level F-statistics, reported in Table 5.6, test the 
incremental explanatory power of the interaction models over the base linear model. 
Less than eleven per cent of the individual F-statistics are significant for interaction 
models 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. About twenty per cent of the individual F-statistics are 
significant for interaction model 3 and the combined interaction model (see Appendix Q, 
Figures Q.7 and Q.8 for the distribution of F-Values for the six single interaction models 
and the combined interaction model). The aggregate level F-statistics are significant for 
models 2, 3, and 6, and the combined interaction model.
Table 5.6: Prediction Correlations and F-test for Incremental Explanation by 
Interaction Variables for Estimation and Holdout Samples
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Combined
Estimation Samnle
Pearson's r 0.7639 0.7724 0.7748 0.7670 0.7648 0.7637 0.7869
F-Valuea 0.866 2.535 4.131 1.438 0.758 1.479 2.051
Sig. p > 0.50 p< 0.001 p< 0.001 p< 0.001 p > 0.50 p <0.001 p <0.001
dfl/df2 246/6396 246/6396 246/6396 246/6396 246/6396 246/6396 1476/5166
% Sig. at a = 0.01 h 1.22% 10.16% 20.33% 3.66% 0.81% 0.81% 19.51%
Holdout Sample
Pearson's r 0.8175 0.8180 0.8096 0.8191 0.8178 0.8176 0.8112
F-Valuec 1.006 0.998 0.971 1.049 0.992 0.937 0.904
Sig. p = 0.451 p > 0.50 p > 0.50 p = 0.181 p > 0.50 p > 0.50 p > 0.50
dfl/df2 1476/1476 1476/1476 1476/1476 1476/1476 1476/1476 1476/1476 1476/1476
% Sig. at a = 0.01b 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
a F-statistic for pooled estimation sample residuals tests H0: addition of the two-way interaction 
regressors do not lead to incremental explanatory power over the M individual linear models.
b Percentage of M individual F-statistics significant.
c F-statistic for pooled holdout sample residuals tests Hq: Holdout sample errors for the interaction 
models are not greater than the holdout errors for the M individual linear models.
The result for the combined model is largely driven by the high proportion of 
individuals for which model 3, the ownership-board membership two-way interaction 
model, is significant. This suggests that for some individuals two-way ownership-board 
membership interaction might be a better description of their judgements. The 
possibility of different structural forms for different individuals is explored in section 5.3.
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It should be noted, however, that the adjusted R2 for the six interaction models are 
similar to that for the linear aggregate model, and the adjusted R2 for the combined 
interaction model is lower than for the linear aggregate model. Hence caution should be 
exercised in interpreting the in-sample performance of the different models. A more 
important criterion is the holdout sample prediction rate.
The correlation between the holdout judgements and predicted control scores, 
reported in Table 5.6, are virtually the same as for the linear model reported in Table 4.9 
(Fisher z-tests all insignificant, 0.20 < p < 0.50). The F-statistic for the ratio of errors 
for the M individual interaction models and the M individual linear models indicated that 
the interaction models have neither significantly more, nor significantly less, explanatory 
power for the holdout sample than the linear model (see Appendix Q, Figure Q.9 for the 
distribution of F-Values). The F-Value for the pooled disturbances, reported in Table 
5.6, confirms the individual level tests.
The conclusion from these statistics is that the interaction models are no better or 
worse in holdout prediction than the simple linear model. This is in spite of some of the 
interaction models having better estimation sample fit for a minority of individuals. The 
linear model is therefore a robust description of the individual judgement process for the 
majority of the respondents. The more complex two-way interaction models do not 
offer significant predictive ability gains to off-set their complexity.
5.3. STABILITY OF THE CONTROL MODEL
5.3.1. Analysis of Stability Across Individuals
This section addresses the stability of the model across individuals. In its null 
form hypothesis nine states that the beta coefficients will be equal across the M 
individuals (ie. Pj>m = Pj, j = 1, 2, 3, 4; V /n g (1, 2, ..., M}). To test this hypothesis 
an F-statistic is constructed based on an unrestricted model (ie. the M individual models
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which are equivalent to a SUR estimation - see Appendix K) and a restricted GLS cross- 
sectional model where all M x £ individual parameters are restricted to be the same 
across respondents (but not attributes).56 The F-statistic is 2.83 and is significant (df = 
984, 6642; p < 0.001). The null hypothesis is therefore rejected and the alternative, that 
some of the individual parameter vectors differ to the vector of restricted coefficients, is 
accepted (ie. At least one Pj m * fij).
5.3.2. Clustering of Individual Models
To further explore the differences across the M individual models the estimated 
parameters were cluster analysed to identify groups of respondents whose wth individual 
models were similar in structure (Green and DeSarbo, 1978; Huber and Moore, 1979; 
Louviere, 1988). A k-means cluster analysis was performed using the SAS FASTCLUS 
procedure to identify distinct groups of respondents that exhibited similar implicit 
parameters for their individual control models.57
Figure 5.1 plots the unexplained variance (1-R2) for the cluster solutions for the 1 
to 15-mean cluster solutions against the number of clusters as an indicator of the number 
of'significant' clusters (SAS, 1988a; Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). This is akin to 
the scree test for identifying factors in factor analysis. The flattening of the rate of 
improvement in explanatory power in the plot at four clusters suggests that there are 
four clusters in the data. A graphical view of the cluster structure is provided in 
Appendix R, Figure R.10, which plots the cluster number for each respondent in the 
multi-dimensional space of the input variables (ie. the estimated parameters). For
56 Judge et al (1988, pp. 456-459) note this statistic is equivalent to estimating XF = gU, J = M x
j (ie. j independent restrictions), which is distributed F/M- to test the null hypothesis that the M
individual parameter vectors are equal (ie. fi] X = = pjj = ... = Pjj^)
57 This is a non-hierarchical method (ie. dusters do not form a tree structure) which identifies 
clusters based on Euclidean distances computed from the M individual model parameter estimates 
(Aldenderfer and Blashfied, 1984; Kaufman and Rousseeaw, 1990). The k-means method is 
particularly appropriate for large data sets where there are over 100 observations, such as in the current 
study (SAS, 1988a, pp. 493-494).
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comparative purposes the results for the three and five cluster solutions are reported in 
Appendix S.58
Figure 5.1: Plot of Unexplained Variance Against 
Number of Clusters for all A/Individuals
Table 5.7 reports the descriptive statistics for the model parameters for each 
cluster. Cluster one consists of the 'ownership-board' respondents that placed greater 
v/eight on ownership and board membership than any of the other attributes. The 
second cluster is the 'ownership' respondents that have a high ownership weighing and 
only a moderate 'board' weighting. The third group is the 'ownership-board-dispersion' 
respondents that place high weights on all attributes except the ratio of direct to indirect 
ownership. The final group are the 'ownership-dispersion' type respondents that 
implicitly judge ownership and the negative effects of dispersion to be the more 
important attributes of control. Similar cluster patterns are exhibited by the groups for 
the three and five cluster solutions (see Appendix T, Tables T. 14 and T. 15).
58 The three, four and five cluster solutions respectively explain 51.5, 62.4, and 66.2 per cent of 
the variation in the combined input variables.
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Table 5.7: Cluster Profile for 4 Cluster Solution
Coefficient
Cluster Number and Title
R2 aOne
'(hvn/Board
Two
'Own'
Three
'Own/ 
Board/Disp'
Four
' Own/D isp'
Constant (>90) -2.55b -2.36 -2.84 -1.79 0.475
(0.32) (0.31) (0.20) (0.40)
Own ($,) 2.37 4.49 3.70 3.81 0.592
(0.86) (0.59) (0.80) (0.80)
Dir/Ind (/?2) 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.34 0.049
(0.37) (0.32) (0.27) (0.51)
Disp 0?3) -0.08 -0.66 1.53 -2.86 0.724
(0.76) (0.79) (0.85) (0.65)
Board (#,) 3.15 1.44 2.26 1.24 0.583
(0.56) (0.72) (0.62) (0.79)
Frequency
Percentage
72
29.3%
103
41.9%
18
7.3%
53
21.5%
n= 246
a R2 is the explanatory power of the cluster structure to predict each of the input coefficients.
b Mean input coefficient (Std.Dev.) for the cluster.
5.3.3. Validity of the Cluster Structure
The cluster structure is further explored by testing if cluster membership is a 
significant factor in explaining between individual differences in the self-explicated 
weights, residual variance, and measures of accounting expertise. Table 5.8 summarises 
the ANOVA results for each self-explicated variable. The cluster structure is not 
significantly related to the respondent's self-explicated rating of either the complexity of 
ownership (direct vs indirect mix), dispersion (ie. potential to control), or the level of 
actual control. However, the cluster structure is significantly (p < 0.001) related to the 
self-explicated rating of majority ownership and majority board membership. Although 
the R2 for the ANOVA analysis is low, the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
main difference in the clusters is the weighting for ownership and board membership, 
and to some extent dispersion (significant at the 0.102 level).
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Table 5.8: ANOVA of Relationship Between Cluster Structure and the Self- 
Explicated Importance Ratings, the Individual Residual Variance, and 
Demographic Variables for the Respondents
Item F-Value p-Value R2
A - Complexity of Ownership 0.86 p = 0.464 0.011
B - Potential/Dispersion 1.45 p = 0.229 0.018
C - Majority Ownership 6.2 p <0.001 0.071
D - Actual Control 2.09 p = 0.102 0.025
E - Majority Board Membership 11.41 p< 0.001 0.124
Individual Model Residual Variance 2.32 p = 0.076 0.028
Accounting Dummy Variables 
EMPLOY 0.07 p = 0.976 0.001
DEGREE 3.15 p = 0.026 0.038
PROF 1.62 p = 0.185 0.019
The significant (p < 0.10) F-Value for the individual model residual variances in 
Table 5.8 suggests that the heteroskedasticity of the residuals is related to the cluster 
structure. This implies that the individual models fit better for some clusters of 
respondents than for other clusters. It is equally possible that this is simply a spurious 
correlation. The residual variance and the coefficient inputs for identifying the clusters 
are not independent and thus clusters will correlate with the residual variance. Caution 
in interpretation is therefore warranted.
Table 5.8 also reports the F-Value for the relationship between the cluster 
structure and dummy variables for prior exposure to accounting. The results suggest 
that neither employment in an accounting related position (EMPLOY = 1 for accounting 
related position, 0 otherwise) nor membership of a professional accounting body (PROF 
= 1 if member of accounting professional group, 0 otherwise) are related to the cluster 
structure. A formal accounting degree (DEGREE = 1 for accounting, 0 otherwise) is, 
however, related to the cluster structure (significant at p < 0.03). Scheffe comparisons
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indicated that there were significantly more non-accounting degree respondents in 
cluster four (the ownership-dispersion cluster) than cluster two (the ownership cluster). 
However, none of the dummy variables for accounting exposure (employment, 
education and professional affiliation) are significantly (at the 0.05 level) related to the 
cross-sectional differences in estimated coefficients. On balance there is no strong 
relationship between accounting exposure and the control judgements.
Finally, Table 5.9 reports the results for an ANOVA testing if the cluster structure 
explained the variation in the individual F-statistics for the incremental explanatory 
power of the two-way interactions (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.9: ANOVA of Relationship Between Cluster Structure and F-Statistics for 
Incremental Explanatory Power of Two-Way Interaction Variables in Individual
Models
Interaction Model8 F-Value p-Value Mean Effectb
Model 1 4.07 p = 0.008 1, 2 <4
Model 2 10.86 p <0.001 1, 2 <4
Model 3 1.71 p = 0.166 none
Model 4 3.57 p = 0.015 3 <4
Model 5 2.75 p = 0.044 none
Model 6 6.69 p< 0.001 1 <2,4
Combined Model 4.07 p = 0.008 1 <4
a See Table 5.5
b SchefFe test for difference in mean effect of cluster = 1, 2, 3, 4; p < 0.05
The cluster structure is significantly (p < 0.01) related to the F-statistics for 
interaction models 1, 2, 6, and the combined interaction model. Scheffe comparisons 
indicate that the F-statistics are significantly (p < 0.05) higher (ie. the interaction model 
has incremental explanatory power and thus is a better fit) for respondents in cluster 
four for interaction models 1 and 2. For interaction model 6, clusters two and four have 
higher average F-values than cluster one, and for the combined model the respondents in 
cluster four have significantly higher F-Values than cluster one respondents. This
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evidence suggests that the significance of the interaction models reported in Table 5.5 is 
driven by the respondents in cluster four who place greater weight on ownership and 
dispersion.
In summary, the four cluster structure indicates that there is diversity of view as to 
the attributes of control. The cluster structure is related to the self-explicated ratings for 
the ownership and board membership attributes. However, the cluster structure is not 
related to prior exposure to accounting, although the structure does indicate that the 
respondents in cluster four are different to the rest of the respondents. This is both in 
terms of exposure to accounting education and the significance of the two-way 
interaction effects in their individual models.
5.3.4. Analysis of Cross-Cultural Differences
The cross-cultural stability of the model was also tested. The null to hypothesis 
ten stated that the parameters for the US and Australian respondents would be equal (ie 
Pj,US~ Pj,Aust> 7=C2,3,4). To test this hypothesis a SUR model (homoskedastic and 
cross-sectionally uncorrelated, see Appendix K for a discussion) was estimated for both 
the US and Australian sub-samples (ie. pooling the responses for each country sub­
sample). Table 5.10 reports the estimated beta vectors and model statistics for the two 
country sub-samples. The SUR estimation is significant (p < 0.001) and all the 
individuals coefficients are significant. The structure of the model is similar to the 
aggregate model in Table 4.5 and the pooled cross-sectional models reported in Table 
5.1 for the entire set of respondents.
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Table 5.10: US and Australian Culture Specific Models and Tests for 
Cross-Cultural Parameter Stability
US Australia H0a: 7th Pj,US~ PjAust
Variable A t-Value
A
Pj t-Value F-Value p-Value
A
Constant (/?0) -2.375
(0.039)
-61.0 -2.431
(0.036)
-67.3 1.11 p = 0.293
Own (^) 4.064
(0.061)
67.2 3.655
(0.056)
65.1 24.53 p <0.001
Dir/Ind (fi2) 0.186
(0.028)
6.6 0.17.
(0.026)
6.6 0.113 p = 0.736
Disp 0?3) -0.891
(0.091)
-9.8 -0.643
(0.084)
-7.6 4.01 p = 0.045
Board (#*) 1.783
(0.045)
39.3 2.140
(0.042)
50.8 33.27 p <0.001
Pearson's r
r2 b
F-Value
0.7908
0.6253
1311.9
p< 0.001
H0b: Pj,US
F= 12.4
p <0.001
— Pj^iust
x2= 61.92
p <0.001
a () = Standard Error for f}- 
b Buse R2 (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 477-478)
An F-statistic and Wald x2 statistic were computed to test if the coefficients for 
the US model were equal to the corresponding coefficients for the Australian model (ie. 
H0b: Pj, US ~ Pjsiusfi and 4). Both these statistics were significant (p < 0.001)
thus the null for hypothesis ten is rejected. To explore which of the individual 
parameters were different between the models, five additional F-statistics were 
computed. The F-statistics, reported in the last column of Table 5.10 test the hypothesis 
that the yth coefficient of the US model is equal to the yth coefficient for the Australian 
model (ie. Hq^. The results show that the estimated parameters for ownership and 
board membership are significantly different (p < 0.001) between the models for the two 
country sub-samples. All other parameters are not significantly different except for
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dispersion which is significant at the 0.05 level. The null for hypothesis ten (ie. that >9 
j,US = PjMst)is therefore rejected fory =1,3,4. That is, P^us* Pj^u&j = U 3- 4
These cross-cultural differences are consistent with the bias that current reporting 
practice would produce. For the Australian sub-sample one would expect a multi­
attribute control model, reflective of the broad concept of control in that country. The 
results are consistent with this. The ownership defined control in the US might be 
expected to produce an ownership dominated control model. The US model has a 
definite bias towards ownership, but the other attributes are also significant. Even the 
US respondents perceive that control is determined by more than just ownership.
5.4. ANALYSIS OF WITHIN CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Within cultural differences were analysed to gain an insight into the between 
cultural differences. The M individual model parameters for each sub-sample were 
cluster analysed to test if the cluster structures for the two countries accounted for the 
significantly different model coefficients. Appendix U reports the cluster identification 
and cluster profiles for the country specific clusters.
The clusters for the two countries are not exactly the same (see Tables U. 16 and 
U. 17). Cluster one for the US has no comparable cluster for the Australian respondents. 
Similarly, cluster three for the Australian sub-sample has no corresponding cluster in the 
US sub-sample. There are, however, some cross-cultural similarities between the within 
culture clusters. Cluster two for the US, that weights ownership and dispersion more 
heavily, corresponds with cluster four in the Australian sub-sample. The 'ownership- 
board' type respondents are in cluster three for the US sub-sample and cluster one for 
the Australian respondents. Finally, clusters four and two represent the 'ownership' only 
respondents respectively in the US and Australian sub-samples. Similar proportions of
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the two sub-samples fall into the corresponding clusters which suggests the between 
country differences are to some extent an artefact of the within sub-sample differences.
5.4.1. Within and Cross-Cultural Differences
The hypothesis that between country differences are driven by the similar patterns 
of within country clustering is tested by comparing the SUR estimated coefficients for 
each of the 'corresponding' clusters in a restricted and unrestricted F-statistic. Table 
5.11 reports the results for this estimation and testing.
Table 5.11: SUR Cross-Sectional Models for Corresponding Clusters
and F-tests for Differences
Coefficient
Cluster Number and Title
'Own/Disp'
US Aust
Two Four
'Own/Board'
US Aust
Three One
'Own'
US Aust
Four Two
'Other'
US Aust
One Three
A
Constant (/?0) -1.62 -2.06“ -2.68 -2.61 -2.32 -2.32 -2.50 -3.01
( 13.98, p c 0.001) (0.86, p = 0.354) (0.009, p = 0.923) (8.53, P = 0.004)
Own ($j) 3.90 3.86 3.85 2.24 4.77 4.83 1.80 3.95
(0.04, p = 0.850) ( 173.59, p< 0.001) (0.33, p == 0.568) (63.18, P <0.001)
Dir/Ind (/y 0.29 0.29 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.32 0.32
(0.0001, p = 0.994) ( 1 13,p = 0.289) (3.96, p = 0.046) (0.001, P = 0.991)
Disp (/?3) -3.17 -2.50 -0.09 0.13 -0.88 -0.71 -0.29 1.76
(6.06, p = 0.014) (1-39, p = 0.237) (0.887, p == 0.346) (25.31, P <0.001)
Board {pp 0.98 1.68 2.39 3.33 1.17 1.17 3.42 2.21
( 26.23, p i 0.001) ( 104.30, )< 0.001) (0.005, p = 0.946) (35.51, P <0.001)
F-Value b
Sig.
6.46
p <0.001
56.08
p <0.001
1.04 
p = 0.394
24.80
p <0.001
Frequency 
Total Percent
21 32
21.5%
39 52
37.0%
39 45
34.1%
11 7
7.3%
a SUR estimated coefficients: (F-statistic, significance) testing for the yth parameter the 
hypothesis H^yth pj us = pj>Austj = 0, 1, 2, 3, OR 4
b F-statistic testing the hypothesis that all y parameters are equal to the corresponding parameter 
for the other country - H^: pj US = PjtAusPj = 0, 1, 2, 3, AND 4.
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All the parameters for the 'ownership' clusters are insignificantly different between 
the two sub-samples. Approximately one third of respondents place the most weight on 
the ownership attribute. The parameters for ownership and dispersion are insignificantly 
different (at 0.01 level) between the US and Australian 'ownership-dispersion' clusters. 
Board membership is, however, weighted differently between the models for these 
matched clusters. For the 'ownership-board' clusters, both ownership and board 
membership parameters are significantly different between the US and Australian 
models. In both cases ownership and board membership are the highest weighted 
attributes, but the US model places more weight on ownership than board membership. 
The reverse is the case for the Australian model. This probably reflects the regulatory 
bias of each country. The 'other' cluster represents the remaining clusters for the US 
and Australian sub-samples for which there was no 'corresponding' cluster. All except 
the parameters for the constant and direct versus indirect ownership attribute are 
significantly different which is not surprising given the differences in cluster profiles.
5.5. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
The chapter explored the sensitivity of the control models estimated in Chapter 4 
to four assumptions, and tested the stability of the model across individuals and 
countries. Table 5.12 summarises the hypotheses and major results for the chapter.
The aggregate model was found to be an adequate aggregate level model for the 
control evaluations. The alternative pooled model did not exhibit superior holdout 
sample predictive ability. The OLS estimation procedures were also found to be robust 
to potential violations of their theoretical properties. Logit, probit, ordered probit and 
linear probability models did not preform significantly better than the OLS model. The 
superior predictive performance of the models estimated in Chapter 4 provides further 
support to hypothesis six.
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Table 5.12: Summary of Hypotheses and Major Results
Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis Seven: Parameters for non-linear 
variables will be zero
Tables 5.3 and 5.4
H0: =0 (/=1, 2, 3, 4)
H7: At least one fy' * to
Hq! Rejected
H7: Accepted
No predictive ability gain
Hypothesis Eight: All six two-way interactions 
will be zero
Tables 5.5 and 5.6
H0: pj' =0 (,' = 5,6,7,8,9,10)
H8: At least one Pj' * to
H(): Rejected
Hg: Accepted
No predictive ability gain
Hypothesis Nine: Model parameters will be 
equal across the M individuals
Tables 5.7 and 5.8
H0: Pj<nrPj (y=l,2,3,4;Vm e{l,., M))
H9: At least one Pj m * Pj
Hq: Rejected
Hg: Accepted
Clusters correlate with self-explicated 
ownership and board membership ratings
Hypothesis Ten: Model parameters for the US 
and Australian subjects will be equal
Table 5.10
Ho: Pj,vs =PjAu*P ;=M,3,4
H10: At least one pj US * pj Aust
Hq. Rejected
(Not rejected for some matched clusters) 
H10: Accepted
The null to hypothesis seven, that the non-linear parameters would be zero, was 
rejected for the ideal point and the quadratic models. This implies that the non-linear 
terms should be included in the control model. However, these additional regressors 
added in-sample explanatory power for only a fraction of the respondents. Furthermore, 
the predictive analysis indicated that the simple linear model performed at least as well in 
terms of predictive ability as more complex ideal point and quadratic models for the 
holdout sample.
Similarly the null to hypothesis eight was rejected. All but one of the two-way 
interactions were non-zero. However, the interaction models did not exhibit superior 
holdout sample predictive ability. The conclusion from this analysis is that the linear 
model is robust to assumptions about the model's linear form.
115
The stability of the model across individual respondents and across cultural 
boundaries was also tested. The evidence rejected the null for hypothesis nine that the 
parameters were equal across individuals. The alternative hypothesis was accepted that 
there are some respondents (in fact groups of respondents) who differ in their implicit 
judgements of the importance of the control attributes. These differences are not related 
to dummy variables for accounting exposure but do correspond to the self-explicated 
attribute ratings.
The null to hypothesis ten was also rejected as the US and Australian control 
models were found to be significantly different. Within cultural differences indicated 
that there were at least four different groups of respondents for each of the sub-samples. 
Three of the clusters for the US respondents corresponded with clusters for the 
Australian sub-sample. The 'ownership' groups were not significantly different. While 
some similarities were observed for the other two pairs of corresponding clusters. The 
fourth cluster for each sub-sample was, however, unique to the respective sub-sample. 
In sum the evidence suggests that the cross-cultural differences are to some extent an 
artefact of the clustering of professional opinion as to the attributes of corporate control 
within each culture.
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CHAPTER SIX :
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the research and the major findings. It examines the 
limitations of the research, and discusses the study's implications for corporate control 
evaluations in accounting and auditing practice, regulation, education and research. The 
chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 summarises the research objectives, the 
research method and analysis. Section 6.3 discusses the research conclusions 
concerning the attributes that determine dominant control. Section 6.4 examines the 
limitations of the research and the implications for the validity and generality of the 
research results. Section 6.5 addresses the implications of the research results.
6.2. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH
The aim of this research was to delineate and empirically test a predictive model of 
the attributes that give one entity dominant control over the decision making of another 
entity. Control was modelled as a continuous concept (Q) that practitioners arbitrarily 
partition into three segments for reporting purposes. The upper cut-off, % partitions 
dominant control situations from significant and insignificant influence relationships. 
For reporting purposes, accountants, auditors and directors assess the probability that 
the group exercises dominant control over another entity. A review of the relevant 
literatures identified four key attributes that affect the degree of control: (1) the level of 
ownership; (2) the directness of that ownership; (3) the dispersion of ownership for the
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other equity; and (4) the level of board membership. The importance of each attribute 
was estimated through a conjoint experiment.
The subjects for the study were two broad groups of US and Australian business 
decision makers. The quasi-experiment presented subjects with pre-planned scenarios 
that differed in the orthogonal combinations of ownership, ownership complexity, 
dispersion, and board membership attribute levels. The respondents evaluated whether 
or not each scenario represented a control situation. They also rated the degree of 
confidence they had in their evaluation. A composite of these two measures provided an 
index of the degree of control the respondent felt each situation depicted.
The evaluations were collected through a mailed instrument. Non-response bias 
was assessed by comparing early and late respondents. The consistency in response was 
used to establish the reliability of the responses. Through conjoint analytic techniques 
the evaluations of the judges were disaggregated to reveal the relative attribute weights 
for each respondent, and for the respondent group as a whole. OLS, GLS, and pooled 
cross-sectional regression estimation techniques (ie. Kmenta model) and residual 
analysis were employed in estimating and testing the model. The correlation between 
the predicted and actual control evaluation for the estimation sample indicated the 
goodness of fit for the model. Holdout sample correlations tested the predictive ability 
of the model. The face validity of the model was tested through the relative predictive 
performance of the estimated importance scores, the self-explicated importance scores, 
and naive assumed scores.
The robustness of the regression estimation was assessed in terms of its prediction 
rates relative to those for logit, probit, linear probability, and ordered probit estimation 
techniques. Alternative ideal point, quadratic and interaction functional specifications 
were also tested though residual analysis. A SUR estimation tested whether the model 
was stable across the respondents. K-means cluster analysis was then used to identify 
clusters of respondents from the estimated parameters. The validity of the cluster
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structure was assessed through ANOVA of proxy variables. Country specific models 
were estimated by SUR methods, and within country differences explored by further K- 
means cluster analysis. Finally, within and cross-cultural differences were explored 
through a SUR estimation by country and cluster.
6.3. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
Table 6.1 summarises the study's propositions, hypotheses, and major results.
Table 6.1: Summary of Propositions, Hypotheses, and Major Results
Propositions Hypotheses Results
Proposition One: There is a 
direct proportional
relationship between the 
level of ownership and 
the degree of control over 
related entity i.
Hypothesis One: Ownership is positively 
related to degree of control
H0: A = 0
Hj: /?, > 0
Table 4.5
Hq: Rejected
Hp Accepted
Proposition Two: There is a 
direct proportional
relationship between the 
level of direct versus 
indirect ownership and 
the degree of control over 
related entity /.
Hypothesis Two: Directness of ownership is 
positively related to degree of control
Ho:
H2: ^ > 0
Table 4.5
Hq: Rejected
H2: Accepted
Proposition Three: There is a 
direct proportional
relationship between the 
dispersion of ownership 
and the degree of control 
over related entity i.
Hypothesis Three: Dispersion is negatively 
related to degree of control
Ro: = o
H3: &<()
Table 4.5
Hq! Rejected
H3: Accepted
Proposition Four: There is a 
direct proportional
relationship between
board membership level 
and degree of control over 
related entity i.
Hypothesis Four: Board membership is 
positively related to degree of control
Hq' $4 = 0
H4: jff4 > 0
Table 4.5
Hq! Rejected
H4: Accepted
Proposition Five: The four 
attributes have equal 
influence on the degree of 
control over related entity 
/.
Hypothesis Five: At least one attribute is 
weighted differently in the model
H0: Pj = Pk (j* k; for7, k = 1,2,3,4)
Hs: At least one Pj* Pk
Table 4.6
Hq: Rejected
H5: Accepted 
(All sig. different)
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Table 6.1: Continued
Proposition Six: The four
attribute control model 
has predictive ability.
Hypothesis Six: The predicted and actual 
decisions are positively correlated
H0: p = 0
H6: P > 0
Tables 4.8, 4.9, Figures
4.1, 4.2
Hq: Rejected
H6: Accepted
Proposition Seven: The
control model is linear 
additive.
Hypothesis Seven: Parameters for non-linear 
variables will be zero
H0: £/=0 (/’ = 1, 2, 3, 4)
H7: At least one * 0
Tables 5.3 and 5.4
Hq: Rejected
H7: Accepted
No predictive ability gain
Proposition Eight: There are 
no interactions between 
the attributes in the 
control model.
Hypothesis Eight: All six two-way
interactions will be zero
H0: £/=0 (, = 5,6,7,8,9,10)
H8: At least one P]
Tables 5.5 and 5.6
Hq: Rejected
H8: Accepted
No predictive ability gain
Proposition Nine: The
structure of the control 
model is stable across 
different decision making 
executives and countries.
Hypothesis Nine: Model parameters will be 
equal across the M individuals
H0: Pjm= Pj U=l,2,3,4;Vm e{l,.., M})
H9: At least one P] m * Pj
Tables 5.7 and 5.8
Hq : Rejected
Hg: Accepted
Clusters correlate with self- 
explicated ownership and 
board membership ratings
Hypothesis Ten: Model parameters for the 
US and Australian subjects will be equal
Ho: Pjtus =PjAusP j=WA
H10: At least one pj us * pJy4ust
Table 5.10
Hq: Rejected (Not rejected 
for some matched clusters) 
H10: Accepted
6.3.1. Importance of Control Attributes
The results for the model estimation allowed the acceptance of hypotheses one to 
four that each of the four attributes has a significant impact on the degree of control. 
The null to hypothesis five, that the parameters would be equal, was rejected. The 
parameters for ownership, ownership complexity, dispersion, and board membership 
were all found to be significantly different for at least some of the individual models.
The structure of the estimated control model (see Table 4.5) implies that control 
can be established through 100 per cent ownership but not by 100 per cent board 
membership. Ownership is therefore sufficient for control. Where there is less than 60- 
64 per cent ownership (ie. the ratio of the coefficients for the constant and the
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ownership variable) then other control attributes are necessary to achieve control. For 
instance, an inter-entity relation consisting of 40 per cent ownership, all of which is 
direct, with all other stock widely held, also requires at least 34 per cent of the board 
membership to attain the threshold level of control of a zero score for the model.59 
Board membership by itself is not sufficient to achieve control. Some level of the other 
three control attributes (ie. ownership, direct holding or low dispersion) are required to 
outweigh the negative constant in the model and establish a threshold level of control.
Although ownership and board membership have the largest contribution in the 
control model, the results indicate that the level of direct versus indirect ownership and 
dispersion of ownership also contribute to the control index. Lower levels of ownership 
or board membership are required if the shareholding is direct. It is easier to exert the 
power associated with board positions and/or ownership if a greater percentage of the 
holding is direct. If there is a high probability that others can challenge the dominant 
position (ie. remaining shares are dispersely held), then the absolute level of ownership 
and/or the level of board membership has to be higher to establish and maintain 
dominant control. Conversely, total board dominance with a small equity interest is 
unlikely to be left in place by other block shareholders. Consistent with this notion most 
consolidation regulations and accounting standards allow non-consolidation where 
control is considered impaired or temporary (see Table 1.1).
6.3.2. Performance and Sensitivity of Linear Control Model
Hypotheses six through eight concerned the performance and sensitivity of the 
assumed linear additive model. The linear additive model was found to be a good fit in 
terms of the estimation sample predictive ability. The M individual models fitted better
59 Using the model in Table 4.5, the threshold for control of zero is achieved by evaluating the 
following expression: -2.329 + (3.666 X 40%) + (0.191 X 100%) + (0.806 X 0) + (1.959 X 34%).
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than the aggregate model, although both in-sample prediction correlations were 
significant. The predictions from both models correlated highly with a set of holdout 
observations, although the aggregate model performed marginally better in this 
prediction task than the M individual models. The evidence supports hypothesis six that 
the four attribute control model has predictive ability (ie. prediction correlations > zero).
The fit and performance of the model was also compared to different 
specifications for the competing prediction model. The parameters for non-linear 
variables in an ideal point and quadratic model specifications were found to be 
significant, leading to the acceptance of hypothesis seven that the parameters were non­
zero. In spite of this the simple linear model was found to predict as well as the non­
linear models for most individuals. The null for hypothesis eight, that the two-way 
interaction would be zero, was rejected. Nevertheless, it was concluded that the simple 
four-attribute model was a robust description of the individual judgement process for 
the majority of the respondents. The more complex two-way interaction models did not 
offer significant predictive ability gains to off-set their complexity. Finally, the linear 
model out-performed the self-explicated model and two naive models.
6.3.3. Stability Analysis
The analysis in Chapter 5 tested hypotheses nine and ten concerning the stability 
of the control model across individuals and cultural locations. The evidence rejected the 
null for hypothesis nine that the model was stable across individuals. The alternative 
hypothesis, that there are some respondents (in fact clusters of respondents) who differ 
in their implicit judgements of the importance of the control attributes, was accepted. 
These differences were found to be unrelated to dummy variables for accounting 
exposure, but did correlate with some of the self-explicated attribute ratings.
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The null for hypothesis ten was also rejected. Analysis of within cultural 
difference indicated that there were at least four different groups of respondents for each 
of the sub-samples. Three of the clusters for the US respondents corresponded with 
clusters for the Australian sub-sample. The 'ownership' groups were not significantly 
different, and the other two pairs of corresponding clusters exhibited similar structure in 
their respective control models. The fourth cluster for each sub-sample was unique to 
the respective sub-samples. This evidence suggests that the cross-cultural differences 
are to some extent an artefact of the within culture clustering of professional opinion of 
the attributes that determine corporate control.
6.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
There are a number of potential limitations of this research which the reader must 
be cognizant of when interpreting the findings. A framework for the discussion is 
provided by Cook and Campbell's (1979) four general threats to the validity of research 
experiments: threats to statistical conclusion validity; threats to internal validity; threats 
to construct validity; and threats to external validity. Cook and Campbell (1979) 
suggest that there is a trade-off among these four types of validity and hence the design 
of any experiment will reflect the priorities of the researcher. In the current study the 
objective is to develop a predictive model of the attributes that are perceived to 
determine dominant control. To that end there is a greater emphasis on internal validity, 
statistical conclusion validity, and construct validity, than external validity (Pedhazur, 
1982; Duncan and Moores, 1988).
6.4.1. Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity
Statistical conclusion validity is concerned with the validity of the statistical 
evidence that a presumed cause and effect co-vary. This is a function of the reliability of
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the measures and other sources of error variation and the threat they pose for the 
conclusions one can draw from the statistical tests.
The power of the estimation models and other statistical tests is dependent on 
both the sample size and significance levels employed. There were 27 degrees of 
freedom (ie. T-K = 32-5) for the individual regression models which, while not large, is 
sufficient for valid inference. Compensatory estimation errors are neutralised by 
forming an aggregate model and the pooling process which has at least M x (T-k) 
degrees of freedom (where M = 246). Given the sample size, the probability of type II 
error is low. Further, the low significance levels for most of the analysis means that the 
probability of type I error is also low.
The reliability of the measures employed impacts directly the level of noise in the 
data. No direct testing of reliability of the measures was possible for the test subjects. 
Nevertheless consistency analysis, reported in section 4.3.3, suggests that the 
respondents were far from random in their responses. It is therefore unlikely that the 
measures introduced significant levels of noise into the data.
The heterogeneity of respondents, identified in the SUR estimation and explored 
in the cluster analysis, inflates the error term for the treatment effects and thus poses a 
threat to the statistical conclusions. The seriousness of this problem depends on the 
objective of the research model. If one is interested in the average opinion then this 
problem is trivial. If the purpose of the model is to represent a consistent opinion then 
this is problematic. The results are, however, robust to this threat as the aggregate 
model is marginally superior to the individual models in terms of holdout sample 
predictive ability. This suggests that the model is relatively consistent despite 
heterogeneity of the respondents.
Other sources of error stem from the quasi-experiment design. The mail 
questionnaire does not allow complete control of the treatment implementation nor the 
impact of extraneous sources of variation unique to each data collection site. The only
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control possible in the design was a standard set of instructions to respondents on the 
procedures to follow. The exact error from this source can only be estimated from 
further true experiment applications of the instrument.
6.4.2. Threats to Internal Validity
Internal validity refers to the ability to infer that the relationships between the 
experimental variables is causal and not an artefact of a non-experimental variable. 
Cook and Campbell (1979) identify a number of potential threats to internal validity. 
The post-test only design of the current study means that there is not interference from 
history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, or statistical regression types of threats. 
Further, as all respondents received the same stimuli there can be no between group 
mortality, selection, or selection interaction effects, and there is unlikely to be any 
demoralisation, or compensatory equalisation or rivalry effects.
There are, however, three potential threats to the internal validity of the conjoint 
experiment. First is that there is no control over communication between the 
respondents, or between the respondents and non experimental subjects. Between 
subject communication is highly unlikely as all questionnaires were sent to different 
respondents at different addresses. Thus any inter-subject communication effects will be 
negligible. There is no control, however, over the respondents interacting with non- 
experimental subjects, other than the request on the instrument that the subjects provide 
their perceptions. The exact effect on the responses of any 'consultation' with other 
people is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand such discussions might make the 
respondent 'more confident' and thus they will rate their evaluation higher on the 
confidence scale. On the other hand if the discussion represented a difference of opinion 
the respondent might rate a lower degree of confidence in their decision. In any event 
such consultation, where it takes place, still provides a base from which to estimate a 
predictive model, albeit a 'group' predictive model rather than purely individual model.
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The professionalism of the target respondents lessens the probability of this threat being 
real.
The second threat to internal validity is related to the first and stems from the lack 
of control over who actually completed the questionnaire. The targets were identified as 
professionals involved in making control decisions. If a target respondent passed the 
instrument to a subordinate assistant then this may weaken the quality of the responses. 
By definition subordinates are likely to have less expertise in control evaluations than the 
target respondent. There is no way to measure or control for this threat to internal 
validity. It is conceivable that the clusters identified in the study capture the differences 
between 'real decision makers' (ie. the target respondents) and surrogate respondents 
chosen by the target respondents. Again we must rely on the professionalism of the 
respondents.
The third, and arguably most important threat to internal validity, is the degree of 
learning that is imbedded in the responses. Winzar (1991) suggests that the first few 
conjoint evaluations are less reliable in that they contain more error than the last few 
conjoint evaluations. He suggests that respondents develop their evaluative heuristics 
after a couple of stimulus evaluations, which implies the internal validity of the conjoint 
measures can be improved by including some "training" stimuli. No training stimuli, 
other than a single case example, were included in the instrument. This is unlikely to 
seriously flaw the results due to the nature of the two stage task.
The first stage required respondents to detach the cards then sort them into at 
least two piles, with a possible third representing 'doubtful' cases. The third pile was 
then to be split between the other two. There is no set order to the tasks of forming the 
cards or sorting the cards. Thus the first stimuli evaluated by each respondent was 
probably different. The second phase required the respondent to record their decisions 
in the research book and rate their degree of confidence. Although this is set out as a 
list, the respondents were free to complete it in any order. This was found to be the
case for the pre-test respondents. Most completed the booklet in the non-sorted order 
of their two piles of stimulus cards. Thus there is unlikely to be any systematic learning 
effect in the current conjoint task. Nevertheless, to completely control for learning 
effect a set of holdout "training" stimuli would need to be added to the instructions for 
the task. The increase in internal validity from the "training" stimuli would, however, 
come at the expense of respondent time commitment and could reduce the probability of 
gaining a response.
6.4.3. Threats to Construct Validity
Construct validity refers to the possibility that the cause and effect constructs are 
not the constructs that the operational measures are capturing. The issue is one of the 
mapping between the sample of operational measures and the "population" of theoretical 
constructs. This is an important concern for the current study as there is no prior 
empirical research on the attributes of a control relation and there is no ready made set 
of measures to employ. The instrument was therefore developed from scratch. The 
conjoint method employed provides a base level of validity as prior research (eg. in 
marketing and psychology) has found it to provide valid measures of the constructs 
under research (Green and Sirinvasan, 1978; Green, 1984; Winzar and Johnson, 1993).
Potential threats to validity of the constructs in the current study were controlled 
by canvassing the related control literatures in accounting, economics, finance and 
organisational behaviour. This extensive research based pre-operational explication of 
constructs (see Chapter 2) moulded the theoretical relation and the operational 
measures. The latter were also influenced by case evidence. Further, the estimated pre­
test model was applied to a number of cases to examine the face validity of the model.
The study also adopted Cook and Campbell's (1979) recommendation of multiple 
measures for the constructs. The self-explicated ratings for the independent variables 
and the multiple dependent variable observations facilitates multi-method and multi­
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operation comparisons. The positive, albeit low, correlations between the parameters 
for the M individual estimated model and the self-explicated ratings (see Table 4.10) 
suggest there is face or construct validity for the independent variables in the model. 
The performance of the model relative to two naive models provides further evidence 
that the measures have construct validity (see Table 4.12).
Hypothesis guessing represents a final potential threat to construct validity. The 
'hypothesis' was not disguised as the independent and dependent variables are obvious in 
a conjoint study. The question is one of whether the respondents can distort their 
behaviour to either that which they thought was expected or is 'correct' in some sense 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979). The low correlation between the self-explicated measures 
and the control evaluations suggests this is unlikely, or at least the respondents were 
unsuccessful in imbedding their overall attribute ratings into their control evaluations.
6.4.4. Threats to External Validity
External validity refers to the ability to generalise the presumed causal relationship 
to different types of persons, setting, times and countries on the basis of the research 
results. The first threat is that the sample may not be representative of the true 
population. The sampling frame, from which a random sample was drawn, represented 
only a fraction of the population of potential respondents. Any biases in the sampling 
frame biases the results. Further, the low response rates threatens the sample's ability to 
provide a valid representation of the sampling frame. The normal 'early versus late' 
response test for non-response bias suggests that non-respondents are unlikely to be 
significantly different to the respondents (see section 4.2.2.).
The second threat to external validity is that the independent variables are 
artificially presented (ie. on cards). In a real world setting the stimuli come from 
multiple sources and may include other cues not captured in the four attributes on the 
cards. Practitioners making control decisions are likely to have more information
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available to them from similar decisions in the past. None of this information history is 
available on the case cards. Verbal descriptions, however, have been found to produce 
externally valid results in marketing research and are used extensively in commercial 
product evaluations (Cattin and Wittink, 1982; Wittink and Cattin, 1989).
The reality of the cards is the product of a more fundamental threat to external 
validity. The problem is that there is no direct empirical measure for the dependent 
variable, control-not control. This is precisely the motivation for the model in the first 
place. One cannot collect secondary data for the dependent variable and then regress 
that data on the attributes to estimate the model's parameters. In practice the 
consolidation decision is not necessarily motivated solely by the facts of the relation. 
Research and case evidence60 has shown a key motivation for keeping some controlled 
entities off balance sheet is the effects on capital structure and to a lesser extent profits 
(eg. Francis, 1986; Livnat and Sondhi, 1986; Copeland and McKinnon, 1987; Mohr, 
1988; Heian and Thies, 1989). Determining the degree of control therefore has to be a 
subjective process which in turn requires indirect methods for estimation.
6.5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The four-attribute model of dominant control provides a simple operational 
measure for assessing control situations. The simplicity arises from the limited number 
of components (ie. four attributes) that constitute the model and its linear additive 
structure. This makes the model both easy to comprehend and straight forward to apply 
to determine the degree of control for real inter-entity relations. In that sense the model 
is an operational definition of where an inter-entity relationship lies on the control
60 The Adsteam case is a significant example of the effects of non-consolidation on reported 
profitability and financial structure. Even with the regulated exclusion of the non-consolidation option 
firms are choosing not to consolidated controlled, but minority owned, investments (see the Pattinson 
and Milton cases discussed by Frith, 1993).
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continuum and has implications for those areas of accounting practice, regulation, 
education, and research interested in the issue of corporate control.
6.5.1. Practical Implications
The model will assist accounting and auditing professionals to assess the extent of 
control implied by particular inter-entity relationships and to identify when consolidation 
is appropriate. Control assessments in a number of contexts will be enhanced by the 
model. For instance, the results for the model could form the base for the practitioners' 
internal operating manuals and check lists for use with their accounting and auditing 
clients. The model may also be held out as 'independent' evidence to convince 
accounting and audit service clients to change their reporting practices. Corporate 
accountants, grappling with determining reporting policy as well as their professional 
obligations, will be able to use the control model to justify to the Board of Directors that 
a change in accounting policy for a particular related entity is necessary. In this context 
the model would provide a normative justification for the change.
The research evidence might be of use in audit negligence and other litigation 
contexts. The 'consensus' nature of the model's construction and estimation provides 
evidence of the 'consensus' control opinion which will be useful where the level of 
control is disputed. The attributes identified in the model could also form the basis of 
client advice on ways to achieve control without the costs of majority equity investment. 
The corporate control structure could be optimised using the model by ensuring 
adequate dispersion of ownership, high board representation as well as directness of 
holding, thereby reducing the level of ownership and thus real resources required to 
effect control. Conversely the model could be useful in identifying takeover defence 
strategies. Finally, the accounting firms' in-house education and training programs will 
also benefit from simplifying the control concept.
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6.5.2. Regulatory Implications
This research will also benefit the regulation of corporate accounting. 
Harmonisation of consolidation regulation around the globe is predicated on a common 
Operational measure of control. This research suggests that there are significant within 
country differences that will make operationalisation of the control concept difficult 
within jurisdictional boundaries let alone across boundaries. The experience in Australia 
in recent months seems to bear this out (see the discussion below).
New regulations, revisions to existing standards, and/or explanatory discussion 
notes can be now based on research evidence rather than politically motivated debate.61 
Australia is well on the way to revising its corporate reporting standards and 
regulations. Nevertheless, the revision of consolidation standards in other countries, 
such as the US, will benefit from the research evidence on the concept of control 
provided by this thesis. Besides the formulation of accounting regulations, the model 
will assist regulatory bodies, such as stock exchanges and government securities 
commissions, with the monitoring of reporting practice and compliance with 
consolidation standards incorporating a broadly defined concept of control.
For example, the ASX in Australia has recently disputed Washington H. Soul 
Patterson's, and Milton Corporation's, non-consolidation of controlled associates (Frith, 
1993). In each case the ASX contends there is a control relationship despite less than 50 
per cent ownership. The companies are arguing that their associates are not controlled 
as the operations are not integrated. The model would help identify such situations and 
form a simple hurdle tests for associated investments. This could be applied 
mechanically by the ASX and ASC as a first evaluation of all corporate reports. The 
model would streamline the identification phase and provide and objective measure of 
control where control is disputed.
61 See footnote 8, in Chapter 1.
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6.5.3. Educational Implications
Consolidation texts typically include a cursory discussion of the concept of control 
and rely on authoritative statements to convince readers of the approaches 
demonstrated. Research based discussions, the hallmark of texts such as Ma, Parker and 
Whittred (1991), have greater pedagogic merit. To that end the model provides those 
involved in the education of corporate accountants (including text book writers) with a 
clear delineation of the attributes that give rise to a control situation. The model also 
indicates the weights users place on each of the control attributes and thus will assist 
classroom discussion of the dynamics of the concept of control. In addition, the stimuli 
materials developed in the study could be used by educators as a pedagogic device, with 
little or no adaptation. The scenario 'cards' would focus students on the attributes they 
have to assess to determine whether or not a relationship constitutes a control situation.
For instance, students could be asked to evaluate the scenario 'cards'. The 
tabulated results for the estimated control models (class average and individual) would 
form the basis for a discussion on individual differences of opinion on the nature of 
control. Following the conceptual discussion and the review of specific cases, a post­
test (in alternative form to the pre-test) could be administered. Feedback from this 
phase would indicate to the students (and the instructor) the revisions in individual and 
group opinion. The model estimated for the class could then be used as part of an 
undergraduate or post-graduate case study or empirical research project. Students 
would learn about the nature of dominant control and the importance of consolidating 
all controlled entities by applying the control model to well-documented cases such as 
Adsteam, Pattinson and Milton.
6.5.4. Research Implications
The methodology and findings of this research have implications for other areas of 
accounting and auditing research. First, the conjoint techniques employed in this project
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are relatively new to accounting. Conjoint analysis has seen very little use in accounting 
and auditing research (Krogstad, Ettenson and Shanteau, 1984) and limited use in 
economics and finance (eg. Slovic et al, 1972; Teas and Dellva, 1985; Zinkhan, 1990). 
The current study therefore serves as an example to other accounting researchers.
Other business disciplines, principally marketing, have refined conjoint research 
methods for evaluating products and product attributes. Similarly in accounting and 
auditing we are concerned with the decision making importance of different attributes of 
an information set. Our questions relate to whether one package of information (ie. a 
particular product) has more decision value to users than competing packages of 
information. The methodology employed in this thesis offers a new approach to 
measuring information importance judgements by users. Accounting and auditing 
researchers interested in assessing the relative value users or preparers place on the 
attributes of some accounting information set might consider the conjoint method as a 
potential research tool.
Second, the findings for the exploratory analysis of within and between culture 
differences in the structure of the control model represents and inviting area for further 
research. Cross-cultural differences in professional judgement are of interest to 
researchers given the move to standardise accounting regulation internationally and 
increasing globalisation of accounting entities. More research is required to assess the 
extent to which cultural differences influence accounting innovation and policy 
formulation (see Harrison and McKinnon, 1986).
Within culture differences also raise the question as to whether there are different 
fundamental views of the reporting entity. This revisits the issue of proprietary versus 
entity views of business. The literature has long debated the conceptual merits of these 
two fundamental views (Willingham, 1964; Gynther, 1967; Bird, Davidson and Smith, 
1974). Recent evidence suggests that accountants at least are split between these two 
views (see Moores and Steadman, 1986). One implication of this debate for the analysis
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of within cultural differences is that respondents who hold a proprietorship view could 
represent the cluster that favoured the ownership only model, whereas those 
respondents of the entity view might represent the cluster that adopted a broader 
concept of control. Thus these respondents tended to fall into the board membership, 
ownership and dispersion cluster. Further research is required to resolve this issue.
134
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acito, F., (1977), "An Investigation of Some Data Collection Issues in Conjoint 
Measurement", in Greenberg, B.A., and Bellenger, D.N., (Eds.), Contemporary 
Marketing Thought. Chicago, American Marketing Association, pp. 82-85.
Acito, F., and Jain, A.K., (1980), "Evaluation of Conjoint Analysis Results: A 
Comparison of Methods". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 17, February, pp. 
106-112.
Accounting Standards Board, (1989), Interim Statement Consolidated Accounts. 
London, Accounting Standards Board.
Addelman, S., (1962), "Orthogonal Main-Effect Plans for Asymmetrical Factorial 
Experiments". Technometrics, Vol. 4, February, pp. 21-46.
Akaah, I P., (1991), "Predictive Performance of Self-Explicated, Traditional Conjoint, 
and Hybrid Conjoint Models under Alternative Data Collection Modes". Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 309-314.
Akaah, IP., and Korgaonkar, P.P., (1983), "An Empirical Comparison of the Predictive 
Validity of Self-Explicated, Huber-Hybrid, Traditional Conjoint, and Hybrid 
Conjoint Models". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 20, pp. 187-197.
Aldenderfer, M.S., and Blashfield, R.K., (1984), "Cluster Analysis". Sage University 
Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-044. Beverly 
Hills and London: Sage Publications.
American Institute of Certified Practicing Accountants, (1959), Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 51, Consolidated Financial Statements. American Institute of 
Certified Practicing Accountants.
Anderson, N.H., (1970), "Function Measurement and Psychophysical Judgement". 
Psychological Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 153-170.
Anderson, R., (1989, December 20), "Court Puts Seal On BRL Board Deal". The 
Australian, p. 23.
135
Armstrong, J.S., and Overton, T.S., (1977), "Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail 
Surveys". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 14, August, pp. 396-402.
Arthur, N., (1991), "A Code for Corporate Practice and Conduct: Reshaping Company 
Boards". Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, November, pp. 48-56.
Ashton, R.K., (1986), "The Argyll Foods Case: A Legal Analysis". Accounting and 
Business Research, Vol. 17, Winter, pp. 3-12
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, (1990), Statement of Accounting Concepts 
SAC 2: Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting. Melbourne, 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation.
Australian Accounting Standards Board, (1991), Accounting Standard AASB 1024: 
Consolidated Accounts, Melbourne, Australian Accounting Standards Board.
Baker, R.E., Lembke, V.C., and King, T.E., (1989), Advanced Financing Accounting. 
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Barrett, M.E., (1971), "Accounting for Intercorporate Investments: A Behavior Field 
Experiment". Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 9, Supplement, pp. 50-65.
Barron, F.H., (1977), "Axiomatic Conjoint Measurement". Decision Sciences, Vol. 8, 
pp. 548-559.
Bartlett, M.S., (1937), "Properties of Sufficiency and Statistical Tests". Proceedings of 
the Royal Society, Series A, Vol. 160, pp. 268-282.
Beechy, T.H., (1985), Canadian Advanced Financial Accounting. Fortworth, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston
Beesley, M.E., and Hensher, D.A., (1987), "The Consistency of Choice Using 
Experimental Design". Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 8, pp. 445-456.
Beranek, W., and Clayton, R., (1985), "Risk Differences and Financial Reporting". The 
Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter, pp. 327-334.
Berl, I, Lewis, G., and Morrison, R., (1976), "Applying Models of Choice to the 
Problem of College Selection", in J.S. Carroll and J.W. Payne, (Eds.), Cognition 
and Social Behaviour. Hillsdale, Lawrence Elbaum Associates, pp. 203-219.
Berndt, E.R., (1991), The Practice of Econometrics Classic and Contemporary. 
Reading, Massahusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
136
Bird, F.A., Davidson, L.F., and Smith, C.H., (1974), "Perceptions of External 
Accounting Transfers Under Entity and Proprietary Theory", The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 49, pp. 233-244.
Bose, R.C., and Bush, K.A., (1952), "Orthogonal Arrays of Strength Two and Three", 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 23, pp. 508-524.
Brickley, J.A., and James, C.M., (1987), "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board 
Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking". Journal of Law & 
Economics, Vol. 30, April, pp. 161-180.
Burnett, T., King, T.E., and Lembke, V.C., (1979), "Equity method Reporting for 
Major Finance Company Subsidiaries". The Accounting Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 
pp. 815-823.
Burt, R.S., (1980), "Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of 
Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manufacturing". Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, pp. 557-582.
Byron, R.P., (1977), "Efficient Estimation and Inference in Large Econometric 
Systems". Econometrica, Vol. 45, pp. 1499-1516.
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, (1974), CICA Elandbook. Ontario 
Canada, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
Carmines, E.G., and Zeller, R.A. (1979), "Reliability and Validity Assessment". Sage 
University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07- 
017. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications.
Carrol, J.D., (1972), "Individual Differences and Multidimensional Scaling". 
Multidimensional Scaling Theory and Application Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 1, 
pp. 105-155.
Cattin, P., Hermet, G., and Pioche, A., (1982), "Alternative Hybrid Models for Conjoint 
Analysis", in Marketing Science Institute, Analytical Approaches to Product and 
Market Planning: The Second Conference. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Marketing 
Science Institute, pp. 142-152.
Cattin, P., and Wittink, K.R., (1982), "Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis: A 
Survey". Journal of Marketing, Vol. 46, Summer, pp. 44-53.
Cliff, N., (1973), "Scaling". Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 29, pp. 473-506.
Coase, R.H., (1937), "The Nature of the Firm". Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, pp. 
386-405.
137
Cochran, W.G., and Cox, G.M., (1950), Experimental Designs. New York, John Wiley 
and Sons.
Comiskey, E.E., and Mulford, C.W., (1986), "Investment Decisions and the Equity 
Accounting Standard". The Accounting Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 519-525.
Comiskey, E.E., McEwen, R.A., and Mulford, C.W., (1987), "A Test of Pro Forma 
Consolidation of Finance Subsidiaries". Financial Management, Vol. 16, pp. 45- 
50.
Cook, T.D., and Campbell, D.T., (1979), Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis 
for Field Settings. Chicago, Rand McNally College Publishing Co.
Coombs, C.H., (1964), A Theory of Data. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Coopers and Lybrand (International), (1991), International Accounting Summaries: A 
Guide for Interpretation and Comparison. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Copeland, R.M., and McKinnon, S., (1987), "Financial Distortion and Consolidation of 
Captive Finance Subsidiaries in the General Merchandising Industry". Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 14, pp. 11-91.
Copeland, T.E., and Weston, J.F., (1988), Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. 
Third Edition, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Courtis, J.K., (1989), "Perception Data-Gathering: A Note on Mail Questionnaire 
Methodology and Bias". Pacific Accounting Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 118-135.
Dalton, D.R., and Kesner, I F., (1987), "Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of 
Directors: An International Perspective". Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 33-42.
Dann, L.Y., and De Angelo, H., (1983), "Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated 
Stock Repurchases and the Market for Corporate Control". Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 275-300.
Darmon, R.Y., and Rouzies, D., (1989), "Assessing Conjoint Analysis Internal Validity: 
The Effect of Various Continuous Attribute Level Spacings". International 
Journal of Research In Marketing, Vol. 6, pp. 35-44.
Davidson, R., and MacKinnon, J.G, (1984), "Convenient Specification tests for Logit 
and Probit Models". Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 25, pp. 241-262.
138
Dawes, R., (1971), "A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Application of Three 
Principles of Human Decision Making". American Psychologist, Vol. 26, pp. 180- 
188.
Dawes, R., and Corrigan, B., (1974), "Linear Models in Decision Making". 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 81, February, pp. 95-106.
De Angelo, H., and Rice, E.M., (1983), "Antitakeover Charter Amendments and 
Stockholder Wealth". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 329-359.
Debreu, G., (1960), "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory", in Arrow, K.J., 
Karlin, S., and Suppes, P., (Eds.), Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. 
Stanford University Press, pp. 16-26.
Dey, A., (1985), Orthogonal Fractional Factorial Designs. New York, Halsted Press.
Dielman, T.E., (1989), Pooled Crossed-Sectional and Time Series Data Analysis. New 
York, Marcel Dekker, Inc.
Dodd, P., and Warner, J.B., (1983), "On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy 
Contests". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 401-438.
Dooley, P.C., (1969), "The Interlocking Directorate". The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 59, pp. 314-323.
Dubin, R., (1978), Theory Building. Revised Edition, New York, Free Press.
Duncan, K.R., and Etebari, A., (1990), "Insider Trading, Information Leakage and Pre- 
Announcement Price Movements", in S.G. Rhee and R.P. Chang, (Eds ), Pacific- 
Basin Capital Markets Research. Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp. 227-241.
Duncan, K.R., and McNamara, R.P., (1991), "Syntax of Consolidated Financial 
Statements: The Impact on Credit-Manager's Decision-Making". Presented at the 
Accounting Association of Australia and New Zealand (AAANZ), Queensland 
University of Technology, Brisbane, July.
Duncan, K.R., and Moores, K.J., (1988), "Usefulness of CCA Information for Investor 
Decision Making: A Laboratory Experiment". Accounting and Business
Research, Vol. 18, No. 70, pp. 121-132.
Dwivedi, T.D., and Srivastava, V.K., (1978), "Optimality of Least Squares in the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation Model". Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 
7, pp. 391-395.
Edwards, J.R., (1989), A History of Financial Accounting. London, Routledge.
139
Edwards, J.R., and Webb, K.M., (1984), "The Development of Group Accounting in 
the United Kingdom to 1933". Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
Spring, pp. 31-61.
Emory, C.W., (1980), Business Research Methods. Homewood, Illinios, Irwin.
Evans, T.G., Taylor, M E., and Holzmann, O., (1988), International Accounting and 
Reporting. Boston, Massachusetts, PWS-Kent Publishing Company.
Fama, E., (1980), "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm". Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 88, April, pp. 288-307.
Fama, E., and Jensen, M.C., (1983), "Agency Problems and Residual Claims". Journal 
of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, June, pp. 327-350.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, (1978), SEAS 1: Objectives of Financial 
Reporting by Business Enterprise. Connecticut, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, (1976), SEAS 13: Accounting for Leases. 
Connecticut, Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, (1982), SEAS 58: Capitalization of Interest 
Cost in Financial Statements that Include Investments Accounted for by the 
Equity Method. Connecticut, Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, (1987), SEAS 94: Consolidation of All Majority 
Owned Subsidiaries. Connecticut, Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Fishbein, M., (1967), "A Behavior Theory Approach to the Relations Between Beliefs 
About an Object and the Attitude Towards the Object", in M. Fishbein, (Ed.), 
Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 
pp. 389-399.
Francis, J.R., (1986), "Debt Reporting by Parent Companies: Parent-Only Versus 
Consolidated Statements". Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, Autumn, pp. 393-403.
Frith, B., (1989, December 13), "NCSC May Find BRL Deal 'Unacceptable' ". The 
Australian, p. 24, 28.
Frith, B., (1993, May 27), "Pattinson, ASX Test Accounting Standard". The Australian, 
p. 36.
140
Gensch, D.H., and Recker, W.W., (1979), "The Multinomial, Multiattribute Logit 
Choice Model". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 16, February, pp. 124-132.
Gessner, G., Kamakura, A., Malhotra, N.K., and Zmijewski, M E., (1988), "Estimating 
Models with Binary Dependent Variables: Some Theoretical and Empirical 
Observations". Journal of Business Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 49-65.
Goldberg, L.R., (1968), "Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on 
Clinical Judgments". American Psychologist, Vol. 23, pp. 483-496.
Goldberger, A.S., (1964), Econometric Theory. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Gottliebsen, R., (1991, May 3), "Spalvins1 Fatal Flaw". Business Review Weekly, pp. 40- 
51.
Green, P.E., (1974), "On the Design of Choice Experiments Involving Multifactor 
Alternatives". Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 1, September, pp. 61-68.
Green, P.E., (1984), "Hybrid Models for Conjoint Analysis: An Expository Review". 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 21, May, pp. 155-169.
Green, P.E., Carroll, J.D., and Goldberg, S.M., (1981), "A General Approach to 
Product Design Optimization via Conjoint Analysis". Journal of Marketing, Vol. 
45, Summer, pp. 17-37.
Green, P.E., and DeSarbo, (1978), "Additive Decomposition of Perception Data via 
Conjoint Analysis". Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 5, June, pp. 58-65.
Green, P.E., Goldberg, S.M., Montemayor, M., (1981), "A Hybrid Utility Estimation 
Model for Conjoint Analysis". Journal of Marketing, Vol. 45, Winter, pp. 33-41.
Green, P.E., Goldberg, S.M., and Wiley, J.B., (1982), "A Cross Validation Test of 
Hybrid Conjoint Models", in Proceedings of the 1982 Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Consumer Research. San Francisco, Association for Consumer 
Research.
Green, P.E., Krieger, A.M., and Carroll, J.D., (1987), "Conjoint Analysis and 
Multidimensional Scaling: A Complimentary Approach". Journal of Marketing 
Research, Vol. 24, October/November, pp. 21-27.
Green, P.E., and Rao, V.R., (1971), "Conjoint Measurement for Quantifying 
Judgmental Data". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 8, August, pp. 355-363.
141
Green, P.E., and Srinivasan, V, (1978), "Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: 
Issues and Outlook". Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 5, September, pp. 103- 
123.
Green, P.E., and Tull, D.S., (1978), Research for Marketing Decisions. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersy, Prentice-Hall.
Green, P.E., Tull, D.S., and Albaum, G., (1988), Research for Marketing Decisions. 
New Jersey, Prentice Hall.
Green, P.E., and Wind, Y., (1973), Multiattribute Decisions in Marketing: A 
Measurement Approach. Hinsdale, Illinios, Dryden Press.
Green, P.E., and Wind, Y., (1975), "New Way to Measure Consumers' Judgments". 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, August, pp. 107-117.
Gujarati, D.N., (1988), Basic Econometrics. Second Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company.
Gynther, R.S., (1967), "Accounting Concepts and Behavioral Hypotheses". The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 274-290.
Hair, J.F.Jr., Anderson, R.E., and Tatham, R.L., (1987), Multivariate Data Analysis 
with Readings. New York, Macmillan Publishing Company.
Harrison, G.L., and McKinnon, J.L., (1986), "Culture and Accounting Change: A New 
Perspective on Corporate Reporting Regulation and Accounting Policy 
Formulation". Accounting, Organisations and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 233- 
252.
Harrison, T., (1977), "Different Market Reactions to Discretionary and Non- 
Discretionary Accounting Changes". Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 15, 
No. 1, Spring, pp. 85-107.
Hawkins, D.F., (1968), "The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Practices 
Among American Manufacturing Corporations", in Chatfield, M., (Ed.), 
Contemporary Studies in the Evolution of Accounting Thought. California, 
Dickenson Publishing Co, pp. 247-279.
Hays, P., (1993), "Accounting Implications in Amended Bill". Accountants' Journal, 
Vol. 72, No. 2, March, pp. 40-41.
142
Heian, J.B., and Theis, J.B., (1989), "Consolidation of Finance Subsidiaries: $230 
Billion in Off-balance-sheet Financing Comes Home to Roost". Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-9.
Hensher, D.A., and Johnson, L.W., (1981), Applied Discrete-Choice Modelling. New 
York, John Wiley and Sons.
Hermalin, BE., and Weisbach, MS., (1988), "The Determinants of Board 
Composition". Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 589-606.
Hirschey, M., (1981), "The Effect of Advertising on Industrial Mobility", Journal of 
Business, Vol. 54, pp. 329-339.
Hoffman, P.J., Slovic. P., and Rorer, L.G., (1968), "An Analysis-of-Variance Model for 
the Assessment of Configural Cue Utilization in Clinical Judgment". Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 338-349.
Hong Kong Society of Accountants, (1984), SSAP 7: Group Accounts. Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong Society of Accountants.
Hong Kong Society of Accountants, (1991), SSAP JO: Accounting for Associated 
Companies. Hong Kong, Hong Kong Society of Accountants.
Hosmer, D.W., and Lemeshow, S., (1989), Applied Logistic Regression. New York, 
John Wiley and Sons.
Huber, J.H., and Moore, W., (1979), "A Comparison of Alternative Ways to Aggregate 
Individual Conjoint Analyses", in Beckwith, N., Houston, M., Mittelstaedt, R., 
Monroe, K.B., and Ward, S., (Eds.), 1979 Educators' Conference Proceedings: 
Series #44. Chicago, American Marketing Association, pp. 64-68.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, (1972), SSAP 14: Group 
Accounts. England, Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, (1982), SSAP 1: Accounting 
for Associated Companies. England, Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, (1989a), SSAP 14: Group 
Accounts. England, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, (1989b), Interim Statement: 
Consolidated Accounts. England, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales.
143
International Accounting Standards Committee, (1976), IAS 3: Consolidated Financial 
Statements. International Accounting Standards Committee.
International Accounting Standards Committee, (1990), IAS 27: Consolidated 
Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries. 
International Accounting Standards Committee.
International Accounting Standards Committee, (1990), IAS 28: Accounting for 
Investments in Associates. International Accounting Standards Committee.
Jaccard, J., Turrisi, R., and Wan, C.K., (1990), "Interaction Effects in Multiple 
Regression". Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the 
Social Sciences, 07-072. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications.
Jain, A.K., Acito, F., Malhotra, N., and Mahajan, V., (1979), "A Comparison of the 
Internal Validity of Alternative Parameter Estimation Methods in Decompositional 
Multiattribute Preference Models". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 16, 
August, pp. 313-22.
Jensen, M. C., (1986), "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers". The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 323-329.
Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H., (1976), "Theory of the Firm: Management 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure". Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360.
Johnston, J., (1984), Econometrics Methods. Third Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company.
Jones, T.M., (1986), "Corporate Board Structure and Performance: Variations in the 
Incidence of Shareholders Suits", in Preston, L., (Ed.), Research in Corporate 
Social Performance and Policy, Vol. 8, pp. 345-359.
Judge, G.G., Griffiths, W.E., Hill, R.C., Lutkepohl, H., and Lee, T.C., (1985), The 
Theory and Practice of Econometrics. Second Edition, New York, John Wiley 
and Sons.
Judge, G.G., Hill, R.C., Griffiths, W.E., Lutkepohl, H„ and Lee, T.C., (1988), The 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics. Second Edition, New 
York, John Wiley and Sons.
Kalton, G., (1983), "Introduction to Survey Sampling". Sage University Paper series on 
Quantitative Application in the Social Sciences, 07-035. Beverly Hills and 
London: Sage Publications.
144
Kaufman, L., and Rousseeuw, P.J., (1990), Finding Groups in Data: An Introduction to 
Cluster Analysis. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Kerlinger, F.N., (1986), Foundations of Behavioral Research. Third Edition, 
Fortworth, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kesner, IF., Victor, B., and Lament, B., (1986), "Board Composition and the 
Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of the Fortune 500 Companies". 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 789-799.
Kesner, I F., and Johnson, R.B., (1990), "An Investigation of the Relationship Between 
Board Composition and Stockholder Suits". Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
11, No. 4, May, pp. 327-336.
Kitchen, J., (1972), "The Accounts of British Holding Company Group: Development 
and Attitude to Disclosure in the Early Years". Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 114-136.
Klecka, W.R., (1980), "Discriminant Analysis". Sage University Paper series on 
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-019. Beverly Hills and 
London: Sage Publications.
Klugh, H.E., (1974), Statistics: The Essentials for Research. Second Edition, New 
York, John Wiley and Sons.
Kmenta, J., (1986), Elements of Econometrics. Second Edition, New York, Macmillian 
Publishing Company.
Kohli, R., (1988), "Assessing Attribute Significance in Conjoint Analysis:
Nonparametric Tests and Empirical Validation". Journal of Marketing Research, 
Vol. 25, May, pp. 123-133.
Krantz, D.H., (1964), "Conjoint Measurement: The Luce-Tukey Axiomatization and 
Some Extensions". Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 248-277
Krantz, D.H., and Tversky, A., (1971), "Conjoint-Measurement Analysis of 
Composition Rules in Psychology". Psychological Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 
151-169.
Krogstad, J.L., Ettenson, R.T., and Shanteau, J., (1984), "Context and Experience in 
Auditors' Materiality Judgments". Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 54-74.
145
Larson, R.J., and Marx, M L., (1986), An Introduction to Mathematical Statistics and 
its Applications. Second Edition, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
Larsen, E.J., and Mosich, A N., (1988), Modern Advanced Accounting. New York, 
McGraw-Hill.
Lee, L.N., McPherson, L.A., Booth, B., and Fraser, D.J., (1976), Consolidated 
Statements and Group Accounts. Second Edition, Sydney, Law Book Co.
Leigh, T.W., MacKay, D.B., and Summers, J.O., (1984), "Reliability and Validity of 
Conjoint Analysis and Self-Explicated Weights: A Comparison". Journal of 
Marketing Research, Vol. 21, November, pp. 456-462.
Leo, K.J., (1987), Discussion Paper No. 10: Consolidated Financial Statements. 
Melbourne, Australian Accounting Research Foundation.
Leo, K.J., and Leftwich, R.W., (1974), "Presentation of Minority Interest in 
Consolidated Balance Sheets". Accounting Education, Vol. 14, May, pp. 57-72.
Lewis, M.K., and Wallace, R., (Eds.), (1985), Australia's Financial Institutions and 
Markets. Melbourne, Longman Cheshire.
Linn, S.C., and McConnell, J.J., (1983), "An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 
Antitakeover Amendments on Common Stock Prices". Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 361-399.
Livnat, J., and Sondhi, A.C., (1986), "Finance Subsidiaries: Their Formation and 
ConsoXidzhon". Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 13, pp. 137-147.
Louviere, J.J., (1988), "Analyzing Decision Making: Metric Conjoint Analysis". Sage 
University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07- 
067. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications.
Luce, R.D., (1959), Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York, 
John Wiley and Sons.
Luce, R.D., and Tukey, J.W., (1964), "Simultaneous Conjoint Measurement: A New 
Type of Fundamental Measurement". Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 
1, pp. 1-27.
Ma, R., Parker, R.H., and Whittred, G., (1991), Consolidation Accounting. Melbourne, 
Longman Cheshire Limited.
Maddala, G.S., (1983), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
New York, Cambridge University Press.
146
Maddala, G.S., (1988), Introduction to Econometrics. New York, Macmillan Publishing 
Company.
Mariolis, P., and Jones, M.H., (1982), "Centrality in Corporate Interlock Networks: 
Reliability and Stability". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 27, pp. 571-584.
Markovic, M., (1992), "Off Balance Sheet Financing: The Legal Implications". 
Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 35-60.
McCullough, J.M., and Best, R., (1979), "Conjoint Measurement: Temporal Stability 
and Structural Reliability". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 16, pp. 26-31.
McDaniel, J.R., and Wyatt, J.L., (1988), "Funds in Front Lines". Pensions and 
Investment Age, Vol. 16, No. 25, November, pp. 34-35.
McFadden, D., (1973), "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior", in 
Zarembka, P., (Ed ), Frontiers in Econometrics. New York, Academic Press, pp. 
105-142.
McKelvey, R.D., and Zavoina, W., (1975), "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of 
Ordinal Level Dependent Variables". Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol. 4, 
pp. 103-120.
Mian, S.L, and Smith, C.W., (1990a), "Incentives for Unconsolidated Financial 
Reporting", Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 141-171.
Mian, S.L, and Smith, C.W., (1990b), "Incentives Associated With Changes in 
Consolidated Reporting Requirements", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 13, pp. 249-266.
Mintz, B., and Schwartz, M., (1985), The Power Structure of American Business. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Mizruchi, M.S., and Steams, L.B., (1988), "A Longitudinal Study of the Formation of 
Interlocking Directorates". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 
194-210.
Mohr, R.M., (1988), "Unconsolidated Finance Subsidiaries. Characteristics and 
Debt/Equity Effects". Accounting Horizons, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 27-34.
Moore, W.L., (1980), "Levels of Aggregation in Conjoint Analysis: An Empirical 
Comparison". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 17, November, pp. 516-523.
147
Moores, K.J., and Steadman, G.T., (1986), "The Comparative Viewpoints of Groups of 
Accountants: More on the Entity-Proprietary Debate". Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 19-34.
New Zealand Society of Accountants, (1990), SSAP 8: Accounting for Business 
Combinations. Wellington, New Zealand Society of Accountants.
Nobes, C.W., and Parker, R.H., (1988), Comparative International Accounting. Second 
Edition, New York, St Martin's Press.
Noreen, E.W., (1988), "An Empirical Comparison of Probit and OLS Regression 
Hypothesis Tests". Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring, pp. 
119-133.
Noreen, E.W., (1989), Computer Intensive Methods for Testing Hypotheses: An 
Introduction. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Nunnally, J.C., (1978), Psychometric Theory. New York, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, (OECD), (1987),
Consolidation in OECD Countries. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, (OECD), (1988),
Accounting Standards Harmonization No. 5: Consolidated Financial Statements. 
Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Oppenheim, A.N., (1966), Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. New 
York, Basic Books Inc.
Palmer, D., (1983), "Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate 
Coordination". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 40-55.
Parker, B.R., and Srinivasan, V., (1976), "A Consumer Preference Approach to the 
Planning of Rural Primary Health Care Facilities". Operations Research, Vol. 24, 
pp. 991-1025.
Parker, R.H., (1977), "Explaining National Differences in Consolidated Accounts". 
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 7, No. 27, Summer, pp. 203-207.
Pedhazur, E.J., (1982), Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research: Explanation and 
Prediction. Second Edition, New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
148
Pendlebury, M., (1980), "The Application of Information Theory to Accounting for 
Groups of Companies". Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 7, pp. 
105-117.
Pfeifer, I, (1972), "Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors". 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 218-227.
Potter Warburg Research, (1990), The Adsteam Group. Sydney, Potter Warburg 
Research.
Raghavarao, D., (1971), Constructions and Combinatorial Problems in Design of 
Experiments. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Richardson, R.J., (1987), "Directorship Interlocks and Corporate Profitability". 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 32, pp. 367-386.
Ricks, W.E., and Huges, J.S., (1985), "Market Reaction to a Non-Discretionary 
Accounting Change: The Case of Long-Term Investments". The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 33-52.
Romesberg, H.C., (1984), Cluster Analysis for Researchers. Belmont, California, 
Lifetime Learning Publications.
Rosenberg, M.J., (1956), "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect". Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 53, pp. 367-372.
Rosman, A.J., (1992), "FASB Statement No. 94: Do Lenders Contract on Consolidated 
Information?". Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 7, pp. 251-267.
SAS Institute Inc., (1988a), SAS/STAT User's Guide, Release 6.03 Edition. Cary, North 
Carolina, SAS Institute Inc.
SAS Institute Inc., (1988b), SAS Technical Report: P-179, Additional SAS/STAT 
Procedures, Release 6.03. Cary, North Carolina, SAS Institute Inc.
SAS Institute Inc., (1990), SAS Technical Report P-200, SAS/STAT Software: CALIS 
and LOGISTIC Procedures, Release 6.04. Cary, North Carolina, SAS Institute 
Inc.
Scott, C., (1961), "Research on Mail Surveys". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A, Part 2, Vol. 124, pp. 143-195.
Segal, M.N., (1982), "Reliability of Conjoint Analysis: Contrasting Data Collection 
Procedures". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 19, February, pp. 137-143.
149
Shaw, J.C., (1976), "Criteria for Consolidation". Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol. 7, No. 25, Winter, pp. 71-78.
Shenoy, P.P., Shriver, K.A., and Smith, D.B., (1989), "The Potential Effects of 
Different Voting Rules on the FASB Due Process". Research in Accounting 
Regulation, pp. 125-132.
Shepard, R., (1964), "On Subjectively Optimum Selection Among Multiattribute 
Alternatives", in Shelly, M.W., Bryan, G., (Eds.), Human Judgments and 
Optimalilty. New York, John Wiley and Sons, pp. 257-281.
Shvets, V., (1990), The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited: Notes on Asset 
Valuation. Sydney, Baring Securities, Australian Research.
Siegel, A., and Castellan, N.J.Jr, (1988), Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral 
Sciences. New York, McGraw-Hall Book Company.
Slovic, P., Fleissner, D., and Bauman, W.S., (1972), "Analyzing the Use of Information 
in Investment Decision Making: A Methodological Proposal". Journal of 
Business, Vol. 45, pp. 283-301.
Solomons, D., (1978), "The Politicization of Accounting". Journal of Accountancy, 
Vol. 146, No. 5, pp. 65-72.
SPSS, (1990), SPSS Catergories. Chicago, SPSS Inc.
Srinivasan, V., and Shocker, A.D., (1973), "Estimating the Weights for Multiple 
Attributes in a Composite Criterion Using Pairwise Judgments". Psychometrika, 
Vol. 38, No. 4, December, pp. 473-493.
Steams, L.B., and Mizruchi, M.S., (1986), "Broken-Tie Reconstitution and the 
Functions of Interorganizational Interlocks: A Reexamination". Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, pp. 522-538.
Steckel, J.H., DeSarbo, W.S., and Mahajan, V., (1991), "On the Creation of Acceptable 
Conjoint Analysis Experimental Designs". Decision Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 2, 
Spring, pp. 435-442.
Stephenson, W., (1953), The Study of Behavior Q-Technique and Its Methodology. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Stone, M., and Rasp, J., (1991), "Tradeoffs in the Choice Between Logit and OLS for 
Accounting Choice Studies". The Accounting Review, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 170- 
187.
150
Strauss, N., and Weber, J., (1988), "Consolidations and the Reporting Entity". 
Corporate Accounting, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 58-60.
Teas, R.K., and Dellva, W.L., (1985), "Conjoint Measurement of Consumers' 
Preferences for Multiattribute Financial Services". Journal of Bank Research, Vol. 
16, No. 2, Summer, pp. 99-112.
Teweles, R.J., and Bradley, E.S., (Eds ), (1987), The Stock Market. Fifth Edition, New 
York, John Wiley and Sons.
Torgerson, W.S., (1967), Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York, John Wiley and 
Sons.
Tricker, R.I., (1984), Corporate Governance. London, Gower Press.
Urban, G.L., and Hauser, J.R., (1980), Design and Marketing of New Products. New 
Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
Walker, R.G., (1970), "Group Accounts". Chartered Accountant in Australia, Vol. 41, 
pp. 13-20.
Walker, R.G., (1976), "An Evaluation of the Information Conveyed by Consolidated 
Statements". Abacus, Vol. 12, No. 2, December, pp. 77-115.
Walker, R.G., (1978), "International Accounting Compromise: The Case of 
Consolidation Accounting". Abacus, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 97-111.
Walker, R.G., (1987), "Australia's ASRB: A Case Study of Political Activity and 
Regulatory 'Capture'". Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 17, No. 67, pp. 
175-195.
Walker, R.G., Wilkins, T. and Zimmer, I., (1982), "The Effect of Consolidated 
Statements on Loan Officers' Assessments of Ability to Repay". Australian 
Journal of Management, Vol. 7, December, pp. 179-202.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, (1978), "Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination 
of Accounting Standards". The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 112-134.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, (1979), "The Demand for and Supply of Accounting 
Theories: The Market for Excuses". The Accounting Review, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 
273-305.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, (1986), Positive Accounting Theory. New Jersey, 
Prentice-Hall.
151
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, (1990), "Positive Accounting: A Ten Year Perspective". 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 131-156.
Weisbach, MS., (1988), "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover". Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 20, March, pp. 431-460.
White, K.J., Wong, S.D., Whistler, D., and Haun, S.A., (1990), SHAZAM User's 
Reference Manual Version 6.2. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company
Whittred, G., (1986), "The Evolution of Consolidated Financial Reporting in Australia". 
Abacus, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 103-120.
Whittred, G., (1987), "The Derived Demand for Consolidated Financial Reporting". 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 259-285.
Wilkie, W.L., and Pessemier, E.A., (1973), "Issues In Marketing's Use of Multi- 
Attribute Attitude Models". Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 10, November, 
pp. 428-41.
Wilkins, T., (1984), "A Behavioural Investigation of Alternative Methods of Financing 
Capital Acquisitions and Lease Capitalisation". Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 14, No. 56, pp. 259-366
Wilkins, T., (1988), "An Experimental Investigation of Bank Lenders' Financial Analysis 
and Contracting Behaviour in Group Term Lending Contexts", unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Queensland, November.
Wilkins, T., and Zimmer, L, (1985), "The Reporting of Investments in Associated 
Companies and Credit Evaluations: An Experimental Study". Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer, pp. 207-220.
Williamson, O.E., (1963), "Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior". The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 11, pp. 1032-1057.
Williamson, O.E., (1970), Corporate Control and Business Behavior. New Jersey, 
Prentice-Hall.
Williamson, O.E., (1983), "Organizational Form, Residual Claimants and Corporate 
Control". Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 351-366.
Willingham, J.J., (1964), "The Accounting Entity: A Conceptual Model", The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 543-552.
Winer, B.J., (1973), Statistical Principles in Experimental Design. Second Edition, 
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
152
Winn, M., (1989, December 13), "Minorities Attack Deal on Bell Res". The Australian, 
p.24.
Winzar, H., (1991), Addressing Some Puzzles in Conjoint Analysis. Working paper, 
Bond University.
Winzar, H., Duncan, K., and McNamara, R., (1992), "Dichotomous Response in 
Conjoint Analysis". Working Paper, Proceedings of the Sixth New Zealand 
Marketing Educators' Conference, Department of Marketing, University of Otago, 
Dunedin, 17-19 November.
Winzar, H., and Johnson, L.W., (1993), Hybrid Conjoint Analysis: A Test of 
Assumptions and Predictive Validity. Working paper No. 92-02, University of 
Sydney.
Winzar, H., and Morley, R., (1989), "Attitudinal and Environmental Influences on 
Preferences for Commerce and Management Courses Amongst Matriculation 
Students: An Application of Fishbien's Extended Multi-Attribute Model". 
Presented at Australian and New Zealand Association of Management Educators 
(ANZAME) Conference, Auckland, 4-6 December.
Wittink, K.R., and Cattin, P., (1989), "Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis: An 
Update". Journal of Marketing, Vol. 53, July, pp. 91-96.
Zajac, E.J., (1988), "Interlocking Directorates as an Interorganizational Strategy: A Test 
of Critical Assumptions". Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 
428-438.
Zellner, A., (1962), "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions and Tests of Aggregation Bias". Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, Vol. 57, pp. 348-368.
Zinkhan, C., (1990), "A New Approach for Jointly Evaluating the "Six Cs" of Loan 
Analysis". Akron Business and Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring, pp. 8- 
17.
Zmijewski, M.E., and Hagerman, R.L. (1981), "An Income Strategy Approach to the 
Positive Theory of Accounting Standard Setting/Choice". Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 129-149.
i
BOND UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY
153
APPENDIX A
A. 1. Introduction
This appendix provides further discussion of the international differences in the 
regulation of "associated" and "controlled" entities. Table 1.1 shows that the definition 
of "associated" companies is fairly uniform across the countries surveyed. With the 
exception of Japan, the nations surveyed in Table 1.1 employ the conceptual de facto 
test of "significant influence" to define associated companies. However, the regulation 
of consolidation of "controlled" entities is much less uniform and thus is discussed in 
detail below. The comparison is broken down by region (North America, Europe, and 
Australasia) and is followed with a review of the provisions of the International 
Accounting Standards.
A.2. North America - USA and Canada
The profession in the US requires consolidation if there is a controlling 
financial interest in another entity. Such control exists where one company directly 
or indirectly owns the majority of the voting stock of the subsidiary entity (ARB 51, 
para 2, as amended by SEAS 94, para 13). Securities and Exchange Commission 
Regulation S-X Rule 4-02(a) also requires consolidation of majority owned 
subsidiaries. These provisions may not fairly reflect the economic reality in modem 
web like structured groups as a company can have de facto control of the operating 
and financing policies of another entity but own less than a majority position in the 
stock. However contemporary US practice considers only majority owned subsidiaries
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part of the economic entity (Baker et al, 1989, p. 113; Larsen and Mosich, 1988, p. 
217). This narrow interpretation of ARB 51 means that US companies apply the de 
jure ownership criterion.1
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) adopts a slightly 
narrower view of the entity. The CICA Handbook (Section 3050, para .03, "Long- 
Term Investments") defines a controlled entity to be a company in which another 
company owns (directly or indirectly) the majority of the shares which also confers the 
right to elect the majority of the Board of Directors. Thus not only is ownership 
required but that ownership must be associated with the ability to control the 
membership, and hence the decisions, of the Board of Directors. Control of decision 
making at the board level is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership 
of the economic entity.
Both the US and Canada allow exclusions to consolidation of "controlled" 
entities. Where control is temporary, impaired (eg. by a foreign government), or the 
entity is controlled by others (such as where the firm is in bankruptcy), then US and 
Canadian regulations allow the entity to be excluded from the consolidated accounts. 
Canada also allows non-consolidation where the activities of the parent and subsidiary 
are dissimilar. Until the 1990 amendments to SFAS 94, US corporations were also 
able to use dissimilarity of activities as a reason for non-consolidation, in particular the 
non-consolidation of finance subsidiaries (Mian and Smith, 1990a, 1990b).
A.3. Europe - EEC, France, Germany and the UK
EEC member countries are subject to a diverse range of definitions of control 
relationships under the Seventh Company Law Directive (1983). The Directive
1 The FASB is currently reviewing the concept of control as part its project to update ARB 51,
which has seen little change since issuance in 1959 (Strauss and Weber, 1988).
155
provides that either ownership of more than 50% of the voting stock or control of the 
Board of Directors constitutes a subsidiary, consistent with the historical provisions of 
the UK professional standards.2 Reflective of French and German law, the Directive 
also considers an arrangement for joint administration, even though no ownership 
interest may exist, to constitute a parent-subsidiary relationship. For example where 
one entity contracts to place all its managerial decisions with another entity with little 
or no cross ownership. This sort of arrangement clearly places greater weight on de 
facto control aspects than ownership aspects of the relation between two entities.
The UK has recently adopted a broader de facto test for controlled entities. It 
defines a "subsidiary undertaking" (ie. a controlled entity) to be where one entity 
"actually exercises a dominant influence over [another entity] ... or ... it and the 
subsidiary undertaking are managed on a unified basis".3 Dominant influence requires 
that the major decisions are in accordance with the wishes of the dominant party, 
through active involvement or through a passive veto power, that can exist with or 
without the normal legal rights (ie. majority ownership) that signify control. However, 
there must be a non-zero participating interest (holding more than 20% of the shares is 
presumed to be a participating interest unless shown otherwise). Finally, unified 
management refers to integrated operations managed as a single unit.
EEC countries all allow multiple grounds for non-consolidation, including where 
control is temporary, impaired or others control. In addition, the EEC Directive, 
Germany and the UK provide for non-consolidation where consolidation would not be 
material, too expensive, or would delay the production of the financial statements. 
The EEC member countries generally provide a wider range of exception provisions 
than the US or Canada.
2 See SSAP 14 "Group Accounts" issued in September 1978, prior to the amendments in 
December 1989.
3 See the UK Companies Act 1985 (as amended in 1989) and Accounting Standards Board 
"Interim Statement: Consolidated Accounts".
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A.4. Australasia - Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Japan
Regulations in the Pacific region generally reflect an historical bias towards the 
UK provisions. Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan define control in terms of majority 
share ownership and majority vote control. Until recently provisions in New Zealand 
(SSAP 8) and Australia (Companies Act 1981, section 7) also used majority ownership 
and majority vote control as the definition of a subsidiary. The Australian and New 
Zealand provisions (consistent with the 1978 UK standard) also recognised control of 
the Board of Directors as giving rise to a parent-subsidiary relationship.
Reporting regulations in New Zealand and Australia have, however, moved to a 
broader definition of control that focuses on de facto control. The Australian 
Corporations Law (through AASB 1024 "Consolidated Accounts") defines control as 
the "capacity of an entity" to directly or indirectly dominate the decision making of 
another entity to achieve the objectives of the controlling entity. New Zealand's SSAP 
8 has a similar definition for "in-substance" subsidiaries which are subsidiaries that are 
not majority owned, as defined in the current Companies Act. New Zealand is now 
looking to change its Companies Act, with amendments tabled in the Companies Bill, 
to define controlled entities solely in terms of "capacity to dominate" as per the 
provisions for "in-substance" subsidiaries (Hays, 1993).
The regulations in Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan allow non-consolidation 
where control is temporary, impaired or others control. Firms in Hong Kong and 
Japan can also justify non-consolidation on the grounds that consolidation is not 
material, too expensive or would unduly delay the preparation of the accounts. 
Further Hong Kong companies do not have to consolidate subsidiaries whose 
operations are dissimilar to the parent's. The current New Zealand provisions only 
allow non-consolidation where the subsidiary's activities are dissimilar or where 
consolidation is not material, costly, or would cause a delay. The New Zealand
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Companies Bill proposes that all entities be consolidated - no exclusions - consistent 
with the provisions in Australia (see Table 1.1).
A.5. International Accounting Standards
The new International Accounting Standard 27 (1990, para 6) defines an 
"enterprise" to be controlled where another "enterprise" has the "power to govern the 
financial and operating policies of ... [the first enterprise] ... so as to obtain benefits 
from its activities". IAS 27 replaced IAS 3, "Consolidated Financial Statements", 
which defined control in terms of majority ownership and majority vote control. The 
new IAS 27 does, however, provide for non-consolidation in two situations. The first 
is where control is considered temporary. The second basis for non-consolidation is 
where control is impaired or the subsidiary is under the control of another entity.
A.6. Summary
Table 1.1 and the discussion above show that there is a range of definitions of 
controlled entities and exclusions from consolidation internationally. Nevertheless the 
recent trend in consolidation regulations is to recognise the de facto aspects of control 
and to adopt a broadly (some might say "ill") defined concept of control. This is 
expected to lead to changes in the practice of corporate accounting internationally. In 
particular, in those countries that have moved to embrace the notion of a widely 
defined economic entity, namely the UK, New Zealand and Australia.
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APPENDIX B
Figure B.l: Adsteam Group Structure Including Material Off Balance Sheet 
Operating and Investment Entities
fANZ
Allowrie Foods lovelock Luke EMAIL
AUf McPhersons 50%......... -► QCL
4
Duncan Holdings Ajax Cooke
-------------- r
r—h—-
! l
1100%1•1
-------
5o%,y 111
/■ i
! // :50%
27% rPetersville
Sleigh
Tooth k Co
^ AOZ . ‘
j 64% ‘ 1 \ ' 
|33% \\ 50%,' /
Los cam
/ Bridge Haulage
S } /18% [WBC]
Metro
Meat / / 33%.--^
Spence Casings 
[ANZ.WBC]
A / /
142% 121%
___________ S
150%
:---i.........!
50%
f 18%
National
Consolidated
.....t—
1%', 150%
Vaniro [NAB]
""""T.............. .
50%
50% i3%/y . TTH 33% 18%l
f"
33% r Dextran/IEL 33%
•iii 
■«-•!! !
Steamship
--------- 1---!---- i
i |
“! i 1 i
49% I
L----- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
50%
3%
GA Duncan [Clf] 50%
_________________________ _________ ________ ____________ -L.__ 1
50%'........................................... AAM Inc 50%<—-------------------------- 1
------------------------------------------------------ -
| 50%
31%
Howard 43%
Smith
► Coal k Allied Markheath
*9%
1%
10%
-....... ■..........................-.........-i...........................r...........................i
Pioneer Prop McMahon AWA Belt Resources
[Source: Potter Warburg Research, 1990, p. 2.]
159
APPENDIX C
Table C.l: Directorship Structure for Major Adsteam Related Entities (1990)
David National Petersville Tooth
Director Status Adsteam Jones Consolidated Sleigh & Co
J.G. Spalvins Non-Indep. M Director Chief E./Dir Chair/Dir Chair/Dir Chair/Dir
M.J. Kent Non-Indep. Director Director Director Director Director
K.W. Russell Non-Indep. Chair/Dir Chair/Dir Director Director Director
G.A. Haines Non-Indep. Director Director M Director
R.J. Wright Non-Indep. Director Director
J.D. Cameron Non-Indep. Director Director
D P. Hobbs Non-Indep. Director Director
N.L. Branford Indep. Director
M.S. Gregg Indep. Director
RJ.Mewing Indep. M Director
Sir J. Atwill Indep. Director
W.E. Picher Indep. Director
A.C. Dwyer Indep. M Director
J O. Curry Indep. Director
J.F. Phillips Indep. Director
R.B. Cumberlidge Indep. M Director
D.J. Bennett Indep. Director
M.S. Cohen Indep. Director
J.S. Shaw Indep. Director
D.W. Allen Indep. Director
C.J. Hensen Indep. Director
I.G. Mackley Indep. Director
Total Directors 5 8 8 8 10
Non-Independent % 60% 62.5% 62.5% 50.0% 70.0%
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APPENDIX D
D.I. Introduction
This appendix discusses issues in the design of conjoint experiments. There are 
seven major design issues to resolve in the construction of a conjoint study: (1) 
selection of judgement model; (2) data collection method; (3) measurement scale for 
the dependent variable; (4) independent variable attributes; (5) stimuli set construction; 
(6) stimulus presentation procedures; and (7) the model estimation technique.1 Within 
each of these seven areas there are a range of design choices available to the 
researcher. Further, the collection of conjoint techniques is constantly expanding as 
more research is conducted aimed at improving the methodology. At the same time 
the choice is narrowing in the sense that mounting research evidence favours certain 
methods for the optimal design of conjoint studies. The sections below discuss the 
options for the seven design issues.
D.2. Selection of Judgement Model
The researcher must select a theoretical model of the underlying nature to the 
subject's judgements, preference, or utility. The choice of theoretical judgement model 
will influence the choices for the other design issues, in particular the independent 
variables, stimulus construction, and estimation procedures. Depending on the 
assumptions of the model under investigation, the judgement structure could be either 
vector, ideal point, part-worth or some mixed model.
1 The discussion in this Appendix draws heavily upon Green and Rao, (1971), Green (1974,
1984), Wilkie and Pessemier (1973), Green and Srinivasan (1978), Louviere (1988), and Wittink and 
Cattin, (1989).
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Vector Model: The vector (or composite criterion) model is a simple linear
additive combination of the attributes underlying multi-attribute decisions 
(see equation 3.1). The judgements (ie. in the current study C,) are 
represented as a vector iny-dimensional space. The underlying dimensions 
or attributes are necessarily continuous. The theoretical model outlined in 
Chapter 2 is a vector model.
Ideal Point Model: The ideal point model posits that subject m's judgement
(&m) is negatively related to the squared distance (<i,2) of the location (Xy) 
of the /'th case from the wth individual's ideal point f°r attribute j
(Carroll, 1972; Green and Srinivasan, 1978). Attribute levels further away 
from the ideal level for the attribute may be weighted less heavily than 
levels of the attribute closer to the ideal level or vice versa. These ideal 
point effects imply the following conjoint model:
DC,m = ymd.
and42=I>,(^-/>)2
= wj(Xl-2PjXij + P;)
(D 1)
This can be rewriten as:
where a = L/j.XjPj1’ = Wj ,and Cj = 2WjPj. The essential nature of the 
ideal point model can be captured by including the variable Xy2 in addition 
to Xjj in the model (Carroll, 1972; Green and Srinivasan, 1978). This 
shows that the simultaneous estimation of the weights and the ideal points 
is feasible for the weighted Euclidean metric. Other metrics are, however, 
more problematic (see Green and Srinivasan, 1978).
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Part-Worth Model: The part-worth model represents a piece wise linear
curve. This model differs from the vector model in equation 3.1 in that the 
weights for each attribute level are not the same. Disaggregation of the 
attribute weights (ie. fij) provides an estimate of the weight placed on each 
level of the individual attributes. That is, say the price that consumers will 
pay for otherwise equivalent red versus green cars. The relative weights 
estimated for each level of the individual attributes is called the part 
worth, or more generally the utility, of that attribute level. A general 
formulation of the part-worth model is written as follows:
;=0 /=1
(D.2)
Where:
&im ~ m s rating of attribute package i (equates with Q in equ. 3.1);
J = total number of attributes;
L = number of possible levels for attribute j,
A
Xjiim = subject nis estimated utility or part-worth decomposed from their 
evaluation of the ith package containing level / of the jth attribute;
Xjji = EITHER coded as 1 if package i has attribute j at level /, and 0
otherwise; OR as a continuous variable if attribute j has a natural ratio 
or interval scale;
Sj m = Non-systematic attributes of relationship i.
A
Regression analysis provides an estimate of the part-worths 
associated with each of the attribute levels by decomposing the betas for 
each attribute. Either 'canned' commercial conjoint software packages (eg. 
SPSS) or adaptations to most regression packages provides this 
information. Note that the conjoint model in equation D.2 collapses to the
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theoretical model in equation 3.1 if it is pooled across the subjects (ie. drop 
the m subscript from equation D.2), i9, is replaced with C(, and the
A
relationship between and Xji is recognised. Specifically:
l=\
That is, the sum of the part worths by attribute levels must equate with 
the overall beta weights, from whence they were decomposed.
The choice between these judgement models depends on the decision process 
being modelled. The part-worth model affords the greatest flexibility as it allows 
different shapes for the judgement function for each attribute. To a lesser extent the 
ideal-point model also allows more flexibility than the vector model. The part-worth 
model has been used extensively in marketing applications where the weighting of 
attribute levels is of direct interest (Wittink and Cattin, 1989). The vector model is, 
however, simple and has been found to produce good predictions of many human 
judgement tasks (see discussion in Chapter 3). A vector model is assumed in the 
current study. The validity of this assumption is investigated by comparing the 
performance of the linear model with the ideal point model (and a quadratic model).
D.3. Data Collection Method
A number of data collection methods are available to the researcher in the design 
of a conjoint study. The options include two factor trade-off analysis, full profile 
evaluation, paired comparisons, self-explicated rating, or a hybrid of these approaches.
Two Factor Trade-off Analysis: This method requires respondents to rank pairs 
of attributes from the most to least preferred. The procedure is simple to 
apply and reduces overload. This method, however, has practically 
become obsolete, partly due to its artificial nature and the complications in 
analysis that can occur (Wittink and Cattin, 1989).
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Full Profile Evaluation: Full profile evaluation uses a complete set of attributes 
and thus is the least artificial method for the collection of judgements. 
Respondents are presented with pre-planned packages of attributes (ie. 
cases descriptions) as the experimental stimuli. Each case differs in the 
level of one or more of the attributes being researched. For example, a 
marketing case might consist of different levels of colour (eg. red, green, 
blue), size (eg. small, large), quality (eg. poor, average, good) and 
functionality (eg. 4 seater, 6 seater). In the current experiment the stimuli 
are inter-entity relationships represented by different levels of the four 
attributes in equation 3.1. The major limitation of full profile evaluation is 
the possibility of information overload and sub-optimal decision making by 
respondents. Green and Srinivasan (1978) suggest a maximum of five or 
six attributes to avoid this problem. The evidence suggests that full profile 
evaluation is the most common data collection technique at present 
(Wittink and Cattin, 1989).
Paired Comparisons: Respondents can be asked to evaluate a full profile
relative to another full profile which is a more sophisticated version of the 
two factor trade-off analysis. This is, however, less common that straight 
full profile evaluation (Green and Srinivasan, 1978); Wittink and Cattin, 
1989).
Self-explicated: Self-explicated importance ratings have started to attract
attention in conjoint studies as a means of reducing the data collection 
burden on respondents. Even with fraction factorial designs full profile 
tasks can be quite large. Self rating of the attributes, similar to the data 
collection for the expectancy theory models, offers an economical 
alternative for data collection. The limitations of this form of data, 
discussed in Chapter 3 and below, need to be noted.
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Hybrid: Recent research has explored the merits of combining self-explicated and 
full profile data collection in a hybrid type model. The advantage is that 
the data collection task is reduced while retaining some of the qualities and 
insights of a full profile design (see Akaah and Korgaonkar, 1983; Akaah, 
1991; Green, Goldberg, and Montemayor, 1981; Green, Goldberg and 
Wiley, 1982; Cattin, Hermet and Pioche, 1982; Green, 1984; Winzar, 
1991; Winzar and Johnson, 1993). The limitations of self-explicated 
importance rating can be mitigated by explicitly modelling the bias in self- 
explicated ratings (Green, 1984).
The choice between data collection methods hinges on the constraints on the 
time of the subjects. A full profile model is preferable but a hybrid may have to be 
adopted to make the data collection feasible. The current experiment employs a full 
profile approach and presents subjects with full case descriptions. Self-explicated 
ratings are also collected to facilitate tests of face validity. In this sense only is the 
data collection method a hybrid.
D.4. Measurement Scale for the Dependent Variable
The measurement scale for the dependent variable is the fourth design issue. 
The options include paired choice, rank order, rating scales, constant sum scales, 
category assignment, or a mixture of these measurement approaches.
Paired Choice: Paired choice is a non-metric measure of the preference for one
case set over another. However, this approach is the least efficient in 
terms of information obtained per unit of time. Its only advantage is the 
ability to explore the respondent's preference intransitivity.
Rank Order: Non-metric rank order data is likely to be more reliable as it is
easier for respondents to state a preference that the express the magnitude
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of that preference. There is, however, a potential information loss 
compared with metric measurement (Green and Srinivasan, 1978).
Rating Scales: Rating scales require less respondent time and provide a richer
metric measurement if approximate interval scale properties can be 
assumed. Rating and rank order scales are used extensively in conjoint 
applications (Green, 1984; Hair a/, 1987; Wittink and Cattin, 1989).
Constant Sum Scales: Constant sum procedures require respondents to allocate
a constant total number of 'points' across the attributes so as to represent 
the importance of each attribute. This method is very efficient from the 
respondent's perspective and has the advantage of generating ratio scale 
data. This procedure has not been used often but might gain exposure in 
measuring self-explicated rating in hybrid studies (Green, 1984; Wittink 
and Cattin, 1989).
Category Assignment: Category assignment provides a sort of rank order
response. Essentially the categories may define the monotone preference 
structure in which the individual choices are located. This method is 
particularly useful where the task corresponds with real world categories. 
Using real categories for the data collection is likely to result in more valid 
and reliable responses.
Mixture: A mixture of the above methods is also possible, such as Rosenberg's
(1956) category assignment and rating task.
Measurement choice is related to the data collection procedures chosen. 
Researchers also need to consider the type of testing they want to conduct and thus 
what type of data - metric or non-metric - is appropriate for the planned analysis. In 
the current experiment a mixed measurement is employed. The subjects assign stimuli 
sets to one of two categories - controlled or not controlled. The subject then rates the
■ i
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confidence they have in their decision. The product of these two measures provides a 
metric 'index' for analysis.
D.5. Independent Variable Attributes
The choice of the independent variables will be driven by the theory being tested. 
However, the number of variables from the theoretical model that can be empirically 
tested is limited by the imposition of the task on respondent time. The number, 
spacing and range of the attribute levels also need to be determined.
Number of Attributes: As the number of parameters to estimate increases so
too must the number of observations per observation unit to maintain 
sufficient degrees of freedom. The time the research task requires places 
an upper bound on the number of observations and hence the number of 
attributes in the task. Green and Srinivasan (1978) suggest it is difficult to 
maintain respondent interest much beyond 30 cases which limits the 
number of attributes to 5 or 6 as a maximum.
Number of Attribute Levels: Ability to maintain subject interest and subject
time demands of the task also place and upper bound on the number of 
attribute levels for each attribute. The more attributes included, the fewer 
levels possible for each attribute (see discussion below concerning 
fractional factorial designs).
Spacing of Attribute Levels: The spacing of the attribute levels has achieved
little research attention. Darmon and Rouzies (1989) suggest that where 
the researcher has no a priori reason to hypothesize a specific judgement 
model, then equal spacing is preferable as it results in less distortion. 
Where prior information suggests that the underlying preference function 
for the respondent judgements is curvilinear then unequal attribute levels, 
with smaller spacing where the function has the steepest slope, are more
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appropriate. If, however, OLS regression is used to estimate the model, 
then equal spacing is robust to the judgement model used.
Range for Attribute Levels: Finally the attribute levels should span the range
of research interest. Green and Srinivasan (1978) recommend that the 
range be larger than 'reality' but within believable bounds. This strategy 
will enhance the validity of the estimated parameters.
The choices for the independent variables are a matter of compromise between 
theory and practical measurement issues. The four attributes from the theoretical 
model are used in the stimuli sets for the current study. Either 4 or 6 levels are used to 
represent each attribute and the levels are approximately equally spaced. Finally, the 
levels span the real ranges for each attribute.
D.6. Stimulus Set Construction
In constructing the stimulus set for a full profile study the design considerations 
include fractional factorial design, random sampling, repeated measurement and 
whether to include learning or holdout stimuli.
Fractional Factorial Design: Green (1974) suggested the use of fractional
factorial designs to reduce the number of combinations in a full profile 
study to a manageable level. Orthogonal designs can be employed that are 
factorial designs in which the independent variables are uncorrelated with 
each other (Louriere, 1988). Such designs often assume away all 
interaction effects but have the advantage of providing efficient estimates.
Random Sampling: Random sampling from the multivariate distribution for
the attributes can be used to determine the stimulus descriptions. Parker 
and Srinivasan (1976) and Green and Srinivasan (1978) recommend this 
approach for ideal point type models.
i i
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Repeated Measurement: The design could be constructed to include repeated 
measures for reliability assessments. This could be either test-retest, 
alternative forms, or a Beesley and Hensher (1987) logical consistency 
type reliability analysis.
Learning and Holdout Stimuli: If the task permits and warrants, learning and 
holdout stimuli can be included in the case stimuli sets. Winzar (1991) 
provides some evidence that the first few evaluation stimuli involve some 
'learning' as the initial evaluations are different to the remainder of the 
judgements. Reliability will be enhanced by including some 'learning' 
stimuli which explicitly allow for some initial noisy responses. These can 
then be excluded from later analysis. Similarly, mixing a series of holdout 
evaluations into the stimulus set allows stronger tests of the predictive 
ability of any estimated judgement models (Parker and Srinivasan, 1976; 
Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Louviere, 1988).
The are several computer packages, such as SPSS: Categories Module, which 
can produce orthogonal designs, and some even print the case 'cards'. Most of these 
packages allow the researcher to include additional cases for learning and holdout 
analysis. The critical issue is to evaluate and pre-test the cases for 'believableness'. If 
the case combinations are completely unreasonable then they will only introduce error 
into the data set and confound the estimation of the attribute weights.
An orthogonal array design is employed to identify the 32 treatment cases for the 
current experiment. A further 6 holdout cases were also included to facilitate 
predictive analysis. Due to space considerations, no learning cases were included.
D.7. Stimulus Presentation Procedures
The options for presenting the stimuli include either verbal description cards, 
paragraph description, pictorial representation or computer cue presentation.
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Verbal Description Cards: Verbal description cards are a convenient
method to convey information on several attributes quickly without the 
overhead of other language. The approach is artificial but has been used 
widely from early psychology research on conjoint measurement through 
to commercial conjoint analysis today (see Hair et al, 1987). Pictures do 
not dominate words. Evidence suggests that pictures and words produce 
similar results to purely verbal descriptions, but take much less time to 
complete than verbal descriptions (Green and Srinivasan, 1978).
Paragraph Description: The paragraph description provides a more complete, 
and in that sense realistic, description of the stimuli. Green and Srinivasan 
(1978) suggest that the time demands of the procedure limits the number 
of attributes that can be examined with this method of presentation.
Pictorial Representation: Pictorial presentation has the advantage of reducing the 
possibility of information overload in the sense that a lot of information 
processing takes place in preparing the picture. It also reduces perceptual 
variance and is more interesting than verbal or paragraph presentations. It 
is not, however, suitable for all types of research problems, such as the 
current study.
Computer Cue Presentation: Computer interactive methods allow for a much
richer data set to be captured. Variables such as time per task or task 
component can be measured as well as the order of completion. The 
researcher can also provide feedback information. The limitation is the 
cost to set up the program and the time to train subjects to use the 
computer. With the growth of experimental economics research this 
method may come into its own.
The choice of cue presentation will depend on the data collection method, the 
type of judgements being studied, and the means that the stimuli are presented to the
i
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respondents (ie. personal interview, mail survey, or third party administered). Verbal 
card descriptions were used in the mailed instrument in the current survey.
D.8. Model Estimation Technique
The final design issues in the estimation technique to employ. This will depend 
partly on the other choices made as they will determine the nature of the data 
collected. Possible approaches include MONANOVA, logit, probit, ordered logit and 
probit, multiple regression (OLS), and MDS techniques such as LINMAP and 
PREFMAP. The level of aggregation will also impact on the analysis choice. 
Individual models can only be estimated if there are sufficient degrees of freedom. 
Aggregate or group analysis is less problematic. OLS regression is probably the 
dominant technique in applied conjoint analysis (Wittink and Cattin, 1989; Green, 
1984; Hair et al, 1987). OLS is used in the current study but Chapter 5 also considers 
logit, probit, and ordered probit.
More complex models involving multiple evaluations and multiple attributes 
would require techniques such as canonical correlation and canonical discriminant 
analysis. In addition, cluster analysis of the estimated parameters and discriminant 
analysis based on demographic variables will provide insights into the differential 
judgements of sub-sets of respondents. These issues are explored in Chapter 5.
D.9. Summary of Design Issues
Although there are multiple options available to the researcher, the nature of the 
model being investigated effectively limits the choices applicable in the design of any 
particular study. Some options dominate others in contemporary conjoint applications 
(eg. full profile over trade-off analysis or paired comparisons). Chapter 3 discusses 
further the design options adopted in the current experiment.
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APPENDIX E
E.l. Sample Cover Letter
[Date Here)
[Address Here]
Dear [Name Here]:
This is an invitation to participate in research which seeks to contribute to our understanding of 
what gives one company control over another company. From the outcome of this project we will be 
able to properly inform accounting practitioners, policy makers and legislators on what constitutes a 
"group" of companies.
The enclosed booklet details the research task, which should take you 20-25 minutes to complete. 
The task requires you to sort a series of cases (described in 4 lines) into those that represent control 
situations and those that are not control situations. You then record your classification on the 
response sheet and estimate the degree of confidence you have in your decision.
Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. All data will be coded directly into a computer 
and referenced by an observation number and the hard copy of your response destroyed. Thus there 
will be no trace from the data collected to any respondent. However, if you wish to receive a 
summary of the major findings then you can either furnish your name and address with your 
response OR send reply details under a separate cover.
Proceed by reading the background discussion and instructions in the enclosed booklet. When you 
have completed the task, return your response booklet in the reply-paid envelope supplied.
We appreciate your significant contribution to this study and look forward to your reply.
Sincerely,
Keith Duncan
Assistant Professor of Accounting and Finance 
School of Business
i
E.2. Research Booklet
Research Booklet
Accounting for Groups of Companies
Researcher:
Keith Duncan
Assistant Professor of Accounting and Finance 
School of Business 
Bond University 
Robina, QLD 4229
Direct Line (075) 952238
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Purpose of Project
The purpose of this research is to explore what constitutes a 
"group" of companies, in particular, what gives one company 
control over another company.
Until recently legislation in Australia, United States and Europe defined controlled companies 
as those companies in which another company owned more than 50% of the voting shares. 
However, the trend internationally is to question this narrow view and to broaden the concept 
of a group to include all companies that the parent company has the capacity to control.
This trend can be seen in International Accounting Standard 27: Consolidated Financial 
Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries. It states that a group (or economic 
entity) shall consist of all companies over which a single company has the capacity to control 
the financial and operating decisions. This definition allows for different forms of control to 
exist. For example, control might exist where there is less than 50% ownership interest AND 
the right to appoint or remove the majority of the Board of Directors. The right to cast the 
majority of the votes at Board meetings might also constitute a control relationship.
Your Contribution
To investigate the changing concept of control the following pages present you with the facts 
for different situations (4 lines). You are asked how YOU PERCEIVE the control 
relationship. That is, whether you consider that one company controls another and how 
confident you are in your decision. Remember we are interested in your opinion of whether a 
company controls another, not a restatement of the current legal position. We thank you for 
your 20-25 minute contribution to this study. Please read the following instructions carefully.
i
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Attributes to Consider
Detailed below are four attributes that may affect control. They are a combined in various
situations for you to evaluate. The situations differ in the level of each of four attributes
considered to affect control. The attributes are:
(a) X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
Company X may acquire shares in company Z either directly, or indirectly through 
other related or associated companies. This attribute is presented as the total 
percentage of Z's common shares owned by company X. Thus this includes 
shares held both directly and indirectly.
(b) X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z
If company X's holding in company Z is direct, the extent of its control is 
relatively easy to ascertain. However, the level of ownership expressed in (a) 
above may be established through a variety of structures that makes assessing 
control more problematic. If ownership is indirect, through a host of interposed 
entities, people have differing perceptions on how effectively or promptly control 
may be exercised. The level of direct versus indirect ownership in Z is added to 
the cases to determine what effect, if any, it has on your judgments. If company 
X owns 49% percent in company Z, then this ownership could be direct in straight 
share investments or it could be indirect — X company may hold 10% directly 
through its own investments, and 39% indirectly through intermediaries, 
subsidiaries, or associates.
(c) Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Case evidence suggests that a company may control another company with a 
relatively small share holding if the other shares in the company are widely held.
We define widely held to mean a low probability that other shareholders will act 
in concert against company X. This includes actions at directors' meetings or in 
the courts. Alternatively company Z could be closely held — where a significant 
fraction of Z's shares are held by another party — thus making it more likely that X 
has to consider the wishes of the other party.
(d) Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
A person on Z's Board of Directors is a representative of company X, firstly if X 
has the power to appoint or remove the member from Z's Board. Secondly, if it is 
reasonable to assume that a Board member's voting pattern is under the influence 
of company X, or an associate of company X, then that Director is a 
representative of company X. All other Directors are considered independent of 
company X.
176
Instructions
The task requires you to evaluate each of 38 cases as to whether company X controls company 
Z. Proceed as follows:
1. Detach along the perforations between the 38 cases to form a series of "cards".
2. Sort all 38 "cards" into two piles — one pile for those cases where you consider 
company X controls company Z and one pile for those where company X does not 
control company Z. Some respondents may wish to use a third 'doubtful' pile, 
which is then re-evaluated and split as appropriate between the control and not 
control piles.
3. Examine the contents of your final two piles, making sure that you agree with your 
evaluation, swapping some "cards" over to the other pile if you like.
4. Taking each pile in turn, record your responses on the response form over the page. 
Make sure that you circle YES if you consider company X does control company 
Z and NO for each case you consider company X does not control company Z.
Also indicate how confident you are about your evaluation on the 5-point scale (see 
example below).
5. Complete the additional questions concerning your evaluations and background.
Seal the response booklet in the reply-paid envelope and place in the post.
__________________ Example Case Presentation:______
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares 65%
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z All direct
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z Widely Held
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors_______ 8 of 10
If you judge that company X does control company Z then place this case in the control pile 
and record your evaluation by circling YES on the response form. If you feel EXTREMELY 
CONFIDENT about your classification then circle a number close to 5, as below.
Case Does Co. X Not too Extremely
No. Control Co. Z? Confident 1 2 3 4 5 Confident
If, however, you are NOT TOO CONFIDENT about your classification of the case then circle 
a number closer to 1, as appropriate. Be sure to use the full range of the scale to indicate the 
degree of confidence you have in your evaluations and remember there are no right answers to 
this task. We are interested in YOUR PERCEPTIONS of the control relationship.
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TAKE EACH PILE IN TURN AND CIRCLE YOUR RESPONSES HERE
Case
No.
Does Co. X 
Control Co. Z?
Not too 
Confident 1 2 3 4
Extremely
5 Confident
1 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
2 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
3 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
4 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
5 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
6 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
7 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
8 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
9 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
10 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
11 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
12 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
13 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
14 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
15 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
16 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
17 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
18 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
19 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
20 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
21 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
22 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
23 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
24 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
25 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
26 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
27 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
28 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
29 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
30 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
31 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
32 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
33 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
34 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
35 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
36 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
37 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
38 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5
i
i
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Overall Evaluation;
Indicate on the 5-point scale below how important you consider each of the following are in 
determining whether a company is controlled by another company? (Circle the number between 
1 and 5 that best represents your relative rating of each item)
Not
Important
Extremely
Important
A. Complexity of the ownership structure. 1 2 3 4 5
B. Dispersion of ownership and potential to control decisions. 1 2 3 4 5
C. Greater than 50% ownership of the voting shares. 1 2 3 4 5
D. Actual control of operating and financing decisions. 1 2 3 4 5
E. Majority representation on the Board of Directors. 1 2 3 4 5
Professional Details:
Check the box(s) which best represent(s) your occupation, education and qualifications:
Occupation:
O Director/Board Member
□ Chief Financial Officer
□ Accountant (internal)
□ Security Analyst/ Investment Specialist
□ Senior Management, Functional Area
□ Middle Management, Functional Area
Other - Please Specify____________________
HH Chief Executive Officer
□ Chief Accountant/Controller
□ Accountant (external)
Education and Qualifications:
□ Bachelor Degree (Accounting)
□ MBA
□ Non-Business Degree
□ CMA
Other - Please Specify____________
□ Masters Degree (Accounting) 
d Other Business Degree
□ CPA/CA
□ SIA
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Please Add Any Additional Comments or Suggestions:
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.
If you would like to receive a copy of the major findings of the study please either:
• provide reply details below,
• attach your business card, OR
• send in details under a separate cover.
PLEASE FORWARD A COPY OF THE FINDINGS TO:
Name: ____________________________________________
Address:__________________________________________
City:____________________________State:
Postal Code:______________
180
E.3.Case ’’Cards”
Case 1
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
26% direct, 39% indirect
20% by one firm
4 of 10
Case 2
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
51%
31% direct, 20% indirect
20% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 3
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
18% direct, 27% indirect
Widely Held
2 of 10
Case 4
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
All indirect
Widely Held
4 of 10
Case 5
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
18% direct, 12% indirect
20% by one firm
8 of 10
f ! IW!
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Case 6
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
All indirect
30% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 7
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
9% direct, 6% indirect
10% by one firm
4 of 10
Case 8
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
All direct
20% by one firm
4 of 10
Case 9
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
51%
All indirect
Widely Held
6 of 10
Case 10
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
6% direct, 9% indirect
30% by one firm
4 of 10
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Case 11
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
All indirect
10% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 12
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
49%
20% direct, 29% indirect
30% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 13
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
27% direct, 18% indirect
30% by one firm
8 of 10
Case 14
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
49%
All direct
10% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 15
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
12% direct, 18% indirect
Widely Held
8 of 10
i I
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Case 16
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
All direct
Widely Held
8 of 10
Case 17
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
6% direct, 9% indirect
20% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 18
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
49%
All indirect
20% by one firm
8 of 10
Case 19
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
All indirect
30% by one firm
8 of 10
Case 20
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z’s Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
All indirect
10% by one firm
4 of 10
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Case 21
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
All direct
20% by one firm
4 of 10
Case 22
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
All direct
20% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 23
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
All indirect
20% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 24
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
18% direct, 12% indirect
30% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 25
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
9% direct, 6% indirect
Widely Held
6 of 10
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Case 26
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
All direct
30% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 27
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X’s Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
All direct
10% by one firm
8 of 10
Case 28
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
51%
All direct
30% by one firm
4 of 10
Case 29
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
12% direct, 18% indirect
10% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 30
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
39% direct, 26% indirect
10% by one firm
6 of 10
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Case 31
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
49%
29% direct, 20% indirect
Widely Held
4 of 10
Case 32
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
15%
All direct
Widely Held
2 of 10
Case 33
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
65%
26% direct, 39% indirect
Widely Held
4 of 10
Case 34
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
45%
18% direct, 27% indirect
20% by one firm
2 of 10
Case 35
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
30%
All indirect
20% by one firm
2 of 10
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Case 36
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
49%
29% direct, 20% indirect
20% by one firm
6 of 10
Case 37
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation 7s Board of Directors
45%
All direct
Widely Held
8 of 10
Case 38
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Shares
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Shares in Z
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors
51%
20% direct, 31% indirect
10% by one firm
8 of 10
|
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APPENDIX F
Table F.2: Correlation Between Independent Variables for Main Effects Model
Own Dir/Ind Disp Board
Own
Dir/Ind
Disp
Board
1.000
0.000 1.000
0.000 0.000 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
I
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APPENDIX G
Table G.3: F-test for Difference in Variance of Responses for Early and Late 
Respondents Partitioned by Country Sampled
Case Number
Australian Sample US Sample
n=91 
Std Dev
n=45 
Std Dev
F
Value8
1-Tail
p-Value
n=73 
Std Dev
n=37
Std Dev
F
Value8
1-Tail 
p-Value
1 2.17 2.44 1.27 0.337 1.69 2.02 1.42 0.206
2 2.92 3.09 1.12 0.644 2.00 2.41 1.45 0.182
3 3.57 3.72 1.09 0.723 3.63 3.51 1.06 0.855
4 3.31 3.62 1.19 0.475 3.50 3.47 1.02 0.977
5 2.69 2.78 1.07 0.785 3.14 2.84 1.22 0.523
6 3.16 3.42 1.17 0.532 3.11 3.04 1.04 0.911
7 1.86 1.81 1.06 0.854 2.04 2.21 1.18 0.546
8 3.54 3.37 1.11 0.726 3.64 3.27 1.24 0.477
9 1.10 1.89 2.93 0.000 1.49 1.72 1.33 0.298
10 1.56 1.11 1.99 0.013 0.86 1.63 3.54 0.000
11 3.12 2.60 1.44 0.179 3.34 3.22 1.07 0.830
12 2.16 1.91 1.28 0.372 2.56 2.30 1.23 0.497
13 1.75 2.07 1.40 0.179 2.59 2.26 1.31 0.372
14 3.55 3.46 1.05 0.864 3.54 3.27 1.17 0.617
15 2.64 2.23 1.41 0.212 2.71 2.93 1.16 0.579
16 0.21 0.15 1.98 0.014 0.39 0.16 5.72 0.000
17 3.32 3.01 1.22 0.466 2.61 3.07 1.38 0.244
18 1.70 1.94 1.29 0.303 2.62 2.24 1.36 0.309
19 3.49 3.23 1.17 0.576 2.89 3.09 1.14 0.625
20 3.26 3.43 1.10 0.681 3.49 3.13 1.25 0.473
21 2.98 3.23 1.18 0.510 3.12 3.08 1.03 0.944
22 1.75 1.34 1.71 0.050 2.76 2.32 1.42 0.246
23 1.19 0.81 2.14 0.006 0.54 0.56 1.07 0.794
24 1.47 1.08 1.85 0.026 1.12 1.13 1.02 0.908
25 3.17 3.13 1.02 0.952 3.29 3.22 1.05 0.904
26 3.30 3.45 1.09 0.716 3.26 3.40 1.09 0.745
27 3.11 3.19 1.05 0.819 3.34 3.23 1.07 0.842
28 2.04 2.38 1.37 0.213 1.50 1.32 1.30 0.397
29 2.42 2.85 1.39 0.189 2.86 2.74 1.09 0.787
30 0.54 0.54 1.00 1.000 0.61 1.24 4.08 0.000
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Table G.3: Continued
Australian Samp e US Sample
Case Number n=91 n=45 F 1-Tail n=73 n=37 F 1-Tail
Std Dev Std Dev Value® p-Value Std Dev Std Dev Value® p-Value
31 3.08 3.19 1.08 0.750 3.08 3.15 1.05 0.853
32 1.81 2.65 2.15 0.002 2.35 2.72 1.34 0.295
33 1.97 1.75 1.27 0.390 2.04 1.56 1.72 0.075
34 3.15 3.28 1.08 0.736 3.30 2.53 1.70 0.084
35 1.69 2.01 1.42 0.166 1.90 1.67 1.30 0.394
36 1.56 1.57 1.02 0.917 2.68 2.39 1.26 0.455
37 1.06 1.53 2.08 0.003 2.02 1.97 1.05 0.886
38 0.55 0.57 1.06 0.806 1.54 1.07 2.08 0.017
Self Ratings
A Complexity 1.12 1.20 1.15 0.572 1.12 1.15 1.06 0.826
B Dispersion 1.10 0.97 1.29 0.352 1.07 1.10 1.05 0.828
C Own 1.15 0.78 2.17 0.005 1.08 0.90 1.44 0.235
D Control 0.86 0.81 1.13 0.665 1.02 0.90 1.28 0.419
E Board 0.96 1.00 1.07 0.780 0.89 1.13 1.62 0.085
a F-statistic to test H0: 02Early = <J2Late
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APPENDIX H
This appendix provides additional evidence on the reliability of the responses. It 
compares the responses to case pairs located in the two extreme board membership 
columns and responses to pairs of cases in the two extreme ownership rows. One 
would expect the responses to pairs of 'dissimilar' cases (A,B) to be low or negative if 
respondents make consistent evaluations. All the pairwise correlations between cases 
'dissimilar' in ownership (level 1 vs level 6), reported in Table H.4, are significantly less 
than p = 0.5. Similarly the correlations reported in Table H.5 between cases, 
'dissimilar' in board membership (level 1 vs level 4), are all significantly less than the 
defined 'population' level of 0.5. The low correlations for responses to pairs of 
'dissimilar' cases supports the conclusion that respondents were consistent in their case 
ratings.
Table H.4: Reliability of Input Judgements: Correlation Between Case 
Pairs (A,B) Dissimilar in Ownership (Level 1 vs Level 6)
Case A Case B r a
z-Value b 
Ho: p = 0.5
2-Tail
p-Value
32 6 -0.036 -9.12 <0.001
23 6 0.104 -6.93 <0.001
10 33 -0.007 -8.68 <0.001
7 33 0.053 -7.74 <0.001
10 1 0.104 -6.93 <0.001
7 1 0.140 -6.36 <0.001
25 30 0.124 -6.62 <0.001
17 30 0.105 -6.92 <0.001
19 16 -0.061 -9.51 <0.001
27 16 -0.006 -8.65 <0.001
^ b See footnotes to Table 4.4 for explanation.
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Table H.5: Reliability of Input Judgements: Correlation Between Case 
Pairs (A,B) Dissimilar in Board Membership (Level I vs Level 4)
Case A Case B r a
z-Value b 
Ho: p = 0.5
2-Tail
p-Value
23 27 0.117 -6.74 <0.001
23 19 0.142 -6.34 <0.001
32 27 0.286 -3.98 <0.001
32 19 0.012 -8.38 <0.001
29 15 0.305 -3.65 <0.001
29 5 0.232 -4.88 <0.001
24 15 0.157 -6.09 <0.001
24 5 0.112 -6.81 <0.001
35 15 0.245 -4.67 <0.001
35 5 0.203 -5.36 <0.001
34 13 0.261 -4.39 <0.001
34 37 0.263 -4.36 <0.001
3 13 0.220 -5.08 <0.001
3 37 0.345 -2.96 0.003
14 18 0.233 -4.87 <0.001
2 38 0.128 -6.55 <0.001
6 16 -0.131 -10.61 <0.001
a’ b See footnotes to Table 4.4 for explanation.
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APPENDIX I
'
Table 1.6: Estimated Parameters for the Raw (Unadjusted and 
Unstandardised) Input Data
Independent
Variable
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile B-*"j,m
(t-Value)b
1-Tail 
p-Value
A
Constant (>90) -9.506 -7.834 -5.422 -7.330
(-42.07) <0.001
Own (/?,) 9.702 12.489 15.844 12.731
{MIT) <0.001
Dir/Ind (^2) -0.264 0.337 1.226 0.610
(7.15) <0.001
Disp (^3) -5.875 -1.938 0.625 -2.448
(-7.66) <0.001
Board (^4) 3.516 6.281 9.547 6.868
(26.16) <0.001
Correlations41 
Estimation 
Sample r
0.804 0.849 0.888 0.840 <0.001
Holdout 
Sample r
0.820 0.887 0.930 0.857 <0.001
a R2 for the average model is 0.4877. 
b t-test for H0: fy- = 0, df = 32-5=27.
c Estimation sample correlation for the average model is 0.6984.
i I
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Table 1.7: Estimated Parameters for the Adjusted 
(but Unstandardised) Input Data
Independent
Variable
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 8-a
(t-Value)b
1-Tail 
p-Value
A
Constant (/?0) -8.391 -6.897 -4.803 -6.488
(-42.50) <0.001
Own 0?!) 8.590 11.237 13.792 11.296
(43.27) <0.001
Dir/Ind (y?2) -0.240 0.325 1.142 0.545
(7.33) <0.001
Disp (^3) -5.438 -1.875 0.594 -2.256
(-8.14) <0.001
Board 3.131 5.656 8.438 6.066
(26.40) <0.001
Correlations0
Estimation 
Sample r
0.812 0.856 0.894 0.847 <0.001
Holdout 
Sample r
0.827 0.894 0.936 0.864 <0.001
a R2 for the average model is 0.4967. 
b t-test for H0: fy- = 0, df = 32-5=27.
c Estimation sample correlation for the average model is 0.7048.
il *
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APPENDIX J
Bartlett's (1937) test for homogeneity of variance was applied to the residuals 
for each individual model (as per Judge et al, 1985, pp. 447-449). The resulting x2 ~ 
493.3 (df = 245) is significant (p < 0.001). Pair-wise F-tests were conducted to 
explore the proportion of the sample exhibiting non-equal variances. The results, 
reported in Figure J.2 and Table J.8, show 7.7 per cent of the F-values are significant 
at the 2 per cent level (two tailed test). When the residuals for the 5, 10, and 15 
lowest and highest variance individual models are progressively trimmed from the data 
the distribution of F-Values converges on the expected distribution. Respectively 
4.65, 2.79 and 1.41 per cent of the F-Values are significant at the 2 per cent level (ie. a 
two tailed test) for the trimmed data set.
The poor fit (residual variance is perfectly negatively correlated with the 
explanatory power of the individual's model) of a few models largely drives the 
observed heterogeneous variance. Finally, although general F-testing is robust to a 
moderate violation of assumptions, as with the current data set, caution is exercised in 
the interpretation of hypothesis tests based on the pooled residuals for the M individual 
models.
II J
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Figure J.2: Distribution of F-Values for Pairwise Test of Homogeneous Variance
for Individual Model Residuals
(for n=246 there are [n x (n-l)/2] = 30135 pairwise comparisons)
Table J.8: Analysis of Significant F-Values for All Individual Models
and Trimmed Data Sets
Data in 'Observed' 
F-Distribution
Lower Critical3 
F-Value = 0.3975
Upper Critical3
F-Value = 2.525
#Sig. % Sig. # Sig. % Sig.
All Individual Models 1072 3.56% 1264 4.19%
Trimmed Data Sets
Top & Bottom 5 Models 679 2.45% 611 2.20%
Top & Bottom 10 Models 363 1.43% 346 1.36%
Top & Bottom 15 Models 163 0.70% 164 0.71%
a Critical values for a/2 = 0.01.
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APPENDIX K
K.l. OLS Regression Estimation
To estimate the control model for each respondent M individual OLS regression 
equations (m = 1, M, M = 246 in the current study) are of the following form can 
be estimated:
For /' = 1, ... , T (r = 32 in the current study), Yj is the T x 1 vector of 
judgements by individual m, Xj is a T x K matrix of observations on the independent 
variables (K = 5, the intercept and four independent variable), Py is a ^ x 1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated, and e, is a Tx 1 vector of disturbances. A total of M (ie. 
246) such models are estimated and statistical analysis is performed on the parameter 
estimates (ie. /(vector) and disturbances (ie. vector) for each of the A/models.
K.2. SUR Regression Estimation
Seeming unrelated regression (SUR, also known as Zellner's seemingly unrelated 
regression) is a technique to estimate the parameters for each of the M equations 
simultaneously (ie. the M individual /(vectors). Under certain conditions (see Judge et 
al, 1985, 1988; Dielman, 1989) SUR estimation will result in more efficient estimates 
than equation-by-equation OLS estimation. Hence SUR is particularly useful where 
the researcher is interested in the structure of the individual equations and does not 
want to constrain some or all the coefficients to be constant across the individual 
models. SUR estimation involves stacking the M dependent variable vectors (ie. the
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Y,) and regressing this on a large X matrix which has the M independent variable 
matrices (ie. the X^) on the diagonal and zero for all off-diagonal elements. 
Specifically the following system of equation is simultaneously estimated:
Y = X b +e
where:
'V 0 ... 0 '4/ ’ "
Y = x =
0 0
b = , and e = £,,2
_Yi,M _ 0 0 ••• PiM _
The b matrix is estimated via generalised least squares (GLS) which incorporates 
information about the nature of the covariance matrix. The SUR estimate for the /nth 
vector component of the b matrix of parameters is therefore superior to the M 
equation-by-equation OLS estimates for the m because it allows for any correlation 
between the £j m disturbance vectors, and because it uses information on explanatory 
variables in the system but excluded from the /nth equation (Judge et al, 1985, 1988; 
Dielman, 1989).
However, if either (1) the off-diagonal terms in the covariance matrix for the 
system of equations are zero (ie. a;y = 0 for / * j), or (2) the Xi m matrices span the 
same column space (ie. X^i= X^ j = ... = A^a/), then the SUR estimates for the 
components of b and the OLS estimates for individual m will be identical, and thus 
there is no gain in efficiency (Zellner, 1962; Dwivedi and Srivastava, 1978; Hirschey, 
1981; Judge et al, 1985, 1988; Dielman, 1989).
Therefore in the current study, where the independent variables are the same for 
each equation (ie. i= Ay 2 = ••• = there 15 no 8ain in employing SUR
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estimation and M equation-by-equation OLS estimations are performed. The issue of 
non-zero covariance of the disturbances is considered in the following section.
K.3. Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Estimation
Pooled cross-sectional regression is appropriate where one is interested in the 
population regression coefficients. This assumes that the M individual regression 
coefficients are drawn from a population with a common set of regression coefficients 
(ie. vector P). In this case the judgements of the A/individual can be pooled to obtain 
a more efficient estimator of P (Judge et al, 1985, 1988; Dielman, 1989). The 
equation system is now written as:
Y = Z P + e
where:
'V ' '
Y =
yU2
z = , and e = ^,2
.V Am. _SiM _
and P is a AT x 1 vector of coefficients to be estimated. Further the components 
of the disturbance vector e are assumed to be cross-sectionally homoskedastic (ie. have 
a constant variance, £(8,8,') = o2lj) and to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated (ie. off- 
diagonal terms in the covariance matrix are assumed to be zero, E(e,8,') = 0, i * j). If 
these assumptions are violated then the OLS estimates for the pooled cross-sectional 
model will be inefficient and incorporating information about the structure of the 
disturbances (eg. through a different estimation technique) will produce more efficient 
estimates for the coefficient vector p. Thus in pooled cross-section regression it is 
important to test for violation of these assumptions. If the disturbances are 
heterogeneous, as would seem reasonable for different individuals, then more efficient
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coefficients can be obtained from a GLS estimation weighting the M individual Yi and 
Xij matrices by a,-1. Contemporaneous correlation in the disturbances is possible if 
there are some common unmeasurable or omitted influences. Kmenta (1986) has 
suggested a GLS methodology that relaxes the assumptions of cross-sectional 
homogeneity and cross-sectional independence and estimates a pooled model allowing 
for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (also see White 
etal, 1990; Dielman, 1989).
Nevertheless, Judge et al (1985, p. 429) note that the relative efficiency of the 
estimated GLS parameters over OLS estimates declines as M increases. Hence where 
the violation of the assumptions about the covariance matrix is not severe, and M is 
large, as in the current study, GLS estimations might offer little gain in efficiency over 
the OLS estimation. A corollary is that the gains in model predictive ability, the key 
objective in the current study (Pedhazur, 1982, pp. 136-137), are likely to be small. 
The results reported in Table K.8 below for the different estimation techniques support 
these conclusions.
Table K.8: Estimation and Holdout Sample Predictive Ability of the OLS, GLS 
and Kmenta Pooled Cross-Sectional Models
Measure OLS GLSa Kmentab
Estimation Sample
Pearson's r 0.7636 0.7703 0.7898
z-Valuec -0.02 1.41 5.85
R2 0.5831 0.5933 0.6238d
Holdout Sample
Pearson's r 0.8173 0.8173 0.8172
z-Value 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
R2 0.6680 0.6679 0.6678
a The GLS model is an OLS estimation after weighting the M individual 7, and Xl} matrices by o; '.
b The Kmenta model is estimated as per Kmenta (1986, pp. 616-625) with p = 0 (ie. zero auto­
correlation).
c z-Value for Fisher Z-test for differences in the pooled and aggregate model correlations. 
d Buse R2 is for the Kmenta cross-sectional model (see Judge et al, 1985, pp. 477-478).
i i
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APPENDIX L
i
The analysis in this appendix identifies those respondents who exhibited low 
holdout predictive ability, defined as 0.00 < r < 0.50, for either their /wth individual 
model or the aggregate model. Figure L.2 plots for the M respondents the Pearson 
correlations between their holdout evaluations and the predicted control from both 
their individual model and the aggregate model. The data are sorted by the correlation 
for the aggregate model. There are three cases where the correlation for the aggregate 
model only is less than 0.50, two cases where the mth individual model's correlation is 
less than 0.50, and two cases where both correlations are less than 0.50.
i
Figure L.3: Plot of Holdout Sample Pearson Correlations for Predictions by the 
M Individual Models and Aggregate Model
!
I
Ik
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These seven respondents were deleted from the data set and the aggregate model 
re-estimated. The new model for the reduced data set is reported in Table L.8. The 
parameters in the new model are essentially the same as that estimated for the whole 
data set (see Table 4.5). Further the new aggregate model does not exhibit 
significantly greater explanation power than the old aggregate model (after adjusting 
for the deleted cases) for either the estimation sample (r for new model = 0.7662, r old 
model for reduced data set = 0.7663) or for the holdout sample (r for new model = 
0.8308, r old model for reduced data set = 0.8309).
Table L.9: Parameter Estimates for New Aggregate Model
Independent
Variable
A uB - a’b"j,m t-Value
Pj,m = 0
1-Tail
p-Value
A
Constant QJq) -2.339 -82.03 <0.001
Own OSj) 3.662 48.87 <0.001
Dir/Ind (J}2) 0.197 8.20 <0.001
Disp ($j) -0.823 -8.86 <0.001
Board (JtJ 1.980 29.17 <0.001
A
a Mean fi] for the M individual models signified by the ' subscript. 
For the aggregate model R2 = 0.5871, and Adjusted R2 = 0.5870.b
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APPENDIX M
Figure M.4: Comparison of Pearson Correlation Coefficient Distributions for 
M Individual (OLS) Models and M Self-Explicated Models
(Sorted by Correlations for the Self-Explicated Model, n=246)a
Observations Sorted By Correlation for Self-Explicated Model
Correlation for estimation sample only.
BOND UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY
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APPENDIX N
Figure N.5: Comparison of Pearson Correlation Coefficient Distributions for 
M Individual (OLS) Models and Af Unit Weight Models
(Sorted by Correlations for the Unit Weight Model, n=246)a
Observations Sorted By Correlation for Unit Weight Model
Correlation for estimation sample only.
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Figure N.6: Comparison of Pearson Correlation Coefficient Distributions for 
M Individual (OLS) Models and M Ownership Models
(Sorted by Correlations for the Ownership Model, n=246)a
a Correlation for estimation sample only.
i
i
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APPENDIX O
The assumptions underlying the OLS model require interval rather than ordinal 
level measurement of the dependent variable. When OLS is applied to ordinal level 
data in a limited dependent variable model, the assumptions about the behaviour of the 
residuals are no longer satisfied. Specifically, the disturbances: (1) will not have 
expected value of zero (ie. E(s/) * 0); (2) will not be normally distributed but rather 
have a discrete distribution; and (3) will not be homoskedastic (ie. £(8/8/') * cr2). 
Consequently the OLS parameters estimates are not fully efficient, the usual tests for 
significance for the estimated parameters no longer apply (unless the explanatory 
variables have a multivariate normal distribution), estimated standard errors are not 
consistent, and the summary measure R2 is no longer meaningful. Further, the 
predicted values for the dependent variable can lie outside the range of ordered 
responses making application of the model difficult (Goldberger, 1964; McKelvey and 
Zavoina, 1975; Judge ef a/, 1985, 1988; Maddala, 1983; Johnston 1984).
The severity of the theoretical violations for OLS, however, decrease as the 
number of categories is expanded, such as for the transformed ten point scale in the 
current study (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981). Also research suggests that OLS may 
be more efficient than limited dependent variable techniques where the sample sizes are 
small; which is typically the case for accounting research (McFadden, 1973; McKelvey 
and Zavoina, 1975; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1984; Gessner et al, 1988; Noreen, 
1988; Hosmer and Lemeshaw, 1989). Stone and Rasp (1991) argue, however, that 
much of the bias in the logit test statistic is attributable to the skewness of the 
accounting predictor variables, which also affects the OLS test statistics. In such cases 
OLS statistics are only marginally better calibrated than the logit statistics.
II i
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In the current study the predictor variables are not pure accounting variables and 
are not skewed. The OLS test statistics are therefore likely to be superior to those for 
logit and probit estimation. In any event, basing hypothesis testing on randomization 
procedures could be used to overcome this problem (Noreen, 1989). Such procedures 
permit logit and probit analysis to be employed for small samples, provided the 
samples are sufficiently large to allow convergence of the estimation routine.
The body of conjoint research in marketing has also addressed the issue of OLS 
versus limited dependent variable models. Jain, Acito, Malhotra and Mahajan (1979) 
provide evidence that OLS and logit models achieve similar levels of predictive 
performance for binary evaluations of full profile stimuli. Huber and Moore (1979) 
find little difference in performance between logit and either interval dependent 
variable pooled regression or average (OLS) models. Similarly, Winzar and Merely 
(1989) find little difference in the substantive results between probit and OLS 
estimated functions. However, Gensch and Recker (1979) find that ordered logit 
might outperform the OLS linear probability model in terms of predictive ability for 
estimating consumer choice models. It is therefore unclear which estimation technique 
might perform better for the current data set.
Table 0.10 reports the results for linear probability models (OLS and Kmenta), 
logit and probit models, and an ordered probit model. The coefficients for the binary 
logit and probit models are not directly comparable to the other models and must be 
transformed as per the footnotes to Table 0.10. The transformed parameter estimates 
for the logit model (/?„' = -0.93, = 2.42, p2' = 0.17, p2 - -0.69, p4' = 1.43) and
the probit model (pj = -0.83, p4 = 2.26, p2' = 0.17, p2 = -0.64, p4 = 1.32) are 
virtually the same as for the linear probability models and not too dissimilar from those 
of the ordered probit. All models are significant and all the parameters for all models 
are significant. The explanatory power (ie. R2) of the respective models is comparable 
allowing for the different computational methods.
II
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Table 0.10: Parameter Estimates for Linear Probability, Logit, 
Probit and Ordered Probit Models
Independent 
Variable a,b
OLS
Linear Prob
Kmenta 
Linear Prob
Logit Probit Ordered
Probit
A
Pj
(t-Value)
A
Pj
(t-Vaiue)
A
Pi
(t-Value)
A J
Pf
(t-Value)
A
Pj
(t-Value)
A
Constant (/?0) -1.68 -1.71 -5.71 -3.33 -1.59
/—
V l L/
i O (-52.69) (-38.39) (-41.17) (-31.54)
Own (/?,) 2.87 2.96 9.67 5.64 5.42
(55.42) (58.90) (41.02) (44.25) (63.38)
Dir/Ind (y92) 0.13 0.12 0.69 0.43 0.40
(5.38) (5.05) (8.60) (8.97) (11.77)
Disp A) -0.39 -0.35 -2.74 -1.61 -1.76
(-4.95) (-4.62) (-9.79) (-10.01) (-16.05)
Board (£4) 1.60 1.64 5.72 3.29 2.93
(41.27) (43.53) (34.21) (36.55) (49.36)
F-Value 
-2 Ln X 
Significance
R2
1073.6
p <0.001
0.3803
1234.6
p< 0.001
0.3478f
3766.6
p< 0.001
0.38038
3775.5
p <0.001
0.38108
5921.6
p <0.001
0.52878
See Table 4.5 for parameter distribution for A/individual models and aggregate model 
(interval dependent variable).
b See Table 5.1 for parameters for pooled cross-sectional OLS and Kmenta interval 
dependent variable models.
c Logit parameter x 0.25 (+ 0.5 for constant) = OLS and Kmenta linear probability parameter 
(Maddala, 1983, p. 23).
d Probit parameter x 0.40 (+ 0.5 for constant) = OLS and Kmenta linear probability 
parameter (Maddala, 1983, p. 23).
e All t-statistics are significant at p < 0.001.
f Buse R2 (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 477-478).
8 Maddala R2 (Maddala, 1983, p. 39).
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APPENDIX P
Table P.ll: Correlation Between Independent Variables for 
Ideal and Quadratic Models
Own Dir/Ind Disp Board Own2 Dir/Ind2 Disp2 Board2
Own 1.000
Dir/Ind 0.000 1.000
Disp 0.000 0.000 1.000
Board 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Own2 0.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Dir/Ind2 0.000 0.949 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Disp2 0.000 0.000 0.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Board2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
= an:p = 0, Significant at
ooVa
Table P.12: Quartiles for Parameter Estimates for M Individual 
Ideal Point and Quadratic Models
Independent
Variable
Ideal Point Model Quadratic Model
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
A
Constant (fi0) -3.212 -2.633 -2.186 -1.558 -1.366 -1.132
Own 09j) 1.444 4.443 8.642 - - -
Dir/Ind (/?2) -0.230 0.062 0.581 - - -
Disp ($3) -2.161 -0.277 1.084 - - -
Board (/?4) 0.419 2.429 4.552 - - -
Own2 A') -5.897 -1.659 2.324 3.748 4.775 5.765
Dir/Ind2 -0.456 0.035 0.461 -0.066 0.097 0.364
Disp2 A') -5.217 -0.872 3.758 -5.968 -2.081 0.619
Board2 (/V) -1.924 -0.600 0.927 1.143 1.912 2.591
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Table Q.13: Correlation Between Independent Variables for 
Two-Way Interaction Model
Own Dir/Ind Disp Board Own * Dir/Ind
Own
*Disp
Own
*Board
Dir/Ind
*Disp
Dir/Ind
*Board
Disp
*Board
Own 1.000
Dir/Ind 0.000 1.000
Disp 0.000 0.000 1.000
Board 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Own*Dir/Ind 0.493 0.794 0.017 0.034 1.000
Own*Disp 0.481 0.017 0.801 -0.073 0.192 1.000
Own*Board 0.674 0.029 -0.061 0.674 0.405 0.200 1.000
Dir/Ind*Disp 0.022 0,617 0.638 0.000 0.512 0.532 -0.006 1.000
Dir/Ind*Board 0.034 0.794 0.000 0.493 0.665 -0.006 0.378 0.490 1.000
Disp*Board -0.073 0.000 0.801 0.480 -0.006 0.571 0.226 0.511 0.186 1.000
= 0, Significant at p < 0.01
Figure Q.7: Distribution of F-Values for Incremental Explanatory Power of Six 
Single Two-Way Interaction Models in the Estimation Sample
Fa = 0.01, 1,26 = 7.721, n = 246.
% F-Values Significant: Model 1 = 1.22% 
Model 2 = 10.16% 
Model 3 = 20.33%
Model 4 = 3.66% 
Model 5 = 0.81% 
Model 6 = 0.81%
fa
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Figure Q.8: Distribution of F-Values for Incremental Explanatory Power of 
Combined Two-Way Interaction Model in the Estimation Sample
= o.oi, 6,21 3.812, n 246.
% F-Values Significant: • Combined Model = 19.51%
Figure Q.9: Distribution of F-Values for Difference in Holdout Sample Errors for 
M Individual Models and the Interaction Models
Fa = 0.99,6,6 OHS, n 246; 
% F-Values Significant: •
= 0.01,6,6 8.466, n 246.
Model 1 = 0.0%
Model 2 = 0.0% •
Model 3 = 0.0% •
Model 4 = 0.0%
Model 5 = 0.0%
Model 6 = 0.0% 
Combined Model = 0.0%
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APPENDIX R
To plot the cluster structure, canonical variates were estimated to summarise the 
M individual parameter vectors. The canonical correlation between the cluster 
structure and the first two canonical variates were significant (p < 0.001) suggesting 
that these canonical variates provide a reasonable two dimensional summary of the 
multi-dimensional parameter space. Klecka (1980) suggests that the first two 
canonical functions are usually the most powerful discriminators. Hence a plot based 
on just these two functions is usually sufficient to represent the cluster structure. 
Notably the canonical correlation for the third canonical variate was insignificant at the 
0.01 level.
Figure R. 10 plots the cluster membership in the two canonical variate space (see 
Appendix S, Figures S.ll and S.12 for the plots of the 3 and 5 cluster structures 
within the respective two dimensional canonical space for the clusters). At best the 
cluster pattern in Figure R.10 represents fuzzy clouds of similar respondents. The 
clusters are not disjoint but represent different portions of a non-symmetrical cloud of 
respondents. This allows only cautious statements to be proffered about possible 
differences between the clusters.
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Figure R.10: Plot of 4 Cluster Structure in Canonical Space 
(Canonical Variate 2 * Canonical Variate 1 - Symbol is Cluster Number)
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APPENDIX S
Figure S.ll: Plot of 3 Cluster Structure in Canonical Space 
(Canonical Variate 2 * Canonical Variate 1 - Symbol is Cluster Number)
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Figure S.12: Plot of 5 Cluster Structure in Canonical Space 
(Canonical Variate 2 * Canonical Variate 1 - Symbol is Cluster Number)
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APPENDIX T
Table T.14: Cluster Profile for 3 Cluster Solution
Cluster Number and Title
Coefficient One
'Board'
Two
'Own/Board'
Three 
'Own/Disp'
r2 a
A
Constant (j^q) -2.54
(0.32)
-2.68
(0.28)
-2.06
(0.41)
0.358
Own (ft) 2.47
(0.90)
4.20
(0.74)
4.28
(0.71)
0.537
Dir/Ind (/?2) 0.22
(0.38)
0.07
(0.24)
0.22
(0.43)
0.022
Disp 0?3) -0.25
(0.89)
0.79
(0.83)
-1.78
(1.14)
0.504
Board (Z^) 3.07
(0.57)
1.91
(0.71)
1.23
(0.70)
0.607
Frequency 81 45 120 n = 246
a R2 is the explanatory power of the cluster structure to predict each of the input coefficients. 
b Mean input coefficient (Std.Dev.) for the cluster.
217
Table T.15: Cluster Profile for 5 Cluster Solution
Cluster Number and Title
Coefficient One
'Board'
Two
'OwwDisp'
Three
'Own'
Four
'Board/Own'
Five
'Own/Disp'
r2 a
A
Constant (/?0) -2.48
(0.25)
-1.77
(0.41)
-2.31
(0.30)
-2.67
(0.31)
-2.82
(0.25)
0.501
Own 0?j) 1.75
(0.72)
3.84
(0.77)
4.55
(0.59)
3.20
(0.63)
4.10
(0.71)
0.672
Dir/Ind (/?2) 0.30
(0.35)
0.33
(0.51)
0.11
(0.32)
0.14
(0.35)
0.16
(0.26)
0.060
Disp ($3) -0.45
(0.70)
-2.91
(0.64)
-0.75
(0.81)
0.31
(0.79)
2.08
(1.07)
0.718
Board 3.47
(0.49)
1.20
(0.79)
1.33
(0.66)
2.71
(0.44)
1.78
(0.63)
0.660
Frequency 35 50 94 60 7 n = 246
a R2 is the explanatory power of the cluster structure to predict each of the input coefficients.
b Mean input coefficient (Std.Dev.) for the cluster.
218
APPENDIX U
U.l. Identification of Culture Specific Clusters
This appendix reports the cluster identification and profile for the country 
specific clusters. Figure U.13 plots the unexplained variance (1-R2) for the 1 to 15- 
means cluster solutions for the US and Australian sub-samples. The plot suggests that 
there are probably three or four clusters for both the data sets. A four cluster solution 
was chosen for further analysis, consistent with the pooled cluster analysis.
Figure U.13: Plot of Unexplained Variance Against Number 
of Clusters for US and Australian Sub-Samples
Canonical variates were estimated for each sub-sample. For each sample, the 
canonical correlation between the cluster structure and the first two canonical variates 
was significant (p < 0.001). Figures U.14 and U. 15 plot the cluster membership for 
the US and Australian sub-samples in the space of the first two canonical variates.
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Figure U.14: Plot of 4 Cluster Structure in Canonical Space 
for the US Sub-Sample
(Canonical Variate 2 * Canonical Variate 1 - Symbol is Cluster Number)
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Figure U.15: Plot of 4 Cluster Structure in Canonical Space 
for the Australian Sub-Sample
(Canonical Variate 2 * Canonical Variate 1 - Symbol is Cluster Number)
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U.2.Profile of Culture Specific Models
The estimated cluster structures for both countries are not disjoint and the 
cluster structures represent different portions of the respective non-symmetrical clouds 
of respondents. Tables U. 16 and U. 17 respectively profile the clusters for the US and 
Australian sub-samples.
Clusters two and three for the US sub-sample represent the 'ownership- 
dispersion' and 'ownership-board' respondents. Cluster one represents those 
respondents placing greater weight on board membership. While cluster four 
respondents place more weight on ownership control attributes.
Table U.16: Cluster Profile for US 4 Cluster Solution
Coefficient
Cluster Number and Title
r2 aOne
'Board'
Two
'Own/Disp'
Three
'Own/Board'
Four
'Own'
A
Constant (/?0) -2.46b -1.62 -2.62 -2.27 0.589
(0.29) (0.39) (0.26) (0.30)
Own (^j) 1.83 3.74 3.76 4.58 0.603
(0.64) (0.86) (0.59) (0.55)
Dir/Ind (/?2) 0.34 0.33 0.12 0.21 0.054
(0.41) (0.46) (0.29) (0.39)
Disp (/?3) -0.34 -3.12 -0.08 -0.89 0.613
(0.99) (0.70) (0.89) (0.95)
Board (/?4) 3.29 1.02 2.33 1.15 0.615
(0.50) (0.87) (0.53) (0.57)
Frequency
Percentage
11
10.0%
21
19.1%
39
35.5%
39
35.5%
n= 110
a R2 is the explanatory power of the cluster structure to predict each of the input coefficients.
b Mean input coefficient (Std.Dev.) for the cluster.
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For the Australian sample cluster one and four respectively represent the 
'ownership-board' and 'ownership-dispersion' respondents (see Table U.17). Cluster 
three contains those respondents placing greater weight on 'ownership' control 
attributes while cluster three type respondents weight ownership, dispersion and board 
membership in their judgements.
Table U.17: Cluster Profile for Australian 4 Cluster Solution
Coefficient
Cluster Number and Title
r2 aOne
'Own/Board
Two
'Own'
Three
'Own/
Board/Disp'
Four
'Own/Disp'
A
Constant (/?0) -2.56b -2.29 -2.99 -2.01 0.354
(0.33) (0.36) (0.12) (0.41)
Own {Pi) 2.30 4.69 3.86 3.16 0.690
(0.86) (0.54) (0.58) (0.61)
Dir/Ind (/?2) 0.17 0.05 0.31 0.32 0.075
(0.37) (0.31) (0.22) (0.50)
Disp (/y 0.12 -0.68 1.94 -2.52 0.677
(0.84) (0.78) (1.18) (0.80)
Board 3.19 1.22 2.19 1.63 0.650
(0.58) (0.68) (0.54) (0.74)
Frequency
Percentage
52
38.2%
45
33.1%
7
5.1%
32
23.5%
n= 136
a R2 is the explanatory power of the cluster structure to predict each of the input coefficients.
b Mean input coefficient (Std.Dev.) for the cluster.
